With the rapid developments in the peace process, the role of the US-Israel security relationship becomes increasingly important. In taking risks on the ground and preparing for territorial withdrawal, Israeli defense requirements will increase, and the role of the US in offsetting these risks is vital.
However, a recent report published by the United States General Accounting Office on the Arrow missile defense project serves as a reminder the complexity and sensitivity of the strategic relationship between Israel and the US. The Arrow is an advanced research and development project conducted by Israel, with significant cooperation and funding from the US government. After a number of test failures, including the cancellation of a recent test when the target missile failed, and the future of the effort is uncertain.
The GAO's report was highly critical of the project, and according to press summaries, focused on three main issues; the cost of the project, its objectives, and control over the uses of American technology, (an indirect reference to charges that Israel had transferred know-how or components to other countries). The authors of the report recommend that contracts already signed between the US and Israel be revised retroactively, that funding be reviewed, and regulation over the use of technology be tightened.
The technical information in the report is not new, and the critiques have been heard before, both in Israel and the US. The costs of a research project of this magnitude, whether undertaken in Israel or in the US, involving technologies that have never been tested, are always very difficult to estimate. In this respect, the Arrow is very different from the Lavi combat aircraft, which was also funded by the US for some years, but which involved relatively known systems for which costs could at least be estimated.
Technologically, as many analysts have noted, the prospects for any type of ballistic missile defense system, including the Arrow, are highly uncertain. During the Gulf War, when the US had complete control over the skies in the Middle East, and total technological superiority, the American Patriot missiles failed to intercept a single Iraqi Scud. Ballistic missile defense is extremely complex and costly, involving many different stages, many of which have yet to be developed. The American Strategic Defense Initiative, on which tens of billions of dollars were spent, failed to demonstrate any promising approach to this challenge. In fact, many members of the Israeli defense establishment share this view, and do not expect the Arrow to provide a definitive solution to the threat posed by ballistic missiles.
Since all of this was known, the question is why the US GAO report focused on these issues, when the importance of the Arrow lies elsewhere. This project is not simply another technological pipedream, and its objectives go well beyond the goal of shooting down incoming missiles, and to the heart of strategic cooperation between the US and Israel. This effort began in the late 1980s, following the cancellation of the Lavi combat aircraft, and in the wake of American pressures on Israel to halt exports of advanced military technology to countries such as China and South Africa. In order for Israel to maintain its advanced military industrial base, and to support the operations of Israel Aircraft Industries, which is the country's largest employer, alternatives had to be developed. The research and development phases of the Arrow project provide such an alternative, regardless of whether this system is produced and deployed in later years.
American support for the Arrow also is an important component of Washington's commitment to maintaining Israel's qualitative edge. As US defense firms maintain employment by selling highly advanced technology to Saudi Arabia and other Arab states, the American government has repeatedly committed itself to maintaining Israel's access to advanced technology has increased. This commitment was repeated by President Bush in his first meeting with Prime Minister Rabin in August 1992, and by the Clinton Administration. If the American government were to unilaterally pull the plug on the Arrow project, it would seriously undermine the guarantees that have been made to Israel, but this issue is apparently not even discussed in the GAO report.
The GAO report's reference to charges that Israel has transferred American technology to third countries, in violation of Israeli commitments, is also hard understand. These claims have surfaced periodically since the 1970s, and have never been substantiated. During the period of political tension between the Bush administration and the Shamir government in 1991, a report by the State Department Controller emphasized these charges, which were also highlighted in the press, and a US inspection team was sent. The team, which was given full access to Israeli installations, reported finding no evidence of illegal transfers, and the US Ambassador to Israel suggested that an apology was in order. Such charges seem to surface to support political goals designed to weaken US-Israel strategic ties, and their appearance in a GAO report (without any evidence) suggests similar motivations.
In a broader sense, the fact that a US government agency published a detailed report on a highly sensitive Israeli military project raises some basic questions regarding the relationship between Washington and Jerusalem, and provides a reminder of the fragility of these relations. The Arrow has been discussed in great detail in periodic meetings between officials, and many analyses have been written. While it is true that the US GAO has a responsibility to analyze the activities and allocations of the US government, cooperative ventures such as the Arrow should be handled differently. For example, there is no reason that the Israeli Comptroller, which has been highly critical of Ministry of Defense projects in the past, including the Lavi, should not be brought it, and the report issued to both governments.
In many ways, the strategic relationship and level of cooperation is a barometer of the status of the broader links between Washington and Jerusalem. Israelis are very aware of the level of dependence and vulnerability in this relationship, and examine every nuance and change. Whatever its shortcomings, the Arrow project is the largest and most visible example of cooperation, and the the tone and focus of the GAO report demonstrated a lack of interest in Israeli perceptions, and in the nature of the strategic relationship, and this is not helpful for Israel or for the peace process.
Even under the most fortuitous of circumstances, the agreement
between Israel and the PLO is not likely to mark the end of the Arab-
Israeli conflict. After decades of violence and warfare, and the deep
hatred and hostilities that exist, a sudden transformation to peace
is not plausible. The euphoria surrounding the collapse of the Soviet
Union and predictions of "the end of history" have been replaced by
the more sober and realistic understanding that many regions have
become more violent and dangerous. Similarly, implementation of the
agreement between Israel and the PLO may create conditions for
continued or extended warfare and terror.
There are few, if any examples, of major ethno-national and
religious conflicts that have been ended through negotiation and
compromise. When different groups have competing historic claims to
the same land, a long history of warfare and violence, and a deep
hatred for each other, the disputes appear to be unending. In the
Balkans, Northern Ireland, Cyprus, and the remnants of the Soviet
Empire in Central Asia, ethnic conflicts have continued for
generations. Even the industrial and "enlightened" West is not
immune. In Canada, the distrust and conflict between the French and
English erupts periodically in violence.
Historically, such conflicts have only ended after the complete
victory of one of the parties, and the elimination of the other, or,
as in the case of France and Germany, decisive defeat and lengthy
military occupation. This does not mean that peace is impossible;
this case may be exceptional, but all of these counter-examples should
provide a note of caution and realism for Israeli leaders.
Although optimists can point to progress among some Palestinians,
many, and perhaps the majority have still not accepted the legitimacy
of Israel, Jewish rights in Jerusalem, and need to compromise. The
creation of a Palestinian state will not end the power of radical and
irredentist forces, and terrorism is likely continue. Beyond the
Palestinians, radical Arab and Islamic groups, from Algeria to Iran,
will also continue to Holy War against Israel, or use their opposition
to the Jewish State to support claims for leadership in the region.
At best, negotiation and agreements can provide the basis for
what academics call "conflict management", rather than the more
idealistic peace based on mutual acceptance. If this conflict can be
contained, wars prevented or limited, and the extent of terrorism can
be significantly diminished, while some cooperation and channels of
communication are established, this process can be considered a
success. In this sense, US-Soviet relations between the mid-1960s and
the late 1980s, and the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty provide useful
models. The Camp David accords led to the demilitarization of the
Sinai and the establishment of diplomatic relations, and as a result
of these measures, despite periodic tensions, military clashes between
Israel and Egypt, at least so far.
Based on the texts that have been published, the proposed
agreement between Israel and the PLO does not create a foundation for
conflict management. The negotiators seem to have failed to
anticipate continued conflict, and they did not include provisions for
limiting and managing crises. The lack of explicit provisions to deal
with terrorism and violence invites conflict. The combination of
autonomy and a Palestine police force provide can be expected to be
exploited to protect terrorists and inhibit or block Israeli military
operations beyond the green line. Terror is likely to increase,
Israel will respond, and, as in the case of Lebanon, the cycle of
violence will resume with even greater ferocity.
The agreement, which was drafted quickly by a small group, is
also very ambiguous, inviting conflicting interpretations. The
Palestinians expect quick Israeli military withdrawal, the creation of
a state within a short time period, and an official role in Jerusalem,
while the Israeli interpretation is quite different. This is, in
itself, a likely source of increased conflict, rather than conflict
management.
Successful conflict management also depends on the development of
working relationships and cooperation between Israeli and Palestinian
leaders, to replace the hostile and conflictual relations that have
dominated to date. Regular exchanges of information and visible signs
of cooperation are necessary. Instead of exploiting crises and
threatening violence, the Palestinians will have to work with Israeli
leaders to defuse potential conflicts. The foundations for this
cooperation must be created before the agreement can be implemented.
In addition, conflict management in the Middle East depends on
the committment of the other major powers in this process, beginning
with Syria, Jordan and Lebanon, and extending to Saudi Arabia, the
Gulf States and North Africa. The rejectionist states, including
Iran, Iraq and Libya will increase their support for terrorism and
seek allies in another war against Israel. Thus, it is vital that the
other states make their peace with Israel now, and develop the
mechanisms necessary for conflict management throughout the region.
The boycott of Israel and historic refusal to participate in joint
efforts involving Israelis must be replaced by close working
relationships to prevent the inevitable pressures and crises from
erupting into large scale wars.
The most important element in conflict management is the
recognition that the transition from decades of war and deep hatred to
an immediate and all-embracing "peace" is extremely difficult. As is
clear in other parts of the world, the causes of conflict between
peoples are deeply rooted, and if they are ignored, they reach the
surface quickly. If the agreements between Israel and the PLO lead to
an unrealistic sense of euphoria and "the end of history", it will not
take long for violence and terror to resurface.
What was the Rabin-Peres entourage doing in Morocco on its way
back from Washington after signing the Declaration of Principles with
Arafat? The first announcements of this stopover linked the visit
with the establishment of diplomatic relations between Israel and
Morocco, to be followed immediately by a similar move by Tunisia. In
Washington and Jerusalem, press reports suggested that two states in
the Persian Gulf (some reports named Kuwait and the United Arab
Emirates) would also announce ties with Israel.
The Israeli leaders left Morocco, after a tour of the King's
palace and swimming pool, with some symbolic gains, but without the
announcement of diplomatic links. After the event, a number of
explanations were offered to the press, generally passing off this
high-profile event as an Israeli expression of gratitude to the King
for his role in facilitating the peace agreement with the PLO. If
this had been the purpose of the trip, Rabin and Peres should have
headed for Oslo. Despite, or because of these less than satisfying
explanations, it seems that while diplomatic recognition had been
dangled before Israel, (perhaps to please the Americans), Rabin and
Peres left Rabat and Casablanca empty handed.
Future progress in the peace process is closely linked to the
pace at which the Arab states formally recognize Israel and establish
diplomatic relations. The Arab-Israeli conflict has always had two
components; the first involved the Palestinians and competing claims
for the land, but the second component was the rejection of the
concept of Israel by the Arab states. In 1948, Jordan, Syria, Iraq
and Egypt invaded the Jewish state in the attempt to claim the land
for themselves and not on behalf of the Palestinians. The more
distant Arab states provided support for the Jihad against the Jewish
state, supporting the economic war through the Arab boycott, and
providing financial assistance (particularly in the case of the oil-
rich Gulf states). The Saudi political/religious establishment has
always been among the most vociferous and generous supporters of the
Arab and Islamic war against Israel.
In fashioning the Madrid process, the United States acknowledged
the need to tackle the Arab-Israeli conflict on two levels, or tracks.
The first focused on bilateral relations between Israel and its
immediate neighbors; the Palestinians, Jordan, and Syria, (Lebanon was
included to preserve the fiction of an independent government). The
second multilateral track included many other Arab states, with a
particular emphasis on Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Morocco, Tunisia, and
Algeria. At the time of the Madrid conference, the oil-producing Gulf
states owed their survival to the American military shield, and their
leaders had indicated a readiness to settle the conflict with Israel
in the context of an agreement with the Palestinians. In Washington,
particularly before and during the Gulf War, American government
officials reported promises from Riyadh and Kuwait to halt the anti-
Israeli propaganda and the economic boycott.
To develop this process of communication and regional
cooperation, five separate multilateral working groups were created
(environment, refugees, arms control, economic cooperation, and
water). These groups have met steadily over the past two years, and
have made some progress. However, the role of the Saudis and Kuwaitis
has been minimal, and members of these delegations often fail to
attend meetings. The economic boycott continues, despite frequent
American government declarations of policy changes in Saudi Arabia and
Kuwait. The Saudis, in particular, maintain a very low profile when
it comes to direct links with Israel.
From the Israeli perspective, the establishment of diplomatic
relations and other visible signs of cooperation are important
components of the peace process. In order to demonstrate that
regional peace is possible, and that territorial withdrawal will not
threaten Israel's security, the major Arab states must begin the
process of "normalization" and establish a broad base for cooperation.
For Egypt, it is important that other Arab states open embassies in
Israel, to end the diplomatic isolation that followed the Peace Treaty
in 1979.
Following the mutual recognition between Israel and the PLO, and
the beginning of negotiations for Palestinian autonomy and an interim
arrangement, it is time for the moderate Arab states to open embassies
in Israel and unambiguously end the economic boycott. For years, the
continued hostility of the Saudis has been explained in terms of a
fear of "being out in front" of the other parties. Now, following the
White House ceremony, Riyadh's leaders no longer have anything to
fear; the PLO has recognized Israel, and the Arab states are only
being asked to follow this lead.
If a number of these Arab states establish diplomatic relations
with Israel, and end participation in the economic boycott, the
momentum that has been established by the Oslo agreements will be
sustained. However, if, even after this breakthrough, most or all of
the moderate Arab states maintain their current policies, skeptics in
Israel will question Arab commitment to this process. The Rabin
government cannot afford to come back from Rabat (or Tunis) empty-
handed again. Now is the time for the Arab states to demonstrate
their commitment to peace, without further excuses or delays.
Relations between nations and people often change in short
intense bursts, and these are followed by very long plateaus with
little movement. At the end of each period of radical change, the
system suddenly freezes, without warning, and, in most cases, the old
conflicts resurface. Amidst the euphoria surrounding the agreements
with the PLO, it is hard for many of the officials involved to imagine
a sudden end to this process. However, at some point, whether in
weeks, months, or after a few years, the thaw may end, and another
long ice age will begin.
In early 1949, the first Arab-Israeli war ended when Israeli
forces repulsed the invading Arab armies and occupied parts of Arab
territory. In exchange for a cease fire, the Arab leaders agreed to
negotiations for permanent peace treaties. The cease-fire agreements
were negotiated in Rhodes, and Israeli forces withdrew, but then, this
process suddenly froze. Instead of peace, terrorism resumed, and the
Arabs began preparations for the "next round" of warfare.
Now, as they move through the negotiations and begin to implement
agreements, Israelis are beginning to ask how the Middle East will
look if this thaw suddenly ends. Which of the political and economic
achievements will be maintained, and what will be the cost (or
benefit) in terms of national security?
This process can be viewed in terms of three stages, beginning
with implementation of the agreement covering the Gaza Strip and
Jericho. If the process ends in its first stage, following the
withdrawal of Israeli forces from these areas, but little else, the
security costs will be minimal, and the benefits may be considerable.
This small area does not provide a viable basis for a hostile
Palestinian state, and the additional security threats are very small.
Politically, the precedent established by the PLO's recognition of
Israel, and the high visibility of the direct contacts between
Palestinian and Israeli leaders is important. The nature of the
conflict has been changed, at least to some degree, and the Arab
effort to deny Israeli legitimacy may have lost some of its force.
Jordan, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and other Arab states have recognized the
existence of Israel on a de facto, if not a de jure basis.
However, if the peace process ends in mid-1994, in the second
stage, following large-scale Israeli redeployment and withdrawal in
the West Bank and Jordan Valley, the balance will be reversed. By
this time, the Palestinians are scheduled to hold elections, and a
radical and revanchist leadership may emerge. Conflict could be
renewed at any time, leading to an abrupt end to the peace process at
this stage.
Once Israeli military control has ended in most of the West Bank,
the establishment of a Palestinian state will be unavoidable. This
state could provide a base for the continuation or resumption of the
conflict against the Jewish state. Under such circumstances, the
differences between various Palestinian groups, such as the PLO and
Hamas, can be expected to be forgotten, just as history has erased the
lines which once divided factions in Serbia. If conflict resumes,
many of the Arab states can be expected to freeze their ties with
Israel, and the progress of the previous stage will dissipate.
Optimists, however, led by Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres,
expect the thaw to reach a third stage. They envision a Middle East
Common Market, open borders, and roads and tourism from Jerusalem and
Tel Aviv to Amman and Damascus, and from there to Riyadh and Istanbul.
They have at least one important precedent; the peace agreement with
Egypt has held for 15 years, and Israelis can now drive from Tel Aviv
to Cairo. But even in this successful example, the relationship is
still precarious, and the challenge posed by Islamic fundamentalists
to the Egyptian government could suddenly reverse this progress. In
addition, the wide demilitarized zone in the Sinai helps prevent
renewed conflict.
In the negotiations with the Palestinians, the second stage is
the longest, and is most vulnerable to sudden disruption. Under the
current schedule, many years will elapse between the withdrawal and
redeployment of the IDF, and the establishment of a network of
institutions linking Israel with the Palestinians and the Arab states.
The major objective for the peace-makers now is to shorten the
gap between the second and third stages, and lower the chances that
the process will end suddenly in the second stage. The third stage
can be advanced by creating a network of cooperation and
interdependence, including economic and transportation systems, now,
before all of the other issues are resolved. At the same time, the
second stage can be streched if Israel maintains a significant
military presence in the Jordan Valley and along the ridge of
mountains that dominates the West Bank, until the Palestinians
demonstrate that this presence is no longer necessary for Israeli
security. By overlapping the second and third stages in these ways,
the probability of a sudden resumption of the conflict can be reduced.
The greatest danger in this process is the assumption that it
will continue uninterrupted, and that we have reached the "end of
history" in the Middle East. After the euphoria of the secret
meetings in Oslo and the "historic handshake" in Washington, it is
time for the negotiators to return to the realities of the region, and
to avoid creating conditions that would lead to a sudden interruption
of this process, and the beginning of another ice age.
Every few months, journalists in search of instant fame and a
small fortune publish yet another book purporting to reveal more
secrets of the Israeli nuclear weapons program. The topic is
exciting, assuring wide attention and sales, and little research is
required since the few people who have any real knowledge of this
complex issue and not talking. Authors can practice creative
journalism, indulging their fantasies and speculative abilities to the
fullest, with no risk of being exposed.
Seymour Hersch used this formula in the Samson Option, in which
he claimed that Israel has produced 200 nuclear weapons. with some
aimed at Russian targets, as well as the obvious Arab capitals.
Hersch never bothered to research his topic in Israel, showing his
ignorance by asserting that the entire subject was taboo here. More
recently, William Burrows and Robert Windrem received banner headlines
with a book entitled Critical Mass, which alleges that Israel
possesses nuclear-tipped submarine launched missiles and atomic land-
mines.
In Israel, each revelation is greeted by large headlines and some
hand wringing. From the early 1950s, when Ben Gurion realized that a
nuclear deterrent might be the only way to prevent the Arabs from
amassing huge armies and succeeding where they had failed in 1948, the
Israeli government has maintained a policy of "deliberate ambiguity".
No government official has confirmed or denied the prevailing
assumption that the Dimona reactor was producing material for making
nuclear weapons. This ambiguity allowed for continued development,
without committing Israel one way or another. More importantly,
ambiguity avoids direct confrontation with Washington, where the
prevention of nuclear proliferation is a major goal.
However, the maintenance of deliberate ambiguity also prevents
the government from responding to sensationalist publications, even
when the claims are totally absurd. Although Israeli decision makers
are well aware of the deep moral and political dilemmas posed by
nuclear weapons, they must accept a policy of silence in order to
preserve the state of uncertainty. This silence leaves the field open
to wild speculation and periodic "revelations".
At one time, publications that allegedly provided details of
Israel's "nuclear secrets" were thought to enhance the visibility and
deterrence effect of the otherwise invisible weapon. Some prominent
analysts even believe that Mordechai Vannunu, who had worked at Dimona
and sold his secrets to the London Sunday Times, was "planted" by the
ever clever Israeli government to enhance deterrence. Even his
abduction and imprisonment were seen as staged for this purpose.
However, the Vannunu affair dispelled much of the remaining technical
uncertainty, and the deterrence value of media attention has
diminished.
At the same time, the pace of publications and the scope of the
claims is accelerating, increasing concern in Israel. Each new book
and television expose raises fears that such publicity will increase
tension between Washington and Jerusalem, and lead to more pressure on
Israel to open Dimona and dismantle the deterrent. The Israeli press
gives prominence to every new publication, creating a sense of panic,
as if this time, the line has finally been crossed, and Israel will
not be able to withstand the onslaught of the anti-nuclear idealists
and abolitionists in the United States and Europe.
In reality, the importance attached to this issue by the US and
the West has been distorted and exaggerated. Most serious analysts
and policy makers know how to separate fact from fiction. In a review
of Critical Mass published in the New York Times, Michael Krepon notes
that the uncertainty, not only with respect to Israel, but also with
respect to Pakistan, India, and other states, "poses real difficulties
for Western reporters". Understating the case, he charges the authors
with "recirculating poorly sourced and flawed reporting", and of
"restating 'facts' in need of further checking." Some claims made
regarding the Israeli nuclear force are dismissed as "dubious" and
other assertions are clearly wrong.
The pace of publications regarding Israeli nuclear policies can
be expected to increase in the buildup to the conference to extend the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), scheduled to begin in March
1995. During this period, the Arab states will press their campaign
to pressure Israel to sign the NPT. There is little that the Israeli
government can do to prevent more "revelations", but their net impact
is limited and should be seen in perspective. The fiasco in Iraq, the
lack of response to North Korea's violations of its commitments, and
the evidence of Iran's efforts to acquire nuclear weapons have
demonstrated the weakness of the NPT.
The Israeli position, linking nuclear arms control in the region
to a broad and proven peace accord, major conventional arms reductions
in the Arab world, and acceptance of regional verification and
inspection, to prevent cheating, is increasingly understood. Most
policy-makers recognize that the Israeli deterrence requirement is
serious and, if anything, is increasing as a result of the peace
process and territorial withdrawal. While Israel is taking security
risks for peace, it cannot be expected to simultaneously give up its
major strategic capability. Indeed, a new report published by the New
York Council on Foreign Relations, suggests (unrealistically) that
given the current balance of power, Israel should join the NPT system
as a nuclear weapons state. While the topic will continue to attract
attention, and generate more unsubstantiated and implausible claims,
this should not lead to panic or to a hasty and unnecessary change in
the overall policy.
The debate over the effort by four PLO members, responsible for
the Maalot school murders, to enter Gaza in Arafat's motorcade,
highlights the profound moral issues that are inherent in the peace
process. These individuals, as well as those who planned the murder
of the Israeli atheletes in the Munich Olympics, have "Jewish blood on
their hands". For Israelis, the heinous and inhuman acts of terrorism
and murder they committed permanently disqualify them from being
partners peaceful coexistence.
Although the crisis was resolved when the four officials returned
to Egypt, the moral issues raised by this incident have not
disappeared so quickly. Indeed, if participation in murder is grounds
for disqualification, then these four are no different, and may even
be less culpable than Yassir Arafat himselft. For over thirty years,
Arafat led the PLO in thousands of acts of random terrorism and
violence. Well before the 1967 war and the so-called occupation,
Arafat and his associates began planting bombs in buses, airplanes,
stores and cinemas. It was Arafat who ordered the kidnaping of
children in Maalot, and the murder of Israeli athletes in Munich. The
mothers, fathers, sisters, brothers, children and friends of these
victims are still haunted by the brutality of these murders.
The large demonstrations that took place in Jerusalem in protest
to Arafat's first visit to Jericho were, in part, a rejection of the
welcome he received. For many Israelis, Arafat has and will always be
the "chief of the murderers", and they are demanding his arrest and
trial. Many people who support the substance of the negotiations
still cringe when they see Arafat treated as a statesman, and not
brought to justice for his crimes against humanity. Like Hitler, the
PLO leader is perceived as the representation of unmitigated evil.
In contrast, most Israeli officials have ignored the moral
issues, and have tried to focus exclusively on what they view as
pragmatic politics. From this perspective, the PLO is seen as the
representative of moderate Palestinians, and Arafat is the only leader
with whom Israel can negotiate a settlement of the conflict.
Whatever his actions and sins in the past, argue Foreign Minister
Shimon Peres and Deputy Minister Yossi Beilin, the opportunity for a
political accommodation takes precedence. After decades of hatred and
total rejection, Arafat and other PLO officials have been transformed
from terrorists to pragmatic diplomats and "partners for peace". Most
foreign diplomats, journalists, and members of the Israeli government
are uninterested or simply incapable of grasping the very real
concerns of morality and justice that the victims of terror and the
wider Israeli public cannot ignore.
For some time, Prime Minister Rabin was the only exception; he
conveyed the dilemma in the signing ceremony in Washington on
September 13 1993, when his body language indicated a clear reluctance
to shake Arafat's blood-stained hands. Since then, and particularly
in his last meeting with Arafat in Paris, Rabin seemed to close the
moral distance he had maintained earlier. Indeed, while he ordered the
eviction of the four PLO officials linked to Maalot, he emphasized
that they had entered illegally, in violation of the Cario agreement,
rather than the fact that these men were responsible for inhuman acts
of terrorism. Rabin also indicated when the PLO finally repealed the
clauses in its Covenant calling for the destruction of Israel, the ban
on these and other terrorists would be lifted.
The ethical "laissez passer" which the Israeli government awarded
to Arafat even took the United States and the Clinton Administration
by surprise. American officials had maintained their distance from
Arafat, and broke off a tentative dialogue with the PLO after the 1991
terrorist attack on Israeli beaches. However, once leaders of the
Israeli government embraced the former terrorist, the United States
had no choice but to end the taboo against direct contact with Arafat.
The Israeli government gave Arafat and the PLO a "moral hechsher"
(kosher approval), and pardoned all previous sins.
The difficulties in reconciling political pragmatism and morality
are far from unique to these negotiations and the case of Arafat.
During World War II, the United States and Britain formed a pragmatic
alliance with the Soviet Union to fight the Nazis, despite the purges,
gulags and mass murders that characterized Stalin's rule. At the same
time, neither Churchill nor Roosevelt sought to whitewash the Soviet
dictator or grant him moral legitimacy. Stalin was the lesser of two
evils, and however repugnant, they had little choice but to do
business with him.
Similarly, in the 1930s, Ben Gurion worked with the British to
fight the Nazis, despite the immorality of London's policies limiting
the immigration of Jews to Eretz Yisrael and preventing Jewish self-
defense against Arab terror. Pragmatism took precedence over
morality, but that did not mean that moral issues were of no
consequence. Relations between the leaders of the Yishuv and the
Mandate authorities were businesslike, but, in sharp contrast to Haim
Weitzman, Ben Gurion consistently reminded both Jews and the British
of the immorality of the latter's policies.
The Israeli leadership and the supporters of the peace process
have tried to compare negotiations with Arafat and the PLO to the
Egyptian-Israeli talks involving Anwar Sadat. The Egyptian leader was
responsible for the 1973 Yom Kippur war, which took thousands of lives
(far more than those lost to terrorism), and he expressed support for
the Nazis during World War II. However, when Sadat came to Jerusalem
in 1977 ready to negotiate a peace treaty, his past actions were
forgotten or forgiven.
There are some important moral differences between Arafat and
Sadat, however. In contrast to the PLO, the Egyptians did not engage
in the indiscriminate murder of civilians. In the context of
international relations, Sadat's actions were legitimate, however
violent, and Arafat's were not. There is a vast difference between
war, however repugnant, and vicious and entirely immoral terrorism
directed against innocent civilians.
At best, negotiations between Israeli leaders and the PLO are
pragmatic political efforts designed to lower the level of violence
and terrorism. These negotiations do not erase the decades of heinous
crimes, and do not require that the basic demands of justice and
morality be forgotten. Roosevelt and Churchill were able to develop a
pragmatic working relationship with Stalin without forgiving his
crimes, and there is no reason that Rabin and Peres must embrace
Arafat and grant de-facto pardons to terrorists in the process.
The question of Israel's nuclear status is still a major element
in relations with Egypt, and the issue was raised again in last week's
Cairo summit. Despite Foreign Minister Peres' earlier claims that a
resolution was close, and reports of Israeli gestures on this issue,
the meeting ended without a any sign of change in the policies of
either country.
The immediate source of this dispute is the approach of the
conference that will decide on the extension of the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty. This conference will begin in April 1995 in
New York, where delegates from the 167 countries which are parties to
the 1970 NPT will meet. Article X of the NPT calls for a conference
after 25 years to "decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force
indefinitely or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or
periods". If the majority of the participants vote to extend the NPT,
whether indefinitely or for a limited period, the decision will be
binding on all the current NPT signatories (even those, such Egypt,
that are expected to vote against extension).
For 25 years, Israel has rejected pressure to sign this
agreement, in part because the nuclear deterrent is seen as essential
to guarantee survival and, in part, because the NPT has failed to
prevent proliferation in Iraq, and, it is now feared, Iran. If Israel
signed the NPT, as demanded by Egypt, it would be giving up its
nuclear deterrent, and in a few years, would have no response to the
Iranian and revived Iraqi nuclear capabilities. In addition, Israel
still needs to deter the threats posed by Egyptian and Syrian forces,
which are equipped with thousands of modern tanks, combat aircraft,
missiles, and chemical weapons.
Nevertheless, Jerusalem is coming under tremendous pressure to
change its policy and sign the NPT, or to at least take some steps in
this direction in the build-up to the 1995 conference. Most of the
pressure comes from Cairo, which has seized this issue as a political
vehicle by which to reassert its role as the leader of the Arab world,
and as a means of removing Israel's deterrent option and restoring the
Egyptian and Arab military superiority. Egypt is also attempting to
gain the support of other Arab, Islamic, and non-aligned states in
this campaign. If they succeed, and a majority of states vote against
indefinite or long term extension of the NPT at the 1995 conference,
this will severely weaken or even destroy the NPT and the
international non-proliferation regime.
This poses a dilemma for Israel, since, despite the limitations
of the NPT, Israel has strategic and political interests in the
indefinite extension of this international agreement. In contrast to
the failure in Iraq, the nuclear non-proliferation regime has
prevented the spread of nuclear weapons to Egypt, Syria, Libya, and
other countries in the Middle East. In a broader sense, the
NPT is an important element in international order and stability. A
world of many nuclear powers would be highly unstable, and would
undermine the ability of the United States to intervene in regional
conflicts, including the Middle East. The NPT is a key element in
American foreign and defense policy, and as Washington's major Middle
Eastern ally, Israel is under pressure from the US to make some
gesture of support towards the indefinite extension of the NPT.
In the effort to resolve this dilemma, Israel has declared its
readiness to discuss arrangements in a regional context, such as the
proposed Middle East Nuclear Weapons Free Zone. This would require
the participation of all the states in the region, including Syria,
Iran and Iraq, and would supplement existing safeguards with special
measure designed for the Middle East. These proposals are being
discussed in the multilateral Arms Control and Regional Security
(ACRS) talks that began after the 1991 Madrid conference. Iran, Iraq,
Syria, an Libya are boycotting these talks, but a framework for future
action is being developed, in the hope that political changes in these
states will also lead to policy changes.
Limitations on the acquisition of conventional weapons by Arab
countries are also necessary components of any regional arms control
regime. Any Israeli gestures on the nuclear issue must be accompanied
by limits on Egyptian and Syrian conventional forces. Egypt faces no
external threats, keeps two-thirds of its forces just outside the
Sinai demilitarized zone, and continues to augment its army with F-16
aircraft and modern American M-1 Abrams tanks, now being manufactured
in Egypt. While pressuring Israel for concessions, Egypt should be
pressed to diffuse this threat.
The combination of regional limits on weapon of mass destruction
(including of course, nuclear weapons), linked to agreements on the
control of conventional weapons provide the best hope for resolution
of the Israeli NPT dilemma. Together, these will meet the security
requirements of both Israel and Egypt. However, without both
elements, attempts to force Israel's hand will damage the Middle East
peace process, and will not help the NPT.
While the PLO is building its propaganda campaign to redivide
Jerusalem and make this city the capital of a Palestinian state,
Israel is paralyzed. The Palestinians are using the same tactics that
converted the news clips of the intifada into the Oslo agreements and
autonomy. Staged demonstrations and other "media events" coordinated
by the Faisal Husseini in the Orient House are creating broad
awareness and support for Arab claims on Jerusalem.
Despite this threat to the heart of the Jewish people, the
Rabin government, like its predecessors, is taking no action,
fearing a disruption of the peace process. Although Ehud Olmert,
the Mayor of Jerusalem, threatens to act, even if he has the legal
authority to close the Orient House (which is zoned for use as a
hotel), without a carefully prepared public relations campaign, the
political costs of this move, in isolation, would be very high.
Israeli leaders have given little if any thought to the long-term
political offensive necessary to maintain control of
Jerusalem. The celebrations of the 3000th anniversary of King
David's founding of Jerusalem, planned for 1997, are small steps in
the right direction, but by itself, this event will have little impact
on the media or the diplomatic community.
The events that occurred between 1948 and 1967, when the
Arabs controlled the Jewish Quarter of Jerusalem, provide a firm
foundation for such a public-relations offensive. During that
period, the Palestinians sought to systematically erase every trace
from 3000 years of Jewish life in Jerusalem. After the 1967 war,
these deliberate and organized acts of vandalism were documented by
the Israeli government's Commission for the Examination of the
Desecration of the Burial Grounds on the Mount of Olives.
The Hurva, the central synagogue of the Ashkenazi community,
originally built in the early 18th century, was totally destroyed, as
was Tifereth Israel. The complex of four synagogues, Yohanan Ben
Zaki, Eliyahu Hanavi, Istanbuli, and Kahal Zion (also known the Middle
Synagogue), was totally desecrated and only the broken walls remained.
When the Jewish Quarter was retaken in 1967, these sites were ruins,
filled with dung, garbage, and animal carcasses. A road was carved
directly through the Jewish Cemetery on the Mount of Olives, which
dates back to the Second Temple, and 38,000 graves were defaced or
destroyed.
To preserve a united and Jewish Jerusalem, and to prevent a
return to the pre-1967 occupation and a repeat of the campaign of
desecration, Israel needs to take and maintain a broad offensive. In
addition to publicizing the way in which the Palestinians
"protected" Jerusalem when this area was under their control, the
the hundreds of institutions and the thousands of individuals whose
property was destroyed should begin legal actions against the
Palestinian authority and its leaders.
The financial aspect of this process, as well as the outcome, is
secondary; the major objective is to create media attention and
diplomatic pressure. A sustained series of public hearings and
televised trials over a number of years will focus attention on the
Palestinian responsibility for the systematic destruction of
Jerusalem, and provide a rationale and support for rejection of
Palestinian claims for any sovereignty or autonomy in this city.
It should also be possible to identify those individuals who
took part in the desecration and destruction of this historic and
religious sites. What role did Faisal Husseini and his family play in
this process? (His uncle, Haj Amin al-Husseini was the Mufti of
Jerusalem and responsible for much of the hatred and terrorism against
Jews before and during the 1948 war.) Although the Jordanian
government and military were legally responsible for the Jewish
Quarter, and will share much of the blame, the Palestinians were the
major offenders.
In every political conflict that has arisen since 1967, Israel
has been on the defensive, and has been losing ground. The
Palestinians have seized and held the initiative, attacking and
advancing at every turn. The PLO is now applying the same strategy to
Jerusalem, and the Israeli response has been typically weak, defensive
and reactive.
In international politics, like in war, a defensive strategy
gives the enemy the ability to choose the nature of the engagement,
and to control its outcome with the knowledge that it has nothing to
lose. As long as our government is strictly defensive, the PLO has
nothing to lose in putting pressure on Israel to redivide Jerusalem
and allow the Palestinians to declare the city their "historic
capital". If Israel and the Jewish people hope to win the battle for
Jerusalem, we must adopt an offensive strategy and fight on a broad
front.
After the recent terrorist attack in Jerusalem, the United States
government issued an "advisory" to American citizens, urging them to
stay off Israeli busses. The US routinely issues
such warnings regarding the dangers of war and terrorism for countries
such as Pakistan, Lebanon, Egypt, Sri Lanka, and Russia, and similar
statements have been made in the past with respect to Israel. In this
sense, the American State Department serves as equivalent of a global
weather forecaster, issuing broad and seemingly objective judgments
about dangers from terrorism and violence.
In this case, however, the pronouncement out of Washington struck
me as particularly absurd. In the first place, there is a bitter
irony in the fact that the American government, including
the current administration, has pushed so hard for the measures that
have made Israelis cities increasingly vulnerable to Palestinian
terror in the past year. American pressure on Israeli governments
contributed to the withdrawal from Gaza and Jericho, and Palestinian
autonomy under Arafat and the PLO. As a result, Israel lost of
intelligence and control in these areas, making it easier for
terrorists to obtain explosives and use them. IDF officers and
intelligence analysts warn that the further withdrawals will only
increase the dangers. American government officials have also
pressured Israel to continue to allow Palestinians from beyond the
Green Line to enter and work in Israel, thereby increasing the access
of terrorists to Israeli busses and other targets.
While the Israeli government is ultimately responsible for these
policies, Washington cannot pretend to be an uninvolved observer. If
Israel has become a more dangerous place, in part, due to American
policies and perceptions, then perhaps the State Department should
reconsider its own policies, and the fundamental assumptions about the
Palestinian society and terror. If they were honest, the authors of
these official pronouncements would write, "After the Israeli
government took our advice, the dangers of terrorism on busses in Tel
Aviv and Jerusalem has increased."
For Israelis returning from the United States, the irony in the
American warning about the dangers of Israeli busses was even more
apparent. The United States issues advisories about
many other countries, but the greatest danger of violence and random
terror is in American itself. Many cities, including New York, Los
Angeles, Chicago, and Washington DC, are so dangerous that visitors
cannot leave their hotels at night. Drugs, theft, and thrill killings
plague American cities, and are far more dangerous than riding Israeli
busses.
In California and Florida, driving on a freeway can also be a
life-threatening experience. Americans are armed to the teeth, and
arguments over the right of way at an intersection can become a deadly
exchange. The fear of "car-jackings" and other forms of random
violence is pervasive, and Americans are afraid to drive their cars.
In Florida, a number of foreign tourists have been robbed and killed
in the past few years. With so many Israelis visiting (and staying
in) the United States, perhaps it is time for the Israeli Foreign
Ministry to issue a traveler's advisory for this dangerous part of the
world.
The climate of fear and violence does not end in the big cities
or freeways. Pictures of kidnapped children haunt milk cartons, with
rewards offered for information on the whereabouts of youngster who
disappeared five, ten, or, in some cases, even fifteen years ago.
Tables in Southern California shopping malls offer information on how
to place a micro dot on your children's teeth, in order to allow for
identification in the event of kidnapping. As a result, in American
cities, children are imprisoned, afraid to go anywhere on their own,
and parents become full-time chauffeurs.
It is not just ironic -- it is absurd -- that the American
government places so much emphasis on protecting its citizens from the
threat of Islamic terrorists in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv,
while blithely ignoring the daily violence at home. It is time that
the American government altered its focus, and instead of warning its
citizens about the dangers of busses in Israeli cities, began to look
at the violence and killings at home. And at the same time, perhaps
the officials in the State Department can consider their own
contribution to increased terrorism in Israeli cities.
In seven months from now, the Palestinian-Israeli negotiations
will enter the third and last phase. According to the original Oslo
agreement (the 1993 Declaration of Principles), negotiations on the
Permanent Status will begin on May 4 1996. At that time, all those
insoluble issues that have been deferred during the first two stages
of this process will be placed squarely in the center of the table.
On May 4, Yassir Arafat can be expected to present his proposal,
including a Palestinian State from the Jordan Valley to the outskirts
of Tel Aviv, the removal of all Israeli settlements, Palestinian
claims to a "right of return", control over the main water aquifers,
and at least shared sovereignty in Jerusalem.
These issues have all been avoided during the interim talks
because they are the most difficult and intractable, and would have
led to the breakdown in the negotiations. The theory behind the
entire Oslo process was that the successful implementation of the two
interim stages would give Israel and the Palestinians confidence and
vested interests in its continuation. At that point, the leadership
on both sides would have been able to make the difficult concessions
necessary in order to prevent the collapse of the talks. This utopian
view was reflected in the Israeli Foreign Ministry's press releases,
which speak of "a new era of cooperation and co-existence based on
common interest, dignity, and mutual respect."
However, this scenario was always a long-shot, and not much has
happened since the first White House signing ceremony of September 13
1993 to change the odds. On the contrary, although the time-line was
initially designed to provide almost two years between the
implementation of the second stage of the process and the opening of
the last phase of negotiations, in reality, only a few weeks, at most,
will separate these stages.
Continued suicide bombings, and the general Palestinian failure
to fulfill the obligations under the Gaza-Jericho agreements, have
eroded much of the support for the negotiations in Israel. The
government has been able to maintain a very thin majority for the
recently concluded Taba agreement, but there is insufficient public or
political support to go any further until the Palestinians have
responded in kind. In addition, the failure to cooperate with the
Israeli police in capturing or extraditing terrorists, Arafat's
continued calls for Jihad, the PLO's failure to change its charter
calling for the destruction of Israel, and the continued hatred
expressed for Jews and Israel in PLO videos, speeches and propaganda,
have undermined the initial Israeli enthusiasm for this process.
So the most likely scenario for the next year is an impasse,
followed by a breakdown of formal negotiations, and then de-facto
separation between Palestinians and Israelis. The chances of any
agreement on permanent status are very small, but the process of
separation has begun and will continue on a unilateral basis, as
determined by Israeli domestic politics and security requirements. A
Likud victory in the 1996 elections will accelerate the unilateral
process, while a Labor victory will add a few more months or years of
negotiations until the impasse is reached. However, short of a
massive and unprecedented change in the Palestinian leadership, and a
full implementation of all the requirements of the Taba agreement, as
well as a serious clampdown on terrorist support network, even a Labor
government will find it impossible to go much further with the
process.
Five years from now, we are likely to look back at the Taba
agreement and the Washington signing ceremony as the high-water mark
for the negotiating process. The first stage of the agreement will
probably be implemented, with the IDF withdrawing from the seven major
Palestinian cities (including most of Hebron), and shared patrols in
the villages and surrounding areas (Area B on the maps). The security
risks for Israel are substantial, but they can be managed and
contained by limiting access into Israel for Palestinians (closures).
However, without a fundamental change among the Palestinians, the
permanent status will be determined unilaterally and the boundaries
that are created through the implementation of the first stage of the
Taba agreement will become the new Israeli borders. Israel will no
longer be responsible for the vast majority of Palestinians, the IDF
will not have to patrol these cities, and full-fledged borders,
fences, and patrol roads will reduce terrorism. At the same time, the
Palestinians will have their own government, or even mini-state, and a
high degree of control over their lives. This is not the "New Middle
East" of Shimon Peres' dreams, but for everyone, it is better than the
situation before the process began in 1991.
Last week, Prime Minister Peres was asked about Israel's
nuclear weapons policy in the wake of Egypt's public campaign.
In response, he stated his willingness to trade the Israeli
nuclear deterrent for peace. This statement can be attributed to
exhaustion and the pressure to which Peres has been subject since
the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin, but the potential damage is
extensive.
For the past three decades, Israeli leaders have carefully
developed and nurtured a nuclear deterrence option, based on the
Dimona reactor complex. The late Shalhevet Freier, one of the
architects of this policy, called the nuclear potential a
"caution to states contemplating obliterating Israel by dint of
their preponderance of men and material." Freier warned that
without the nuclear threat, the Arab states would be able to
attack Israel "at a time of their choosing, with nothing to worry
about."
There is, in fact, no contradiction between deterrence and
peace; indeed, there are numerous historical examples in which
deterrence preserved and even strengthened peace and stability.
For thousands of years, military and political leaders recognized
that the best way to prevent conflict between former adversaries
is to insure a balance of power. By making the costs of war far
greater than the potential benefits of any victory, aggressive
states are deterred from going to war. The United States and
NATO used the threat of nuclear retaliation to maintain stability
in Europe during the Cold War. Although deterrence has some
major limitations, there is no better foundation for stability.
Israel's military capabilities and the threat of
overwhelming response forced the Arab states to accept Israel's
existence and contributed directly to the peace process. Despite
all the hopes of a "new Middle East" and "the end of history",
human nature has not changed, and stability is still based on
deterrence and a balance of power.
Israel is a still a very small country, and getting smaller.
The strategic depth necessary for absorbing a conventional attack
and preparing a counterattack (as was necessary in 1973) is
declining. At the same time, the Arab states maintain very large
conventional armies. Each year, Egypt and Syria add hundreds of
advanced tanks and other weapons, and the Iraqi threat will
resume as soon as sanctions end. In addition, many of these
states, as well as Iran are developing or already have chemical,
biological, and nuclear weapons and missiles to deliver them.
With a long history of conflict and only reluctant
acceptance of the need to negotiate and live with the Jewish
state, Arab and radical Islamic leaders in the region may see a
non-nuclear Israel as a very vulnerable target. Israel will only
be able to give up its nuclear deterrent if the military
capabilities of all the other states in the region are reduced to
the point that they can no longer threaten our survival. Peace
agreements may help to create the conditions for such
arrangements, but they do not, in themselves, reduce Arab
military capabilities significantly.
For over thirty years, Israel's deterrent has been based on
a policy of deliberate ambiguity, in order to allow for the
maximum effect, at a minimum political and military cost. In the
1960s, the United States sought to pressure Israel into accepting
international inspection and giving up the nuclear option.
Israeli leaders refused, but did agree keep the "bomb in the
basement", without public announcements or overt testing. The US
understood that greater pressure on this issue and even threats
to withhold aid would not change Israeli policy, and would be
counterproductive. Indeed, in the past decade, many American
policy makers and analysts have come to realize that the Israeli
deterrent policy serves as a source of regional stability and has
contributed to the peace process.
As a result, Egypt has waged a very intensive campaign to
strip Israel of this deterrent. Although this issue is only one
of many used in the attempt to isolate Israel, and to use
hostility towards Israel as a means of increasing their own
political support, it is the most threatening. Egypt hoped to
use the 1995 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Extension
Conference to gain international support. However, despite the
pressure, Rabin rejected proposals to alter the Israeli policy
and he gained the support of the United States and many other
states around the world. The Egyptian campaign failed, and
ironically, helped to confirm international understanding of the
uniqueness of the Israeli situation. The Israeli policy of
deliberate nuclear ambiguity stands as one of the most successful
examples of Israeli diplomacy.
In the long term, if the peace process survives beyond its
infancy and prospers, perhaps it is possible to negotiate and
implement sweeping security arrangements and a Middle East zone
free of weapons of mass destruction and large conventional
forces. However, the process towards this goal is complex and
must begin with the most fundamental steps, beginning with
agreements to prevent surprise attack and provide early warning.
Until Egypt and Syria reduce the size of their armies, and, like
Israel, place most of their force on reserve status, there is no
sense going further and discussing the future of Dimona.
Under these circumstances, there is no reason to alter this
policy. If Peres's statements were merely slips of the tongue,
as seems likely, they must not be allowed to encourage Egypt to
maintain or increase its campaign to strip Israel of its
deterrent. Peace and stability are not only consistent with the
maintenance of the nuclear deterrent for the foreseeable future,
but they are also dependent on this capability.
Jerusalem Post, September 7, 1993
Jerusalem Post, September 25, 1993
WILL THE PEACE PROCESS GO FAR ENOUGH FOR ISRAEL?
Jerusalem Post, October 17, 1993
NUCLEAR "EXPOSES" NO CAUSE FOR PANIC
Jerusalem Post, February 17, 1994
TAKING THE INITIATIVE IN
THE BATTLE FOR JERUSALEM
Jerusalem Post, July 14, 1995
A TRAVELER'S ADVISORY FOR THE USA
Jerusalem Post, October 10, 1995
Jerusalem Post, Jan. 1, 1996