Arye L. Hillman,
Publications by topic
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1.
POLITICAL ECONOMY AND
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 1.1 Political economy of trade policy 1.1.1 The
political economy of protection 1.1.2 Trade
liberalization and globalization 1.1.3 The
environment and trade policy 1.1.4 Market
structure as a determinant of protection 1.1.5 The
multinational firm and foreign investment 1.1.6 Protection
as insurance 1.1.7 Trade
embargoes 1.1.8 Incentives
for illegal activity 1.1.9 Surveys 1.2 Comparative advantage and trade 1.2.1 True
and “revealed” comparative advantage 1.2.2 The
factor content of international trade 1.2.3 Departure
from the law of one price 1.2.4 Domestic
monopoly and dumping 1.2.5 Trade
diversion as a prisoners’ dilemma 1.3 The political economy of
international migration 1.3.1 The
political economy of migration policy 1.3.2 Why
do people emigrate? 1.3.3 Illegal
immigration 1.3.4 Host-country
benefits 1.4 Other
papers and comments 1.1 POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TRADE POLICY 1.1.1 The political
economy of protection In the 1970s when
I began my research career, the literature described how protectionist
policies could enhance efficiency in a “distorted” second-best world. If
governments could only be viewed as benevolently pursuing efficiency
objectives or as maximizing “social welfare”, then indeed the second-best arguments
were required to explain – and to justify – protection. In the 1980s and on
into the 1990’s, the "new trade theory” and the theory of “strategic
trade policy” likewise used second-best circumstances of imperfectly
competitive markets to show how protectionist policies and other government
intervention could increase the welfare of a country’s residents. It did not
seem to me realistic to propose that policy decisions to depart from free
trade reflected socially benevolent efficiency-enhancing government
intentions. The lump-sum taxes and transfers assumed in the literature for
implementing redistribution did not exist or were not used. With lump-sum
taxes and transfers a fiction, surely the reason for protectionism was
political support associated with the income-redistribution effects of trade
policy. Paper [1] below
showed how motives of political support related to income redistribution explain protectionist policies. A protectionist policy
response to a fall in import prices occurs when
governments trade-off political support from import-competing industry
interests and voters at large (or consumers). When world import prices
decrease, the terms of trade improve and “countries” should be pleased.
Incomes (and also employment) however decline in import-competing industries.
I showed how the political policy response is a compromise between industry
interests and the public interest whereby protection increases but by less
than required to fully compensate an import-competing industry for the
decline in the world price. The import-competing industry is grateful for the
increased protection, while voters or consumers have also gained because
post-protection domestic prices have decreased, although not by the entire
fall in the world price. Technically, because gainers and losers from
protection evaluate policies with reference to the deviation from free trade
(in which government policy is inactive), the change in world prices also
changes the origin for the measurement of political support. Paper [2] showed
how political support influences choice between tariffs and quotas as means
of protection. Previous research had not asked why governments sometimes
chose tariffs and sometimes import quotas as the means of protection. Paper [3] begins
with the observation that output and employment in industries confronting
import competition often fall abruptly and the industry collapses rather than
declining along a continuous domestic supply function. The reason for the
collapse of declining industries was shown to be related to political-support
objectives of policy makers. Paper [4]
described the determination of trade policy in the context of political
competition. Tariffs and voluntary export restraints (VERs) were compared as means
of protection. The political advantage of VERs is that tariff revenue is
converted to private profits, which in turn can be used to finance campaign
contributions. Paper [5] is
related to [4] and describes how international trade policy can be used to
regulate industries located in different national jurisdictions. Paper [6]
compares the different views of trade policy as decided by benevolent
efficiency-seeking governments and politically optimizing politicians. Prior to the
mid-1990s, the political-economy view of the determination of international
trade policy was not popular among academic economists. I and my coauthors
James Cassing and Heinrich Ursprung encountered
resistance to the idea that political decision makers might choose policies
for political advantage rather than to maximize social welfare (although
describing policies as determined by majority voting seemed acceptable).
After the mid-1990s the political-economy approach to explaining trade policy
that we had advocated became the standard view, thanks in great part to
acceptance of the idea by Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman, who described
“protection for sale” with politicians auctioning policies. Grossman and
Helpman described a policy maker who maximizes political support by trading
off industry and political benefits against voters’ interests; their
description of politicians as “selling” protection differs (although perhaps
in a subtle way) from the view in papers [1] – [5] that politicians choose
policies subject to the necessity of obtaining sufficient political support
to win elections. The
political-economy influences on international trade policy were summarized in
my 1989 book (reprinted 2001) The Political Economy of Protection. A
volume with Wilfred Ethier The WTO and the
Political Economy of Trade Policy (2008) collects major contributions
that describe politically determined trade policies under the auspices of the
World Trade Organization (previously the GATT). BOOKS The Political Economy of Protection. Harwood Academic
Publishers, Chur, London and New York, 1989. 2nd printing 1994. Republished
2001, Routledge, London. The WTO and the Political Economy of Trade Policy. Co-editor Wilfred J. Ethier, Edward-Elgar,
Cheltenham, UK, 2008. PAPERS [1] Declining industries and
political-support protectionist motives, American Economic Review, December
1982, 72, 1180-1187. Reprinted in: ·
The WTO, Safeguards, and Temporary Protection from
Imports, Chad Brown (Ed.), Edward
Elgar, Cheltenham UK, 2006. ·
The WTO and the Political Economy of Trade Policy, Wilfred
Ethier and Arye L. Hillman (Eds.), Edward Elgar, Cheltenham UK, 2008, pp. 43
– 50. ·
Forty Years of Research on Rent Seeking 2 –
Applications Rent Seeking in Practice. Roger D. Congleton et al.
(Eds.) , Springer, Berlin, 2008, pp. 105 – 112. [2] Political influence motives
and the choice between tariffs and quotas, Journal of International Economics,
November 1985, 19, 279-290. James H. Cassing co-author. [3] Shifting
comparative advantage and senescent industry collapse, American
Economic Review, June 1986, 76, 516-523. James H. Cassing
co-author. Reprinted
in: ·
The WTO and the Political Economy of Trade Policy, Wilfred Ethier and Arye L. Hillman (Eds.), Edward
Elgar, Cheltenham UK, 2008, pp. 516 – 523. [4] Domestic politics, foreign
interests and international trade policy, American Economic Review,
September 1988, 78, 729-745. Heinrich
W. Ursprung co-author. Reprinted in: ·
International Trade, J. Peter Neary (Ed.),
Edward Elgar, Cheltenham UK, 1996. ·
The Globalization of the World Economy: Trade and
Investment Policy, edited by Thomas
Brewer, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham UK, 1999, pp. 470 – 86. ·
The WTO and the Political Economy of Trade Policy, Wilfred Ethier and Arye L. Hillman (Eds.), Edward
Elgar, Cheltenham UK, 2008, pp. 99 -115. See
also ·
Domestic politics, foreign interests, and international trade policy:
Reply, American Economic Review, December 1994, 84, 1476-78
Heinrich W. Ursprung, co-author. [5] Protectionist policies as
the regulation of international industry, Public Choice, 1990, 67, 101-110. [6] International trade policy:
Benevolent dictators and optimizing politicians, Public Choice, 1992, 74, 1-15. 1.1.2 Trade liberalization and globalization Paper [7] investigated the incentive
effects of graduation rules from preferential market access. Papers [8] and [8a] describe trade
liberalization as politically motivated exchange of market access ([9] is a
more technical exposition of [8a]). Paper [10] describes how, through
opportunities for diversification of industry-specific incomes, asset markets
change voter incentives in favor of trade liberalization. Asset
diversification through asset markets makes “strategic trade policy”
redundant, or indeed harmful [9]. Paper [11] reprints an invited lecture
that evaluates social justice in the context of consequences of
globalization. [7] Equalizing the cost of
success: Equitable graduation rules and the Generalized System of Preferences,
Journal of International Economic
Integration, spring 1991, 6, 40-51. James H. Cassing
co-author. [8] Modeling reciprocal trade liberalization: The political-economy
and national-welfare perspectives, Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics,
September 1995, 131, 503-515. Peter
Moser and Ngo Van Long, co-authors [8a] Trade
liberalization as politically optimal exchange of market access. In: The New
Transatlantic Economy, Matthew Canzoneri, Wilfred Ethier, and Vittorio Grilli (Eds.),
Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 295-312. Peter Moser co-author. Reprinted in: ·
The Global Trading System, volume 2, Core Rules and
Procedures, Kym Anderson and Bernard
Hoekman (Eds.), I.B. Tauris
and Co Ltd, London and New York, 2002. ·
The WTO and the Political Economy of Trade Policy, Wilfred Ethier and Arye L. Hillman (Eds.), Edward
Elgar, Cheltenham UK, 2008, pp. 290 – 307. [9] Privatization and the
political economy of strategic trade policy, International Economic Review, 2001, 42,
535-556. JoAnne Feeney, co-author. [10] Trade liberalization through
asset markets, Journal of International Economics, October
2004, 64, 151-167. JoAnne Feeney
co-author Reprinted in: ·
The WTO and the Political Economy of Trade Policy, Wilfred Ethier and Arye L. Hillman (Eds.), Edward Elgar,
Cheltenham UK, 2008, pp. 173 - 189. [11] Globalization and social
justice. Singapore Economic Review, 2008, 53, 173 - 189. · Singapore Economic Review Public Lecture, Nanyang Technological University, September 2007. 1.1.3 The environment and
trade policy How do environmental
interests affect politically determined trade policy? Papers [12] and [12a]
distinguish environmental interest groups concerned exclusively with the
environment at home (environmentalists as NIMBY’s) and groups concerned with
the global environment. In different circumstances, environmental interests
can find it in their interest to form political coalitions with domestic
producer or consumer interests and to support protectionist or liberal trade
policies. [12] was prepared for a conference
organized by the GATT (since 1995 the WTO). [12a] is a technical extension of
[12]. [12] The influence of
environmental concerns on the political determination of international trade
policy. In: Richard Blackhurst and Kym Anderson (Eds.), The Greening of World Trade Issues,
University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor MI, 1992, pp. 195 – 220. Heinrich W. Ursprung co-author. [12a] Greens, supergreens, and
international trade policy: Environmental concerns and protectionism. In: Carlo Carvaro
(Ed.), Trade,
Innovation, Environment, Kluwer Academic
Publishers, 1.1.4 Market structure as a determinant of protection Paper [13] addresses
the question: how does market structure affect politically determined trade
policy? The answers take into account the public-good nature of the benefits
for firms in a protected industry and how the number of firms and market or
profit shares affect voluntary contributions to obtaining the collectively
sought policy. [14] and [14a] extend the original
model and elaborate on conclusions. [14] Market structure, politics,
and protection. In: International
Trade and Trade Policy, Elhanan Helpman and Assaf Razin (Eds.), MIT Press,
1991, pp. 118 – 40. [14a] Protection,
lobbying, and marker structure, Journal of International
Economics, August 2001, 54, 383 – 409. Ngo Van Long and Antoine Soubeyran co-authors. [14b] Lobbying for tariff protection and allocation of
entrepreneurial resources. In: New Developments in
International Trade: Theoretical and Empirical Investigations,
Seiichi Katayama and Kaz Miyagiwa
(Eds.), Research Institute for Economics and Business Administration, Kobe,
2003, pp. 129 – 46. Ngo Van Long and
Antoine Soubeyran co-authors. 1.1.5 The multinational firm and foreign investment Multinational firms can
supply a market from either local production or imports. [15] shows how the decision affects trade policy. [16] describes trade policy when protection is contingent on
supply of a market through local production. [15] The
multinational firm, political competition, and international trade policy, International Economic Review, May 1993,
34, 347 – 63. Heinrich W. Ursprung,
co-author. [16] Foreign
investment and endogenous protection with protectionist quid pro quo, Economics and Politics, March 1999, 11, 1
– 12. Heinrich Ursprung, co-author. 1.1.6 Protection as insurance Moral hazard and
adverse selection are impediments to private insurance against income
declines associated with changes in a country’s terms of trade. [17] showed that protection can in principle substitute for the
absent insurance markets. [18] showed how moral
hazard and adverse selection arise when producers are aware that governments
deciding on protection are influenced by political sensitivities to
unemployment. [17] Risk
aversion, terms of trade variability, and social consensus trade policy, Oxford Economic Papers, June 1986, 38, 234-242. James
H. Cassing, Ngo Van Long co-authors. [18] Workers
as insurance: Anticipated government intervention and factor demand, Oxford Economic Papers, December 1987, 39,
813-820. Eliakim
Katz, Jacob Rosenberg co-authors. Reprinted in: The WTO and the
Political Economy of Trade Policy, Wilfred Ethier and Arye L. Hillman (Eds.),
Edward Elgar, Cheltenham 1.1.7 Trade embargoes The risk of trade
embargoes affects international trade policy. [19] investigated
public-policy responses to embargo threat under conditions of
learning-by-doing as exist for many goods required for national defense. Paper [20] considered
an exhaustible resource such as oil subject to an embargo threat but also
domestically available. Domestic supplies that are used are not be available for use if the embargo eventuates. In [21] foreign
monopoly suppliers of oil also have monopoly power in the international
capital market: the joint foreign monopoly power affects the rate of interest,
which affects intertemporal profit-maximizing production. [19] Embargo
threat, learning and departure from comparative advantage, Journal of International Economics, May
1979, 9, 265 – 75. Ruth W. Arad
co-author. [20] Pricing
and depletion of an exhaustible resource when there is anticipation of trade
disruption, Quarterly Journal of Economics,
May 1983, 98, 215 – 33. [21] Monopolistic
recycling of oil revenue and intertemporal bias in oil depletion and trade, Quarterly Journal of Economics, August
1985, 100, 597 – 624. 1.1.8 Incentives for illegal activity International trade
policy affects incentives for illegal activity. [22] describes
how protectionist policies, by increasing domestic prices of imports and
import-competing goods, increase crime when the goods are readily amenable to
theft. [22] Excise taxes, import
restrictions, and the allocation of time to illegal activity, International Review of Law and Economics,
December 1984, 4, 213 – 22. Eliakim Katz co-author. 1.1.9 Surveys The following are surveys and overviews of
the political economy of trade policy. [23] Policy motives and international trade restrictions, in New
Institutional Arrangements for the World Economy,
Hans-Jürgen Vosgerau
(Ed.), Springer, [24] La politica
del commercio internazionale
per gli anni 2000: idee fondamentali e sviluppi. Il Futuro delle Relazione Economiche Internazionale, Saggi in onere di Fredrico
Caffè, a cure di
Giancarlo Corsetti, Guido M. Rey, and Gian Cesare Romagnoli,
FrancoAngeli, Milano 2001, pp. 27 – 63. International trade policy
circa 2000: Fundamental issues and developments: translated by
Maria Grazia Nicolosi. [25] International
trade policy: explaining departure from free trade. In: Encyclopedia of Public Choice, Charles Rowley and
Friedrich Schneider (Eds.), Kluwer Academic Publishers, Reprinted
in: · Charles K. Rowley and Friedrich Schneider (Eds.), Readings in Public Choice and Constitutional Political Economy. Springer, New York, 2008. [26] Trade
liberalization and globalization.
In: Encyclopedia of Public Choice, Charles Rowley and
Friedrich Schneider (Eds.), Kluwer Academic Publishers, Reprinted
in: · Charles K. Rowley and Friedrich Schneider (Eds.), Readings in Public Choice and Constitutional Political Economy. Springer, New York, 2008. [27]
Globalization and the
political economy of international trade policy. In: Trade Policy Reforms and Development: Essays in Honor of Professor
Peter Lloyd, Volume II, Sisira Jayasuriya (Ed.), Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, U.K., 2005,
pp. 3 – 22. [28] “Introduction”. Wilfred J. Ethier and Arye L. Hillman, 2008. The WTO and the Political Economy of Trade Policy. Edward-Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, pp. v – xix. [29]
The gains from trade and
refusal to trade. In: 1.2
COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE AND TRADE
The following papers address issues of
comparative advantage and trade. 1.2.1
True and “revealed” comparative
advantage 1.2.2 The
factor content of international trade 1.2.3
Departure from the law of one price 1.2.4
Domestic monopoly and dumping 1.2.5
Trade diversion as a prisoners’
dilemma 1.2.1 True and “revealed” comparative advantage [30] showed that
the measure known as “revealed comparative advantage” does not as a general
rule reveal comparative advantage. A condition can be established for the
measure to hold. [30]
Observations on the relation between "revealed comparative
advantage" and comparative advantage as indicated by pre-trade relative
prices, Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv,
June 1980, 116, 315 – 21. See also: ·
Jeroen Hinloopen and Charles Van Marrewijk,
2008. Empirical relevance of the Hillman condition and comparative advantage.
Applied Economics 40, 2313 – 2328. 1.2.2 The factor content of international trade [31] reported on the computation of the energy factor-content
of U.S. trade in the context of the Heckscher-Ohlin
Theorem. For Israel, issues of the factor content of trade and the
applicability of the Heckscher-Ohlin Theorem arose
in the context of free-trade agreements (paper [33]). Papers [32] and
[34] investigate the meaning of the factor-intensity-reversal qualification
of the Heckscher-Ohlin Theorem when traded goods
are defined as aggregates but reversals occur for the underlying
industry-specific production technologies. [31] Energy, the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem and U.S. international trade,
American
Economic Review, March 1978, 68, 96-106. Clark W. Bullard,
III co-author. Reprinted in: ·
Bertil Ohlin: Critical Assessments,
edited by John Cunningham Wood,
Routledge, London, 1997. [32]
Factor-intensity reversals: Conceptual experiments with traded goods
aggregates, Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv,
June 1979, 115, 272-283. Se'ev Hirsch co-author. [33]
The factor-content characteristics of Israel's trade in a multilateral
setting, in The Economic Integration of Israel in the EEC, edited by Herbert Giersch, J.C.B. Mohr, Paul Siebeck: Tübingen, 1980, pp.
175 – 198. Gideon Fishelson, Se'ev
Hirsch co-authors [34] The commodity composition of
trade and the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem in the
presence of aggregate and commodity specific factor-intensity reversals,
Journal
of International Economics,
August 1984, 17, 159-172. Franklin M. Fisher co-author. Reprinted in: ·
Aggregation: Aggregate Production Functions and
Related Topics, chapter 11, pp. 261 – 275, Franklin M. Fisher,
Harvester, Wheatsheaf and MIT Press, 1992. 1.2.3 Departure from the law of one price The law of one price predicts a single world
price for traded goods, after making allowance for transport and transactions
costs. The transactions costs include impediments to commodity arbitrage
because of uncertainty about the duration and magnitude of price differences.
[35] A proposition on short-run
departures from the law of one price: Unanticipated inflation, relative price
dispersion and commodity arbitrage, European Economic Review,
January 1982, 17, 51-60. Mario I. Blejer co-author. Reprinted (in Spanish): ·
“Una explicacion
de las desviaciones a corto plazo de la ley del precio unico: inflacion imprevista, dispersion de precios
relativos y arbitraje
commercial”. In Inflacion y varialibidad de los precios relativos, Mexico, DF, 1984, pp. 75 – 86. 1.2.4 Domestic monopoly and dumping Papers [36] and [37]
showed how domestic monopoly affects utilization for protection of a tariff
and quota. Paper [39] showed how domestic monopoly underlies dumping at less
than marginal cost. [39] considered public-policy
responses to foreign monopoly. [36] Domestic monopoly and
redundant tariff protection, Journal of International Economics,
February 1979, 9, 47-55. Gideon Fishelson co-author. [37] On water-in-the-quota,
Canadian Journal of Economics, May 1980, 13, 310 – 317. [38] Domestic uncertainty and
foreign dumping, Canadian Journal of Economics, August 1986, 19, 403-416. Eliakim
Katz co-author [39] On
the use of trade policy measures by a small country to counter foreign
monopoly power, Oxford Economic Papers,
June 1985, 37, 346 – 52. Joseph
Templeman co-author. 1.2.5 Trade diversion as a prisoners’ dilemma Paper [40] shows how trade diversion is a
case of a multi-person prisoners’ dilemma. [40] Resolving the puzzle of
welfare-reducing trade diversion: A prisoners' dilemma interpretation, Oxford
Economic Papers, April 1989, 41, 452-455. 1.3 THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION 1.3.1 The
political economy of migration policy 1.3.2 Why
do people emigrate? 1.3.3 Illegal
immigration 1.3.4 Host-country
benefits 1.3.1
The political economy of migration policy Neo-classical models base predictions of
incentives for migration on differences in factor returns and treat movement
of capital and of people symmetrically. However, migration of people
introduces complex social and economic considerations that are absent from
the “international labor movements” in a neo-classical model. [41] introduced political-economy considerations into the
explanation for the determination of countries’ migration policies. The political-economy themes associated with
migration are repeated and expanded in paper [42]. Paper [43] considers
whether migration can be a solution to demographic problems affecting
sustainability of intergenerational transfers; the different policy
preferences of young and old in a host population are noted. Paper [44]
investigates policy preferences of a host-country population when immigrants
are disproportionately unemployed and receive tax-financed welfare payments –
and unemployment is dues to efficiency wages. [41]
The political economy of migration policy.
In: Horst Siebert (Ed.), Migration: A Challenge for
Europe, J.C.B. Mohr Paul Siebeck, Tübingen, 1994, pp. 263 – 282. [42]
Beyond international factor movements: Cultural preferences, endogenous
policies, and the migration of people, an overview. In: Jaime de Melo, Riccardo Faini, and Klaus Zimmermann, editors, Migration:
The Controversies and the Evidence. [43]
Immigration and intergenerational transfers. In: Economic
Policy for Aging Societies, Horst Siebert, editor.
Kluwer Academic Publishers, [44] Unemployed immigrants and
voter sentiment in the welfare state, Journal of
Public Economics, August 2003, 87, 1641-1655. Gil Epstein co-author. Reprinted in: ·
International Economic Policies in a Globalized World, Seiichi Katayama and Heinrich Ursprung, editors,
Springer, Berlin, 2004, pp. 119 – 32. 1.3.2 Why do people emigrate? Network effects explain the locations to
which people choose to emigrate: [45] describes how choice of location can be
explained as a herd effect. Paper [46] describes how the decision to emigrate
from societies with rent-seeking and rent-extracting cultures is affected by
personal proximity to the dispensers of rents, who themselves have no
incentive to emigrate so long as their rent-extracting privileges. [45]
Herd effects and migration. Discussion working paper 1811, Centre for
Policy Studies, [46]
The king never emigrates, Review of
Development Economics,
1999, 3, 107 – 21. Gil Epstein, Heinrich Ursprung co-authors. Reprinted in: ·
Forty Years of Research on Rent Seeking 2 –
Applications: Rent Seeking in Practice.
Roger D. Congleton, Arye L. Hillman, Kai Konrad (Eds.), Springer 2008, pp.
265 – 79. 1.3.3 Illegal immigration Illegal immigration raises questions of how
legal immigrants become illegal (paper [47]) and why laws against illegal
immigration are selectively enforced contingent on the sectors in which
immigrants are employed (paper [48]). [47]
Creating illegal immigrants, Journal of
Population Economics, 1999, 12, 3-21. Gil Epstein and Avi
Weiss co-authors. [48]
A theory of permissible illegal immigration, European Journal
of Political Economy,
December 1999, 15, 585-604. Avi Weiss, co-author. 1.3.4 Host-country benefits Before the publication of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem in 1943, the Brigden Report had in 1927 justified protectionist
policies on grounds of incentives for immigration and the host-country
benefits from a larger population (paper [49]). In [50] host-country benefits
from immigration take the form of sharing of collective costs of public
goods. [49] The Brigden
Theorem, Economic Record,
September 1977, 53, 434-446. [50]
The collective good motive
for immigration policy, Australian Economic Papers, December 1979, 18,
243-257. Ruth W. Arad co-author. OTHER PAPERS AND COMMENTS A note on
the distribution of tariff proceeds, Economic
Record, March 1970, 46, 117 - 119. David E. James co-author. The
case for terminal protection for declining industries: Comment, Southern
Economic Journal, July 1977, 43, 155 – 160. Unilateral
and bilateral trade policies for a minimum-wage economy, Journal
of International Economics, August 1981, 11, 407 – 413. On the
dynamic non-equivalence of tariffs and quotas in the monetary model of the
balance of payments, Journal of International Economics,
August 1982, 13, 163 – 69. Also:
Reply, May 1985, 18, 381 – 82. Mario
I. Blejer co-author. Tariff-revenue
transfers to protectionist interests: Compensation for reduced protection or
supplementary reward for successful lobbying? Public Choice,
1988, 58, 169 – 172. Comment
on: The political economy of protectionism: Tariffs and retaliation in the
timber industry. In: Trade Policy Issues and Empirical Analysis,
edited by Robert E. Baldwin, University of Chicago Press for National Bureau
of Economic Research, 1988, 364 – 68. Comment
on: Technology policy in the completed European market. In: European
Integration: Trade and Industry, edited by L. Alan Winters and
Anthony Venables, Cambridge University Press, 1991,
161 – 64. Comment
on: Capital controls in direct democracies. In: European Integration in
the World Economy, edited by Hans-Jürgen Vosgerau, Springer, 1992, 772 – 74 |
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