Arye L. Hillman,
Publications
by topic
3. SOCIALISM
AND TRANSITION
3.1
Surveys 3.2
Rents and transition 3.3
Privatization 3.4
International trade policy in transition 3.5
Public finance in transition 3.6
Other aspects of transition 3.6.1 The
rule of law 3.6.2 Economic
statistics in the transition 3.6.3 Country
studies |
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3.1
SURVEYS Political-economy
issues were at the fore of studies of the transition from socialism in the
1990s, although not always treated as such. Policies with regard to
privatization in particular had the political-economy attribute of
distributing wealth in accord with ability to influence decisions of
policymakers. Much of my research on
transition took place in the course of cooperation with researchers from the
World Bank and includes two co-edited volumes published by the World Bank.
[1], [2], and [3] are surveys. [1] was written early
in the transition. [2] was written when it was
clearer that the “transition” would on-going for some time; the paper was
published in Russian (and subsequently in English), with the intention of
informing Russian researchers of the premises and predictions of the
public-choice school. [3] is a more philosophical
overview written more than a decade after the transition began, asking what
was intended by “transition” and how would we know that “transition” was
over. [1] “The transition from
socialism: An overview from a political-economy perspective”, European Journal
of Political Economy,
May 1994, 10, 191 – 225. Special issue, festschrift in honor of Peter
Bernholz, edited by Manfred Gärtner and Heinrich W.
Ursprung. [2]
“Western economic theory and the transition: The public choice
perspective”. Economics and
Mathematical Methods (Journal of the Central Economic and Mathematical
Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences) 1996, 32, 77-90
in Russian, translated by Mark Levin. Published
in English in: ·
Trade,
Growth, and Economic Policy in Open Economies: Essays in Honor of Hans-Jürgen Vosgerau, Karl-Josef Koch
and Klaus Jaeger, editors, Springer, 1998, pp. 351 – 367. [3] “Interpretations of transition”. In Political Economy
of Transition and Development: Institutions, Politics, and Policies,
Nauro F. Campos and Jan Fidrmuc (Eds.), Kluwer
Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, 2003, pp. 23 – 40. 3.2
RENTS AND TRANSITION The
transition in Bulgaria in the immediate aftermath of the end of communism
provides the background for [4]. [5] explains the
extended transition as due to the distractions provided by the various rents
that the transition created: the paper began as a background paper for a
World Bank World Development Report. [6] describes
the rents that arose through the privatization of banks and introduction of
financial markets. [4] “The private
sector, state enterprises, and informal economic activity”. In Financing
Government in Transition, Bulgaria: The Political Economy of Tax Policies,
Tax Bases, and Tax Evasion, Željko Bogetić and
Arye L. Hillman (Eds.), The World Bank, Washington, D.C., 1995, pp. 47 –
70. Lubomir Mitov and R. Kyle Peters, co-authors. Summarized
in: ·
“Privatizing profits of
Bulgaria’s state enterprises”, Transition March 1995, 6, 4
– 6. Željko Bogetić co-author. [5] “Rents as distractions: Why the exit from transition is
prolonged”. In: Economic
Interdependence and Cooperation in Europe, Nicolas C. Baltas, George Demopoulos, and Joseph Hassid (Eds.),
Springer, 1998, 21 – 38. Alan Gelb and Heinrich W. Ursprung, co-authors. Based
on: ·
Rents and the transition, World
Development Report Background Paper, The World Bank, Washington D.C., April
1996 [6] “The political economy of banking
sector reform in the transition”. In: Financial
Sector Transformation: Lessons from Economies in Transition, edited by Mario Blejer and Marko Škreb,
Cambridge University Press, New York, 1999, 132 – 149. Heinrich W. Ursprung co-author. 3.3
PRIVATIZATION “Market
socialist” type economic systems that attempted to preserve the paternalism
of socialism while introducing markets confronted inherent dilemmas [7]. The
dilemmas are also the theme of the symposium in [8]. [9] recounts
methods used for privatization and emphasizes the redistribution of wealth
and income inherent in privatization and market liberalization. [10] applies the theory of clubs to describe socialism and the
changes of the transition (where people were losing their “clubs” because of
privatization and market liberalization). Also, in the transition people
benefited who had under socialism been assigned to disadvantageous clubs. [7] Liberalization
dilemmas. In Markets and Politicians:
Politicized Economic Choice, edited by A.L.
Hillman, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991, chapter 10, pp. 189 – 207. [8] Debate on the
transition of post-communist economies to a market economy, Acta Oeconomica
(Journal of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences) 1992, 44, 285
– 289. [9] Progress with
privatization, Journal of Comparative Economics, December 1992, 16,
733 – 749. [10] Socialist clubs: A
perspective on the transition, European Journal of Political
Economy,
1993, 9, 307 – 319. 3.4
INTERNATIONAL TRADE POLICY IN TRANSITION The
system international trade among communist countries created impediments to
trade liberalization. [11], [12a] and [12b] describe the subsequent
difficulties of international trade when the communist system of planned
suddenly ended. [13] is about policy commitment.
[14a] and [14b] extend this theme. [11]
Creating the reform-resistant dependent economy: Socialist comparative
advantage, enterprise incentives and the CMEA. In: The
Transition from Socialism in Eastern Europe: Domestic Restructuring and
Foreign Trade,
Arye L. Hillman and Branko Milanovic (Eds.), The World Bank, Washington, DC,
1992, chapter 10, pp. 243 – 262. Adi
Schnytzer co-author. [12a]
The transition from the CMEA system of international trade. In: Trials of Transition: Economic Reform in the Former
Communist Bloc,
edited by Michael Karen and Guru Offer, Westview
Press, Boulder, 1992, 271 – 289. [12b]
The transition from socialist trade to European integration. In: The EC after 1992 - Perspectives from the Outside, edited by Silvio Borner and Herbert Grubel, Cambridge University Press, 1992, pp. 61 – 79. [13]
The
political economy of trade liberalization in the transition, European Economic Review (Papers
and Proceedings), April 1996, 40, pp. 783 - 794. Heinrich W. Ursprung, co-author. [14a]
Protectionist pressures and enterprise restructuring: The political economy
of trade policy in transition. In: Trade and
Tax Policy, Inflation and Exchange Rates, edited by Assaf Razin and Hans-Jürgen Vosgerau, Springer,
Berlin, Heidelberg and New York, 1997, 215 – 243 Manuel Hinds, Branko
Milanovic, and Heinrich W. Ursprung, co-authors. [14b]
What is special about endogenous international trade policy in transition
economies? In: Balance of Payments, Exchange
Rates, and Competitiveness in Transition Economies,
edited by Mario Blejer and Marko Škreb, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston and Dordrecht,
1999, 255 – 282. Heinrich W. Ursprung
co-author. 3.5
PUBLIC FINANCE IN TRANSITION The
following papers from World bank volumes describe problems of public finance
in the transition. Budgetary consequences in the early transition of the end
of the communist system of international trade are described in [15]. [16] describes problems of sustaining the tax base. [15] The
government budgetary consequences of reform of the CMEA system of
international trade: The case of Hungary.
In: The
Transition from Socialism in Eastern Europe: Domestic Restructuring and
Foreign Trade,
Arye L. Hillman and Branko Milanovic (Eds.), The World Bank, Washington, DC,
1992, chapter 12, 277-293. Istvan
Abel, David Tarr co-authors [16] The tax base in the
transition: The case of Bulgaria, Communist Economies and Economic Transformation, December 1994, 6,
267-282. ·
Policy Research Working Paper
number 1267, The World Bank, Washington, DC, March 1994. Željko Bogetić,
co-author. Updated
as: ·
The choice of a tax system, in: Financing
Government in Transition, Bulgaria: The Political Economy of Tax Policies Tax
Bases, and Tax Evasion, Željko Bogetić and Arye L. Hillman
(Eds.), The World Bank, Washington, D.C., 1995, pp. pp. 33 – 46. 3.6
OTHER ASPECTS OF TRANSITION 3.6.1
The rule of law The
role of the rule of law in facilitating transition is described in [17] and
[18]. [17] was written for presentation at a
conference in Belgrade. [18] was first published in
Russian. [17]
“The legal system in the transition from social to private property: with
reference to Hobbesian anarchy, Locke's natural
right of freedom, and the rule of law”. In proceedings of conference on Challenges and
Opportunities for Economic Transition in Yugoslavia, edited by Goran Pitić, USAID, Economic
Institute, Chesapeake Associates, 1998, pp. 264 – 69. [18]
“On the way to the promised land: ten years in the
wilderness without Moses” (English). Published in Russian
(translated by Mark Levin). In Economics and Mathematical Methods -Journal of the
Central Economic and Mathematical Institute of the Russian Academy of
Sciences,
2002, 38, pp. 78 – 94. 3.6.2
Economic statistics in the transition In a market
private-property economy, production and consumption decisions are made
before statistics become available. In a planned socialist (communist)
system, the statistics precede production and consumption. [19] considered the role of statistics in the transition from
the latter economic system to the former. [19]
Some problems of statistical measurement of economic activity in the
transition from planned socialism. In:
Economies
in Transition: Statistical Measures Now and in the Future, Petr
O. Aven (Ed.), International Institute for Applied
System Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria, 1991, 69-78. 3.6.3
Country studies [20] Macroeconomic policy in Hungary and
its microeconomic implications. In: European
Economy, Economic Transformation in [21] Comment on: Money and credit in the
transition of the Czechoslovak Republic. In: The Transformation of
Socialist Economies, edited by Horst Siebert, J.C.B. Mohr Paul Siebeck, Tübingen, 1992, 326 –
330. |
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