Arye L. Hillman, Bar-Ilan University

Publications by topic





1.1  Political economy of trade policy

1.1.1     The political economy of protection

1.1.2     Trade liberalization and globalization

1.1.3     The environment and trade policy

1.1.4     Market structure as a determinant of protection

1.1.5     The multinational firm and foreign investment

1.1.6     Protection as insurance

1.1.7     Trade embargoes

1.1.8     Incentives for illegal activity

1.1.9     Surveys


1.2  Comparative advantage and trade

1.2.1     True and “revealed” comparative advantage

1.2.2     The factor content of international trade

1.2.3     Departure from the law of one price

1.2.4     Domestic monopoly and dumping

1.2.5     Trade diversion as a prisoners’ dilemma


1.3  The political economy of international migration

1.3.1     The political economy of migration policy

1.3.2     Why do people emigrate?

1.3.3     Illegal immigration

1.3.4     Host-country benefits


1.4 Other papers and comments






1.1.1 The political economy of protection

In the 1970s when I began my research career, the literature described how protectionist policies could enhance efficiency in a “distorted” second-best world. If governments could only be viewed as benevolently pursuing efficiency objectives or as maximizing “social welfare”, then indeed the second-best arguments were required to explain – and to justify – protection. In the 1980s and on into the 1990’s, the "new trade theory” and the theory of “strategic trade policy” likewise used second-best circumstances of imperfectly competitive markets to show how protectionist policies and other government intervention could increase the welfare of a country’s residents. It did not seem to me realistic to propose that policy decisions to depart from free trade reflected socially benevolent efficiency-enhancing government intentions. The lump-sum taxes and transfers assumed in the literature for implementing redistribution did not exist or were not used. With lump-sum taxes and transfers a fiction, surely the reason for protectionism was political support associated with the income-redistribution effects of trade policy.


Paper [1] below showed how motives of political support related to income redistribution explain protectionist policies. A protectionist policy response to a fall in import prices occurs when governments trade-off political support from import-competing industry interests and voters at large (or consumers). When world import prices decrease, the terms of trade improve and “countries” should be pleased. Incomes (and also employment) however decline in import-competing industries. I showed how the political policy response is a compromise between industry interests and the public interest whereby protection increases but by less than required to fully compensate an import-competing industry for the decline in the world price. The import-competing industry is grateful for the increased protection, while voters or consumers have also gained because post-protection domestic prices have decreased, although not by the entire fall in the world price. Technically, because gainers and losers from protection evaluate policies with reference to the deviation from free trade (in which government policy is inactive), the change in world prices also changes the origin for the measurement of political support. 


Paper [2] showed how political support influences choice between tariffs and quotas as means of protection. Previous research had not asked why governments sometimes chose tariffs and sometimes import quotas as the means of protection.


Paper [3] begins with the observation that output and employment in industries confronting import competition often fall abruptly and the industry collapses rather than declining along a continuous domestic supply function. The reason for the collapse of declining industries was shown to be related to political-support objectives of policy makers.


Paper [4] described the determination of trade policy in the context of political competition. Tariffs and voluntary export restraints (VERs) were compared as means of protection. The political advantage of VERs is that tariff revenue is converted to private profits, which in turn can be used to finance campaign contributions.


Paper [5] is related to [4] and describes how international trade policy can be used to regulate industries located in different national jurisdictions. Paper [6] compares the different views of trade policy as decided by benevolent efficiency-seeking governments and politically optimizing politicians.


Prior to the mid-1990s, the political-economy view of the determination of international trade policy was not popular among academic economists. I and my coauthors James Cassing and Heinrich Ursprung encountered resistance to the idea that political decision makers might choose policies for political advantage rather than to maximize social welfare (although describing policies as determined by majority voting seemed acceptable). After the mid-1990s the political-economy approach to explaining trade policy that we had advocated became the standard view, thanks in great part to acceptance of the idea by Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman, who described “protection for sale” with politicians auctioning policies. Grossman and Helpman described a policy maker who maximizes political support by trading off industry and political benefits against voters’ interests; their description of politicians as “selling” protection differs (although perhaps in a subtle way) from the view in papers [1] – [5] that politicians choose policies subject to the necessity of obtaining sufficient political support to win elections.


The political-economy influences on international trade policy were summarized in my 1989 book (reprinted 2001) The Political Economy of Protection. A volume with Wilfred Ethier The WTO and the Political Economy of Trade Policy (2008) collects major contributions that describe politically determined trade policies under the auspices of the World Trade Organization (previously the GATT).






The Political Economy of Protection. Harwood Academic Publishers, Chur, London and New York, 1989. 2nd printing 1994.

Republished 2001, Routledge, London.


The WTO and the Political Economy of Trade Policy. Co-editor Wilfred J. Ethier, Edward-Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, 2008.


Table of contents




[1] Declining industries and political-support protectionist motives, American Economic Review, December 1982, 72, 1180-1187.

Reprinted in:

·         The WTO, Safeguards, and Temporary Protection from Imports, Chad Brown (Ed.), Edward Elgar, Cheltenham UK, 2006.

·         The WTO and the Political Economy of Trade Policy, Wilfred Ethier and Arye L. Hillman (Eds.), Edward Elgar, Cheltenham UK, 2008, pp. 43 – 50.

·         Forty Years of Research on Rent Seeking 2 – Applications Rent Seeking in Practice. Roger D. Congleton et al. (Eds.) , Springer, Berlin, 2008, pp. 105 – 112.


[2] Political influence motives and the choice between tariffs and quotas, Journal of International Economics, November 1985, 19, 279-290.  James H. Cassing co-author.


[3] Shifting comparative advantage and senescent industry collapse, American Economic Review, June 1986, 76, 516-523.  James H. Cassing co-author.

Reprinted in:

·         The WTO and the Political Economy of Trade Policy, Wilfred Ethier and Arye L. Hillman (Eds.), Edward Elgar, Cheltenham UK, 2008, pp. 516 – 523.


[4] Domestic politics, foreign interests and international trade policy, American Economic Review, September 1988, 78, 729-745.  Heinrich W. Ursprung co-author.

Reprinted in:

·         International Trade, J. Peter Neary (Ed.), Edward Elgar, Cheltenham UK, 1996.

·         The Globalization of the World Economy: Trade and Investment Policy, edited by Thomas Brewer, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham UK, 1999, pp. 470 – 86.

·         The WTO and the Political Economy of Trade Policy, Wilfred Ethier and Arye L. Hillman (Eds.), Edward Elgar, Cheltenham UK, 2008, pp. 99 -115.


See also

·         Domestic politics, foreign interests, and international trade policy: Reply, American Economic Review, December 1994, 84, 1476-78 Heinrich W. Ursprung, co-author.

[5] Protectionist policies as the regulation of international industry, Public Choice, 1990, 67, 101-110.

[6] International trade policy: Benevolent dictators and optimizing politicians, Public Choice, 1992, 74, 1-15.


1.1.2 Trade liberalization and globalization

Paper [7] investigated the incentive effects of graduation rules from preferential market access.

Papers [8] and [8a] describe trade liberalization as politically motivated exchange of market access ([9] is a more technical exposition of [8a]).

Paper [10] describes how, through opportunities for diversification of industry-specific incomes, asset markets change voter incentives in favor of trade liberalization. Asset diversification through asset markets makes “strategic trade policy” redundant, or indeed harmful [9].

Paper [11] reprints an invited lecture that evaluates social justice in the context of consequences of globalization.


[7] Equalizing the cost of success: Equitable graduation rules and the Generalized System of Preferences, Journal of International Economic Integration, spring 1991, 6, 40-51.  James H. Cassing co-author.

[8] Modeling reciprocal trade liberalization: The political-economy and national-welfare perspectives, Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics, September 1995, 131, 503-515.  Peter Moser and Ngo Van Long, co-authors

[8a] Trade liberalization as politically optimal exchange of market access.  In: The New Transatlantic Economy, Matthew Canzoneri, Wilfred Ethier, and Vittorio Grilli (Eds.), Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 295-312.  Peter Moser co-author.

Reprinted in:

·         The Global Trading System, volume 2, Core Rules and Procedures, Kym Anderson and Bernard Hoekman (Eds.), I.B. Tauris and Co Ltd, London and New York, 2002.

·         The WTO and the Political Economy of Trade Policy, Wilfred Ethier and Arye L. Hillman (Eds.), Edward Elgar, Cheltenham UK, 2008, pp. 290 – 307.

[9] Privatization and the political economy of strategic trade policy, International Economic Review, 2001, 42, 535-556.  JoAnne Feeney, co-author.

[10] Trade liberalization through asset markets, Journal of International Economics, October 2004, 64, 151-167.  JoAnne Feeney co-author

Reprinted in:

·         The WTO and the Political Economy of Trade Policy, Wilfred Ethier and Arye L. Hillman (Eds.), Edward Elgar, Cheltenham UK, 2008, pp. 173 - 189.


[11] Globalization and social justice. Singapore Economic Review, 2008, 53, 173 - 189.

·         Singapore Economic Review Public Lecture, Nanyang Technological University, September 2007.


1.1.3 The environment and trade policy

How do environmental interests affect politically determined trade policy? Papers [12] and [12a] distinguish environmental interest groups concerned exclusively with the environment at home (environmentalists as NIMBY’s) and groups concerned with the global environment. In different circumstances, environmental interests can find it in their interest to form political coalitions with domestic producer or consumer interests and to support protectionist or liberal trade policies. [12] was prepared for a conference organized by the GATT (since 1995 the WTO). [12a] is a technical extension of [12].


[12] The influence of environmental concerns on the political determination of international trade policy.  In: Richard Blackhurst and Kym Anderson (Eds.), The Greening of World Trade Issues, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor MI, 1992, pp. 195 – 220.  Heinrich W. Ursprung co-author.

[12a] Greens, supergreens, and international trade policy: Environmental concerns and protectionism.  In: Carlo Carvaro (Ed.), Trade, Innovation, Environment, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston and Dordrecht, 1994, pp. 75 – 108.  Heinrich W. Ursprung, co-author.



1.1.4 Market structure as a determinant of protection

Paper [13] addresses the question: how does market structure affect politically determined trade policy? The answers take into account the public-good nature of the benefits for firms in a protected industry and how the number of firms and market or profit shares affect voluntary contributions to obtaining the collectively sought policy. [14] and [14a] extend the original model and elaborate on conclusions.


[14] Market structure, politics, and protection.  In: International Trade and Trade Policy, Elhanan Helpman and Assaf Razin (Eds.), MIT Press, 1991, pp. 118 – 40.

[14a] Protection, lobbying, and marker structure, Journal of International Economics, August 2001, 54, 383 – 409.  Ngo Van Long and Antoine Soubeyran co-authors.

[14b] Lobbying for tariff protection and allocation of entrepreneurial resources.  In: New Developments in International Trade: Theoretical and Empirical Investigations, Seiichi Katayama and Kaz Miyagiwa (Eds.), Research Institute for Economics and Business Administration, Kobe, 2003, pp. 129 – 46.  Ngo Van Long and Antoine Soubeyran co-authors.



1.1.5 The multinational firm and foreign investment

Multinational firms can supply a market from either local production or imports. [15] shows how the decision affects trade policy. [16] describes trade policy when protection is contingent on supply of a market through local production.


[15] The multinational firm, political competition, and international trade policy, International Economic Review, May 1993, 34, 347 – 63.  Heinrich W. Ursprung, co-author.

[16] Foreign investment and endogenous protection with protectionist quid pro quo, Economics and Politics, March 1999, 11, 1 – 12.  Heinrich Ursprung, co-author.



1.1.6 Protection as insurance

Moral hazard and adverse selection are impediments to private insurance against income declines associated with changes in a country’s terms of trade. [17] showed that protection can in principle substitute for the absent insurance markets. [18] showed how moral hazard and adverse selection arise when producers are aware that governments deciding on protection are influenced by political sensitivities to unemployment.


[17] Risk aversion, terms of trade variability, and social consensus trade policy, Oxford Economic Papers, June 1986, 38, 234-242.  James H. Cassing, Ngo Van Long co-authors.

[18] Workers as insurance: Anticipated government intervention and factor demand, Oxford Economic Papers, December 1987, 39, 813-820.  Eliakim Katz, Jacob Rosenberg co-authors.

Reprinted in:

The WTO and the Political Economy of Trade Policy, Wilfred Ethier and Arye L. Hillman (Eds.), Edward Elgar, Cheltenham UK, 2008, pp. pp. 585 – 592.



1.1.7 Trade embargoes

The risk of trade embargoes affects international trade policy.

[19] investigated public-policy responses to embargo threat under conditions of learning-by-doing as exist for many goods required for national defense.

Paper [20] considered an exhaustible resource such as oil subject to an embargo threat but also domestically available. Domestic supplies that are used are not be available for use if the embargo eventuates.

In [21] foreign monopoly suppliers of oil also have monopoly power in the international capital market: the joint foreign monopoly power affects the rate of interest, which affects intertemporal profit-maximizing production.


[19] Embargo threat, learning and departure from comparative advantage, Journal of International Economics, May 1979, 9, 265 – 75.  Ruth W. Arad co-author.

[20] Pricing and depletion of an exhaustible resource when there is anticipation of trade disruption, Quarterly Journal of Economics, May 1983, 98, 215 – 33.  Ngo Van Long co-author.

[21] Monopolistic recycling of oil revenue and intertemporal bias in oil depletion and trade, Quarterly Journal of Economics, August 1985, 100, 597 – 624.  Ngo Van Long co-author.



1.1.8  Incentives for illegal activity

International trade policy affects incentives for illegal activity. [22] describes how protectionist policies, by increasing domestic prices of imports and import-competing goods, increase crime when the goods are readily amenable to theft.


[22] Excise taxes, import restrictions, and the allocation of time to illegal activity, International Review of Law and Economics, December 1984, 4, 213 – 22.  Eliakim Katz co-author.



1.1.9 Surveys

The following are surveys and overviews of the political economy of trade policy.


[23] Policy motives and international trade restrictions, in New Institutional Arrangements for the World Economy, Hans-Jürgen Vosgerau (Ed.), Springer, Heidelberg, 1989, pp. 284 – 302.

[24] La politica del commercio internazionale per gli anni 2000: idee fondamentali e sviluppi.  Il Futuro delle Relazione Economiche Internazionale, Saggi in onere di Fredrico Caffè, a cure di Giancarlo Corsetti, Guido M. Rey, and Gian Cesare Romagnoli, FrancoAngeli, Milano 2001, pp. 27 – 63.  International trade policy circa 2000: Fundamental issues and developments: translated by Maria Grazia Nicolosi.

[25] International trade policy: explaining departure from free trade.  In: Encyclopedia of Public Choice, Charles Rowley and Friedrich Schneider (Eds.), Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, 2003, pp. 129 – 138.  See also Departure from free trade: A survey, CEPR Discussion paper 3707, January 2003.

Reprinted in:

·         Charles K. Rowley and Friedrich Schneider (Eds.), Readings in Public Choice and Constitutional Political Economy. Springer, New York, 2008.

[26] Trade liberalization and globalization.  In: Encyclopedia of Public Choice, Charles Rowley and Friedrich Schneider (Eds.), Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, pp. 312 – 20.  See also Trade liberalization and globalization: A survey, CEPR Discussion paper 3845, March 2003.

Reprinted in:

·         Charles K. Rowley and Friedrich Schneider (Eds.), Readings in Public Choice and Constitutional Political Economy. Springer, New York, 2008.


[27] Globalization and the political economy of international trade policy.  In: Trade Policy Reforms and Development: Essays in Honor of Professor Peter Lloyd, Volume II, Sisira Jayasuriya (Ed.), Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, U.K., 2005, pp. 3 – 22.


[28] “Introduction”. Wilfred J. Ethier and Arye L. Hillman, 2008. The WTO and the Political Economy of Trade Policy. Edward-Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, pp. vxix.


[29] The gains from trade and refusal to trade.  In: Ngo Van Long, Makoto Tawada, and Binh Tran Nam (Eds.), Globalization and Emerging Issues in Trade Theory and Policy. A volume in honor of the 80th birthday of Murray Kemp, Emerald Group Publishing, 2008, pp. 193 – 208.





The following papers address issues of comparative advantage and trade.


1.2.1     True and “revealed” comparative advantage

1.2.2     The factor content of international trade

1.2.3     Departure from the law of one price

1.2.4     Domestic monopoly and dumping

1.2.5     Trade diversion as a prisoners’ dilemma



1.2.1 True and “revealed” comparative advantage

[30] showed that the measure known as “revealed comparative advantage” does not as a general rule reveal comparative advantage. A condition can be established for the measure to hold.

[30] Observations on the relation between "revealed comparative advantage" and comparative advantage as indicated by pre-trade relative prices, Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, June 1980, 116, 315 – 21.

See also:

·        Jeroen Hinloopen and Charles Van Marrewijk, 2008. Empirical relevance of the Hillman condition and comparative advantage. Applied Economics 40, 2313 – 2328.


1.2.2 The factor content of international trade

[31] reported on the computation of the energy factor-content of U.S. trade in the context of the Heckscher-Ohlin Theorem. For Israel, issues of the factor content of trade and the applicability of the Heckscher-Ohlin Theorem arose in the context of free-trade agreements (paper [33]).

Papers [32] and [34] investigate the meaning of the factor-intensity-reversal qualification of the Heckscher-Ohlin Theorem when traded goods are defined as aggregates but reversals occur for the underlying industry-specific production technologies.


[31] Energy, the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem and U.S. international trade, American Economic Review, March 1978, 68, 96-106. Clark W. Bullard, III co-author.

Reprinted in:

·        Bertil Ohlin: Critical Assessments, edited by John Cunningham Wood, Routledge, London, 1997.

[32] Factor-intensity reversals: Conceptual experiments with traded goods aggregates, Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, June 1979, 115, 272-283. Se'ev Hirsch co-author.

[33] The factor-content characteristics of Israel's trade in a multilateral setting, in The Economic Integration of Israel in the EEC, edited by Herbert Giersch, J.C.B. Mohr, Paul Siebeck: Tübingen, 1980, pp. 175 – 198. Gideon Fishelson, Se'ev Hirsch co-authors

[34] The commodity composition of trade and the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem in the presence of aggregate and commodity specific factor-intensity reversals, Journal of International Economics, August 1984, 17, 159-172. Franklin M. Fisher co-author.

Reprinted in:

·        Aggregation: Aggregate Production Functions and Related Topics, chapter 11, pp. 261 – 275, Franklin M. Fisher, Harvester, Wheatsheaf and MIT Press, 1992.


1.2.3 Departure from the law of one price

The law of one price predicts a single world price for traded goods, after making allowance for transport and transactions costs. The transactions costs include impediments to commodity arbitrage because of uncertainty about the duration and magnitude of price differences.

[35] A proposition on short-run departures from the law of one price: Unanticipated inflation, relative price dispersion and commodity arbitrage, European Economic Review, January 1982, 17, 51-60. Mario I. Blejer co-author.

Reprinted (in Spanish):

·        Una explicacion de las desviaciones a corto plazo de la ley del precio unico: inflacion imprevista, dispersion de precios relativos y arbitraje commercial”. In Inflacion y varialibidad de los precios relativos, Mexico, DF, 1984, pp. 75 – 86.


1.2.4 Domestic monopoly and dumping

Papers [36] and [37] showed how domestic monopoly affects utilization for protection of a tariff and quota. Paper [39] showed how domestic monopoly underlies dumping at less than marginal cost. [39] considered public-policy responses to foreign monopoly.


[36] Domestic monopoly and redundant tariff protection, Journal of International Economics, February 1979, 9, 47-55.  Gideon Fishelson co-author.

[37] On water-in-the-quota, Canadian Journal of Economics, May 1980, 13, 310 – 317. Edward Tower, Gideon Fishelson co-authors.

[38] Domestic uncertainty and foreign dumping, Canadian Journal of Economics, August 1986, 19, 403-416. Eliakim Katz co-author

[39] On the use of trade policy measures by a small country to counter foreign monopoly power, Oxford Economic Papers, June 1985, 37, 346 – 52.  Joseph Templeman co-author.


1.2.5 Trade diversion as a prisoners’ dilemma

Paper [40] shows how trade diversion is a case of a multi-person prisoners’ dilemma.

[40] Resolving the puzzle of welfare-reducing trade diversion: A prisoners' dilemma interpretation, Oxford Economic Papers, April 1989, 41, 452-455.





1.3.1     The political economy of migration policy

1.3.2     Why do people emigrate?

1.3.3     Illegal immigration

1.3.4     Host-country benefits





1.3.1 The political economy of migration policy

Neo-classical models base predictions of incentives for migration on differences in factor returns and treat movement of capital and of people symmetrically. However, migration of people introduces complex social and economic considerations that are absent from the “international labor movements” in a neo-classical model. [41] introduced political-economy considerations into the explanation for the determination of countries’ migration policies.

The political-economy themes associated with migration are repeated and expanded in paper [42]. Paper [43] considers whether migration can be a solution to demographic problems affecting sustainability of intergenerational transfers; the different policy preferences of young and old in a host population are noted. Paper [44] investigates policy preferences of a host-country population when immigrants are disproportionately unemployed and receive tax-financed welfare payments – and unemployment is dues to efficiency wages.

[41] The political economy of migration policy. In: Horst Siebert (Ed.), Migration: A Challenge for Europe, J.C.B. Mohr Paul Siebeck, Tübingen, 1994, pp. 263 – 282.

[42] Beyond international factor movements: Cultural preferences, endogenous policies, and the migration of people, an overview. In: Jaime de Melo, Riccardo Faini, and Klaus Zimmermann, editors, Migration: The Controversies and the Evidence. Cambridge University Press, 1999, pp. 76 – 91. Avi Weiss, co-author.

[43] Immigration and intergenerational transfers. In: Economic Policy for Aging Societies, Horst Siebert, editor. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht and Boston, 2002, pp. 213 – 26.

[44] Unemployed immigrants and voter sentiment in the welfare state, Journal of Public Economics, August 2003, 87, 1641-1655.  Gil Epstein co-author.

Reprinted in:

·        International Economic Policies in a Globalized World, Seiichi Katayama and Heinrich Ursprung, editors, Springer, Berlin, 2004, pp. 119 – 32.


1.3.2 Why do people emigrate?

Network effects explain the locations to which people choose to emigrate: [45] describes how choice of location can be explained as a herd effect. Paper [46] describes how the decision to emigrate from societies with rent-seeking and rent-extracting cultures is affected by personal proximity to the dispensers of rents, who themselves have no incentive to emigrate so long as their rent-extracting privileges.

[45] Herd effects and migration.  Discussion working paper 1811, Centre for Policy Studies, London, 1998.  Gil Epstein co-author.

[46] The king never emigrates, Review of Development Economics, 1999, 3, 107 – 21. Gil Epstein, Heinrich Ursprung co-authors.

Reprinted in:

·        Forty Years of Research on Rent Seeking 2 – Applications: Rent Seeking in Practice. Roger D. Congleton, Arye L. Hillman, Kai Konrad (Eds.), Springer 2008, pp. 265 – 79.


1.3.3 Illegal immigration

Illegal immigration raises questions of how legal immigrants become illegal (paper [47]) and why laws against illegal immigration are selectively enforced contingent on the sectors in which immigrants are employed (paper [48]).

[47] Creating illegal immigrants, Journal of Population Economics, 1999, 12, 3-21. Gil Epstein and Avi Weiss co-authors.

[48] A theory of permissible illegal immigration, European Journal of Political Economy, December 1999, 15, 585-604. Avi Weiss, co-author.


1.3.4 Host-country benefits

Before the publication of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem in 1943, the Brigden Report had in 1927 justified protectionist policies on grounds of incentives for immigration and the host-country benefits from a larger population (paper [49]). In [50] host-country benefits from immigration take the form of sharing of collective costs of public goods.

[49] The Brigden Theorem, Economic Record, September 1977, 53, 434-446.

[50] The collective good motive for immigration policy, Australian Economic Papers, December 1979, 18, 243-257. Ruth W. Arad co-author.



A note on the distribution of tariff proceeds, Economic Record, March 1970, 46, 117 - 119. David E. James co-author.

The case for terminal protection for declining industries: Comment, Southern Economic Journal, July 1977, 43, 155 – 160.

Unilateral and bilateral trade policies for a minimum-wage economy, Journal of International Economics, August 1981, 11, 407 – 413.

On the dynamic non-equivalence of tariffs and quotas in the monetary model of the balance of payments, Journal of International Economics, August 1982, 13, 163 – 69.  Also: Reply, May 1985, 18, 381 – 82.  Mario I. Blejer co-author.

Tariff-revenue transfers to protectionist interests: Compensation for reduced protection or supplementary reward for successful lobbying? Public Choice, 1988, 58, 169 – 172.

Comment on: The political economy of protectionism: Tariffs and retaliation in the timber industry. In: Trade Policy Issues and Empirical Analysis, edited by Robert E. Baldwin, University of Chicago Press for National Bureau of Economic Research, 1988, 364 – 68.

Comment on: Technology policy in the completed European market. In: European Integration: Trade and Industry, edited by L. Alan Winters and Anthony Venables, Cambridge University Press, 1991, 161 – 64.

Comment on: Capital controls in direct democracies. In: European Integration in the World Economy, edited by Hans-Jürgen Vosgerau, Springer, 1992, 772 – 74