' Prof. Gerald Steinberg
European Security and the Middle East Peace Process: Lessons from the OSCE

Mediterranean Quarterly, February 1996

I. Overview: Europe and the Middle East

A number of European institutions, including the OSCE, the European Union, and NATO have recently launched Middle East initiatives. There are diverse objectives and motivations for these programs, but in general, they reflect the realization that the security and stability of Europe is linked to events in the Middle East. The analysis of security relations between Europe hinges on the definition of each of the three factors involved in this subject; the definition of the Middle East in terms of security, the differences between different areas, interests, and levels within the new and greatly expanded Europe with respect to the security issues; and the nature of security itself.

In their Middle East dialogues, the OSCE, NATO and the European Union have focused on a limited number of Mediterranean states.0 However, in dealing with security issues, terrorism, confidence building, economic security, and conflict amelioration, these states do not constitute an independent region. For the past fifty years, the sources of instability in the region have extended far beyond the narrow confines of the Mediterranean.

In analyzing the European security interests in this region, it is necessary to examine the wider Mediterranean Basin and Middle East, including the Caucuses, the Arab-Israeli conflict zone, with all of its participants and complexities, as well as the overlapping Persian Gulf.1 There are many overlapping and interwoven conflicts and conflict zones in this area, all contributing to war and terrorism. As a result, efforts to establish Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs), and, ultimately, regional security and stability, require the participation of all the actors.

The Mediterranean states, however, can serve as a sub-region for the beginning of a Helsinki-type process, including develop ment of social and cultural communication, greater understanding, and normalization. These activities would involve links between the states themselves, and between the Mediterranean states and Europe. The OSCE has developed models of cooperation and cooperative security, despite the high level of heterogeneity among the member states, and their different security interests. The OSCE can provide assistance in the incremental, step-by-step introduction of CSBMs among the Mediterranean states, and, on this basis, these measures can later be extended to the broader Middle East. Such measures include the creation of crisis prevention centers (CPC), exchange of information and pre-notif ication of military exercises, cooperative monitoring centers (CMC) and the prevention of incidents at sea. These options will be discussed in detail in Section Four of this paper.

We now turn to the second element, the definition of European security interests in the region. Europe has undergone many changes in the past decade, but there are still important differences between individual states and regions. NATO continues to exist and play a central security function, while other organizations, such as the Western European Union, and the OSCE have also developed specific interests and identities. While central Europe and Turkey have focused on the Eastern Mediterranean basin and the Caucuses, Southern European security concerns focus on North Africa. In addition, relations with Russia and between the elements of the Former Soviet Union (FSU) are still far from settled. Thus, a great deal of caution must be exercised in referring to European interests and policies, particularly with respect to security related issues and the Middle East. 2. Links Between War, Peace, and Stability in Europe and the Middle East

The concepts and elements of security are defined different ly for various purposes, periods and conditions. As was the case in the Helsinki process and the development of the CSCE, the definition includes economic security, political stability and more immediate military security.

The nature of the relationship between Europe and the Middle East varies across each of these elements, (and, as noted above, is also a function of different sub-regions within Europe.) In general, there is a high degree of interdependence in the economic sphere, particularly with respect to petroleum reserves. During the past 50 years, European economic and military security has been closely linked to Middle Eastern oil, and the European powers have become involved in the region in order to insure this access. As was demonstrated in the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars, as well as both Gulf conflicts, instability and military conflict in the region can disrupt oil supplies to Europe. The threat of such disruptions has clearly had an impact on the policies of European states. Although the level of dependency on Middle East oil has declined somewhat in the past decade, with the development of North Sea and other alternative sources, Europe continues to have a major interest in maintaining access to these sources. Most recently, this linkage led to the participation of many European states in the response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990.

In considering the military dimension of security, the links between Europe and the Middle East are less direct. From the post- colonial period of the late 1940s and through the 1956 Suez war, the major European powers (Britain, France, and the Soviet Union), maintained military bases and alliances with a number of states in the region and were major actors. By the mid-1960s, the direct involvement of Western European powers in the Middle East had declined significantly. They were replaced by the US and Soviet Union, and the Cold War interests and conflicts in the Middle East continued through the mid-1980s. On a number of occasions, the Soviet Union stationed forces in the region, and in 1973, the United States placed its nuclear forces on alert following reports of an imminent decision by the Soviet Union to deploy troops to intervene. In contrast, the military conflicts of the region had a lesser impact on either Western or Eastern Europe.

However, the potential for spill-over of military conflicts from the Middle East into Europe has increased with the proliferation of long- range delivery systems and weapons of mass destruction (including massive stockpiles of advanced conventional weapons). Southern Europe is in close proximity to the Middle East, and states that acquire medium (500 to 1500 km) or long-range ballistic missiles (1500 to 2000 km) or combat aircraft will have the capability of striking targets in Europe. Many of these states already have significant arsenals of chemical weapons, and are seeking access to biological and nuclear weapons. Military planners have begun to consider the implications of these capabilities, and the potential for direct involvement of Europe in Middle Eastern conflict scenarios.2

The security of Europe is also effected by domestic social and political instability, as well as political and religious radicalism in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. This instability leads to conflict, which creates large movements of refugees, and also contributes to terrorist actions in Europe. The level of terrorism in Europe has been increasing, in large part due to the spill-over effects of domestic political and social instability in North Africa and the Middle East.

Thus, the emphasis in the pattern of interaction between Europe and the Middle East is changing. For the past two decades, direct linkages have been largely economic, centering around oil (and arms sales, as will be discussed in greater detail below), while military interactions have been indirect. Now, however, domestic social and political instability and new deployments of weapons in the Middle East are having direct effects on European security interests. 3. Regional Security and the Peace Process

As a result of these factors, and well as the close proximi ty, European security is increasingly associated with the level of stability and the resolution of the conflicts in the Middle East (not only Mediterranean states). It follows that European interests are also closely linked to the Middle East peace process, as symbolized by the 1991 Madrid Conference. A successful peace process and reconciliation between Israel and the Arab states will increase stability in the region, weaken the infrastructure that supports radicalism and terror, and reduce the threats from the military conflict. This was explicitly recognized in the OSCEs summit in Budapest in December 1994, in which the participants welcomed progress towards peace in the Middle East and its positive implications for European security.

The Middle East peace process has made notable advances since President Sadat's decision to go to Jerusalem in 1977. Despite some significant limitations, the Egyptian-Israeli peace agreement has been effective for over 15 years, establishing the essential basis for stability in the entire Middle East. Egypt continues to be the major power in the Arab world and the role of Cairo in building bridges and leading the movement from confron tation to cooperation is critical.

The 1993 Oslo agreement and the mutual recognition between Israel and the PLO started a fragile and tentative process to end this dimension of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Bilateral negotiations between Israel and Syria, although currently stalled, could potentially lead to normalization and to agreements that extend to Lebanon as well.

The 1994 Peace Treaty between Israel and Jordan is also a major milestone towards enhancing stability in the region. Jordan has joined Egypt in formally ending the state of war with Israel and in acknowledging the legitimacy of the Jewish state in the Middle East. Direct links between these states will provide the basis for increased communication and cooperation, thereby reducing the dangers of conflict and violence. European support for measures that cement these ties will also enhance regional security.

The Middle East Version of the CSCE: The Arms Control and Regional Security Working Group

The Madrid process established a framework of multinational negotiations in five areas that involve the interests of all the states in the region. One of these working groups focuses on arms control and regional security (ACRS).

The ACRS negotiations have continued for three years, focusing on a variety of issues, including national assessments of security threats, visionary goals and long-term objectives for the future of regional security, and the implementation of confidence and security-building measures (CSBMs). The process incorporates formal plenaries as well as intersessional activi ties in a number of areas. Many of the states participate in these activities on a voluntary basis, allowing the more advanced parties to increase the pace of the transition from conflict to cooperation, while not subjecting this process to the veto of the most reluctant participants.3

The ACRS is central to confidence building, the development of a regional security system, and increased stability in the Middle East. It is the only multilateral forum that exists in which all the states, including Israel, are able to exchange views and perceptions on security and sources of instability. This process also includes many states in the region that have played an important role in the Arab-Israeli conflict, but are not directly involved in the bilateral negotiations and have not established diplomatic relations or other channels of communica tion with Israel. Thus, in this sense, the ACRS plays a role similar to that of the CSCE in the 1970s and 1980s, and reflects many of the lessons learned in the development of the CSCE structure.4

To draw the proper lessons from the CSCE experience in Europe in the case of the Middle East, it is important to note both the similarities and differences between the conditions and regions. The CSCE process began in 1972, as a forum for dialogue and debate between the NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Although this was a period of relative détente, and coincided with US-Soviet summit meetings and the ABM/SALT I arms control treaties, the Cold War was still quite intense, and within a short period, détente was replaced by increased tensions. Relations were characterized by sharp conflict over deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, human rights in the Soviet Union, and political repression in Eastern Europe. The meetings in Helsinki (1975), Belgrade (1977) and Madrid (1983) were marked by debate and conflict between East and West.5

However, under pressure from the neutral and non-aligned states, as well as political groups within Western Europe, the process survived, and discussions continued. The CSCE forum provided a framework for the continuation of communications, amidst rising conflict, and for the gradual transition from confrontation to cooperation.

In this sense, the conditions in the Middle East, and the mix of both dialogue and conflict, are similar to those that existed in this early period of the CSCE. The ACRS working group, the peace treaties involving Israel, Egypt, and Jordan, and the agreements with the PLO have created an infrastructure for discussion and negotiation, but major differences and the potential for conflict and war remains. The relations between Israel and Syria continue to be tense, and deployment of new weapons is unabated. The language of hatred and intolerance for different ethnic, national, and religious groups is still heard frequently throughout the region. Terrorism is still tolerated and even supported by some regimes, and the number of casualties from acts of terror directed against civilians has increased in the past year.

Like the CSCE, the ACRS is a vital forum that allows former and current enemies to exchange views and information in the effort to prevent accidental war and the escalation of conflict. The CSCE also established the important precedent of linking military security, economic cooperation, and human rights. From the beginning, all three sets of issues (known as Baskets I, II and III) were central to the process, and the various agreements, as well as the evolution of Europe during this period, reflected this linkage.

In the Middle East, these issues are also closely related. In some states, the closed political regimes, the systematic violation of basic human rights, and failed economic systems create conditions in which terrorism and violence thrive. As in the case of the CSCE, prospects for conflict resolution in the Middle East and the reduction of military instability are closely linked to increasing the level of openness, greater access to information, and human rights.

At the same time, there are critical differences between the situation in Europe that led to the success of the CSCE process, and conditions in the Middle East. Most importantly, the sweeping agreements only became possible after fundamental political change in the Soviet Union and eastern Europe. Gorbachev's rise to power, his decision to make political and economic changes, and the policies of "glasnost" and "perestroika" began a process that led to the end of Soviet control of Eastern Europe. This, in turn, ended the confrontation with the US and the West, increased openness and individual freedom within the USSR, and, in the longer term, resulted in the demise of the Soviet empire. These were essential conditions for the success of the CSCE, and without the radical changes within the Soviet Union, there would not have been an agreement.6

Politically, many states in the Middle East are still in the pre- perestroika era, and the preconditions for many of the features that were central to the CSCE process do not yet exist. In many areas, conflict still dominates over cooperation, and the essential requirements for sweeping arms limitation and tension reductions measures have not been created. Ancient hatreds remain, violence and terrorism are still embraced by significant groups, and the threats of war and total destruction have not disappeared. Some key states, such as Syria, Iraq, and Iran are refusing to participate in the ACRS process, and in some cases, and seeking to sabotage these activities. Under these condi tions, the steady incremental process of creating institutions for communications, and the implementation of other CSBMs is the only possible course. At this stage, efforts to implement more ambitious arms limitation measures are premature and clearly counterproductive.

Finally, in Europe, the CSCE process was characterized by negotiations between two relatively similar blocks, NATO and the Warsaw Pact. However, in the Middle East, the negotiations are highly asymmetric, with one state (Israel) facing a single block (the Arab states). This structural factor also has an important impact on the ACRS process, and emphasizes the need for the gradual transition from conflict to cooperation and the develop ment of appropriate CSBMs to facilitate this process.

Weapons of Mass Destruction and Massive Conventional Forces

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East is a prominent item on the agenda of most discussions of arms limitations and conflict prevention in the region. As noted above, the number of countries in the region that have or are seeking to acquire chemical, biological and nuclear weapons in the Middle East is steadily increasing. Many of these states have acquired or are actively seeking long-range missiles and other delivery systems. In addition, the massive stockpiles of conventional weapons platforms, including advanced tanks and combat aircraft, that continue to be concentrated by some states in the region, also pose dangers to the survival of small states. Large-scale conventional attacks are capable of destroying cities and inflicting large-scale casualties to civilian populations.7

In this context, efforts to prevent aggressive unstable regimes from seeking such capabilities are increasingly important. As the Iraqi case has demonstrated, in closed states with large areas in which to hide illegal facilities and materials, the global nuclear non-proliferation regime, based on the NPT and the IAEA, is limited in its capability to detect and deter violations of safeguards and agreed limits. In response, it is clear that for the Middle East, in particular, a dedicated regional regime, consisting of all the states in the region, is necessary. This regional framework has been endorsed in United Nations resolutions promoting the development of a Middle East Nuclear Weapons Free Zone. Such a framework must include all forms of weapons of mass destruction, as well as large stockpiles of conventional weapons.

In the European case, the CSCE process did not focus on these issues. In the Middle East, the ACRS process may, in the long term, provide a framework for the negotiation of such arms limitation and verification agreements, but in its current stage, the ACRS, like the CSCE, is best suited for negotiation of confidence and security building measures (CSBMs) that are the necessary prerequisites. The CSCE process, and the Stockholm and Vienna agreements, served to create conditions that led to successful negotiations of the INF (Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces) Treaty and the CFE (Conventional Forces Europe) pact.

In the Middle East, as noted, in addition to bilateral peace treaties and normalization of relations among all of the states, CSBMs are necessary to create the conditions for more ambitious arms control measures. It is also necessary for all states in the region, including Syria, Iran, Libya, and Iraq to contribute to the ACRS process and to participate in the CSBMs before the latter stages can be considered.

In this context, one-sided pressures on Israel to relinquish its nuclear option by adhering to the NPT under current condi tions are counter-productive. For Israel, deterrence of aggres sion is essential, as was the case for NATO with respect to the Soviet Union throughout the development of the CSCE. Israel, like NATO during that period, must be able to offset non-conventional attacks, as well as the massive quantitative conventional superiority of the Arab states, and to deter the possibility of large scale conventional attack. Given the history of combined attacks, and the continuing threat to national survival, until peace treaties are signed and implemented with all the states in the region, the Israeli position is unlikely to change, and pressures in this area will only increase the level of conflict. 4. Potential European Contributions to Building Middle East Security

a. Drawing from the CSCE Experience

The CSCE provides a very visible example of successful conflict amelioration and the development of institutions and frameworks for conflict resolution and prevention, based on careful balancing of diverse national interests. As noted above, the political conditions that allowed for the successful conclusion of the CSCE process do not exist currently in the Middle East. However, the early stages of this process are applicable to the Middle East, and the OSCE can contribute to conflict prevention in this region by stressing the importance of the Helsinki Final Act, and the centrality of the respect human rights and fundamental freedoms as a first step.8

A review of CSCE development can also remind states in the Middle East that, at the beginning of this process, the pursuit of CSBMs does not negate the need for continued deterrence against aggression. In the unstable environment in the Middle East, the defense potential of the status-quo powers plays a central role in preserving the peace, and if this potential were to be eroded, the possibility of war would increase significantly. Europe only reached the final stages of the Helsinki process as a result of the maintenance of deterrence on the part of NATO and the West.9

The OSCE and Europe can also play an important role by helping to bring all states into the ACRS process, including Syria, and in the longer term, Iran, Libya and ultimately, following the lifting of UN sanctions, Iraq. Europe has developed closer relations with Syria in the past year, including the lifting of limitations on arms sales, even though Syria maintains a state of war with Israel. Europe should use this relationship to encourage active Syrian participation in regional forums, such as the ACRS, and CSBMs designed to reduce conflict.

In general Europe should promote the ACRS working group, while avoiding overemphasis on global institutions that fail to meet the specific needs of the Middle East. The ACRS is the only existing framework for multinational discussions, and, as noted, plays a role similar to the CSCE in the 1970s. The ACRS process is vitally important for moving the Middle East from confrontation to cooperation.

b. Guidelines For Limiting The Destabilizing Transfer of Weapons and Technology

The Middle East has been a major market for weapons and military technology, and European suppliers, from both West and East, have been very active. The region continues to be one of the world's largest markets of weapons and military technology (although East Asia may be emerging as a bigger market). Realistically, it is important to acknowledge that European suppliers have in interest in maintaining a large share, thereby providing jobs, income, and profits for major firms. However, European governments and firms were active in providing weapons and technology to Saddam Hussein, including tanks, aircraft, missiles, equipment and facilities for the manufacture of chemical and biological weapons, and even components for use in the Iraqi nuclear weapons program.10

Responsible supplier guidelines for Europe, to reduce the quantity of weapons sold to destabilizing states, as well as the adoption of qualitative limitations on the transfer of arms and technology (including dual-use technology that can and is gener ally applied to military programs) would mark a major contribu tion to the amelioration of conflict and the prevention of war in the Middle East.11 Such supplier guidelines are particularly important with respect to states that are not participating in the peace process, or are actively seeking to disrupt it. Once Europe has adopted and implemented such limitations, it will be easier to seek restraint from outside suppliers, including China and North Korea, regarding the sale of advanced weapons, includ ing the medium, and long-range ballistic missiles that are a threat to many European states, as noted above.

Guidelines for the transfer of weapons and military or dual- use technology would also serve to increase the resources available in the recipient countries for social and economic development. Increased development would, in turn, strengthen political and social stability in these countries, and reduce the support for radical groups and terrorism.

In the European context, the CFE (Conventional Forces Europe) Treaty regulates the size of these forces and their deployment. Using this experience, the European participants could provide guidance for negotiations of a similar limitation conventional forces limitation regime in the Middle East (CFME).

c. Measures to Encourage Economic Development and Political and Social Stability

A discussion of the complex and vital issues involved in the economic, political and social unrest and instability in many states in the Middle East is beyond the scope of this paper. However, it is clear that measures to reduce the sources of this instability are closely linked to the broader security issues that are important to both Europe and the Mediterranean states. From the beginning of the CSCE process and the Helsinki confer ence of 1975, the three baskets (security, economic cooperation, and human rights)12 were always interdependent, with progress on one requiring measures in the others as well.

Similarly, in the Middle East, regional security and stabil ity are closely linked to changes in the economic conditions and human rights. The conditions that contribute to terrorism are antithetical to the process of conflict amelioration and the transition to cooperation. The activities of various European institutions, including the European Union's Barcelona Initiative with respect to the Middle East also reflect the recognition of the importance of linking these three areas, or baskets.

d. Support for CSBMs

The CSCE experience and the OSCE structure lend themselves most readily to providing leadership and assistance in the development and implementation of confidence and security build ing measures (CSBMs). In this respect, the focus on the Mediter ranean sub- region can be useful as a means of introducing the concepts and substance of CSBMs. Participation by Mediterranean states, in cooperation with the OSCE, can provide a foundation for wider involvement of other Middle East states, thereby furthering the objectives of the Arab-Israeli peace process.

Specifically, the following types of CSBMs can be considered for the Mediterranean, and, in later stages, for the wider Middle East:

Each of these measures would constitute an important contri bution to the process of conflict amelioration in the Middle East, but the most significant measures are in the category of risk reduction. The potential for surprise attack continues to exist in the region, and is a major destabilizing factor. Measures to reduce these capabilities for surprise attacks are essential components in the reduction of tensions. The OSCE has gained a great deal of experience in this area, particularly with respect to notification and observation of military exercises, and prohibitions on such exercises in border areas. The OSCE can use this experience as the basis for presenting proposals for similar arrangements in the Middle East.

Conclusions:

Conflict management and resolution are difficult and tenuous under any circumstances, and caution is always necessary. As events in the Balkans have reminded all of us, intense ethno national and religious conflicts that have their roots in ancient history may be controlled for some time, but sudden political shifts and changes in the military balance of power can trigger a resumption of conflict.

For this reason, the process of developing a regional security framework for the Middle East must proceed carefully, and expectations must be tempered by a realistic understanding of the threats to stability. The major factors in the Middle East include unstable political and social systems in many states in the region, historic hatreds and intolerance, a readiness to resort to violence and random terrorism, and large military forces in close proximity.

As noted in this analysis, instability in the Middle East can spill-over and effect European interests and security. In the past, this impact has largely been limited to economic effects related to access to petroleum from the Persian Gulf. However, the social and political instability in many states in the region, and the large migration of refugees, as well as terrorism, is effecting European security interests.

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, and the acquisition of long-range delivery systems capable of striking distant targets provides another potential threat. Ironically, many European firms have provided the technologies that are used in the production of these weapons. In its own interests, as well as a means of furthering stability, Europe should implement supplier guidelines on the exports of technology and weapons from Europe to destabilizing regimes.

The OSCE and other institutions have chosen to focus efforts on developing ties with the Mediterranean states. Although the Mediterranean does not constitute a distinct region for the purpose of security and stability, these states can serve as a foundation for the introduction of confidence-and security building measures into the wider Middle East. In addition, the development of normal relations, potentially leading to greater understanding and tolerance among the different cultures, is also important for the region. If the OSCE can advance these goals, based on the relevant European experience, while avoiding being drawn into support for premature and destabilizing measures, this organization can make a substantial contribution to regional security. References

0- The OSCE "Non-Participating Mediterranean States are Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Israel, and Algeria. NATO adds Mauritania, and the European Union's Barcelona Conference of Mediterranean States also includes Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and the Palestinians, and non-EU members Turkey, Cyprus, and Malta.

1- The Middle East security region is often defined to include the members of the Arab League, Israel, and Iran. In addition, Mediterranean and European security and stability are effected by the unresolved Cyprus conflict, as well as other issues, but these are beyond the scope of this analysis.

2- In 1986, Libya fired two SCUD missiles at a base on Lampedusa in retaliation for a US air attack on Tripoli, which, in turn, was triggered by Libyan support for terrorist attacks on a number of US targets, including aircraft and military personnel in Europe.

3- For detailed analyses of the activities of the ACRS working group, see Practical Peacemaking in the Middle East, Vol. I, Arms Control and Regional Security, Steven L. Spiegel and David J. Pervin, editors, Garland, New York, 1995; and Gerald Steinberg, "Arms Control and Regional Security in the Middle East", Survival, Spring, 1994; and Joel Peters, Building Bridges: The Arab-Israeli Multilateral Talks, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1994

4- Ariel E. Levite, "Confidence and Security Building Measures in the Middle East", in Conference of Research Institutes in the Middle East: Proceedings of the Cairo conference (18-20 April 1993). New York : United Nations Insititute for Disarmament Research, 1994.

5- James Macintosh, "Confidence Building Measures in Europe: 1975 to the Present", Encyclopedia of Arms Control and Disarmament, Richard Dean Burns, editor, Charles Scribners' Sons, 1993; Alan Platt, editor, Arms Control and Confidence Building in the Middle East United States Institute for Peace, Washington, DC, 1992

6- See the text of speech by Dr. Wilhelm Hoynck, Secretary General of the OSCE, Tel Aviv University, 5 March 1995

7- The link between conventional arms reductions and nuclear weapons limitations in the Middle East was emphasized in the report of the United Nations, entitled Establishment of a Nucle ar-Weapon-Free Zone in the Region of the Middle East Study on effective and verifiable measures which would facilitate the establishment of a nuclear-weapon- free zone in the Middle East. Report of the Secretary General, United Nations General Assembly, A/45/435, 10 October 1990. See also Geoffrey Kemp, The Control of the Middle East Arms Race, Carnegie Endowment, Washington DC, 1992.

8- The Helsinki Final Act (1975) notes that respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms is an essential factor for the peace, justice and well-being necessary to ensure the developments of friendly relations and cooperation among themselves.

9- Jonathan Alford, "Confidence-Building Measures in Europe: The Military Aspects", Adelphi Paper No 149, IISS, London, 1979

10- Although arms sales are closely related to oil imports this process is often referred to a the recycling of petro-dollars), there is also an inherent tension between arms sales to the region and access to oil. The arms that were sold to Iraq in the 1970s and the 1980s were later used by the Iraqi regime in the invasion of Kuwait leading to direct military intervention by the countries that had sold these weapons a short time earlier. During the 1991 Gulf War, the supplier states that provided the weapons and technology to o Iraq destroyed the same weapons that they had sold.

11- In 1993, the OSCE adopted a set of principles to govern conventional arms transfers. These were designed to complement the UN Conventional Arms Registry and the Missile Technology Control Regime. See Principles governing conventional arms transfers, 25 November 1993 OSCE, Vienna. However, they remain ambiguous and have not been implemented.

12- The Helsinki Final Act (1975) defined three baskets; "Security in Europe," "Cooperation in the Fields of Economics, Science and technology, and the Environment," and "Cooperation in Humanitarian an Other Fields."

13- For more detailed analysis of cooperative monitoring, see Arian L. Pregenzer and John Taylor, "The Role of Technology in Regional Security", in Practical Peacemaking in the Middle East, Vol. I, Arms Control and Regional Security, Steven L. Spiegel and David J. Pervin, editors, (New York: Garland, 1995)