Separating Politics from Conversion
Jerusalem Post, January 30, 1998

Religion and politics rarely mix smoothly, particularly in modern democratic states. The experience of the past 50 years has shown that this is also the case for Israel. Like ”shatnez” (the mix of wool with linen that is forbidden in the Torah), this relationship has led to such awkward institutions as the Chief Rabbinate (Ashkenazi and Sephardi), and a Ministry of Religions. The same difficult mix characterizes Supreme Court battles over “Who is a Jew” and conversion.

In Israel, it is impossible to separate synagogue and state completely without losing our basic raison d’être. Under the Law of Return, in which all Jews can claim citizenship, the definition of “who is a Jew”, and who is authorized to approve conversions, are both political and religious issues of central importance. Jewish law provides an unambiguous definition, but the secular leadership has rejected this and for 50 years, the issue has remained undecided.

The high rate of intermarriage in the Diaspora and the presence of up to 200,000 non-Jews (according to Jewish law) among recent immigrants highlights the importance of reaching agreement acceptable across a wide spectrum. However, in the two current proposals to respond to this problem, the implications are fundamentally different. While one would remove the conversion process, to the extent possible at this time, from the realm of party politics, the other proposal would only increase the friction.

The first option, developed by the committee initiated by MK Prof. Alex Lubotzky and chaired by Finance Minister Neeman, proposes the creation of a special educational framework. This Institute would provide classes for potential converts and their Jewish spouses (also children), whose knowledge of Judaism is very limited. The Board would have the same structure as the Neeman committee, representing each of the major religious branches (except the Haredim), but would not under the control of these groups. Upon completing the course, the participants would receive a certificate for presentation to special rabbinical courts. In this structure, the role of party politics and political appointments is minimized.

Just as the committee was completing its report, and struggling over some of the final issues (such as the Conservative and Reform demands to be able to continue to perform conversions outside the framework), Avrum Burg jumped in to derail the Lubotzky/Neeman proposal. Although Burg claims to favor the separation of politics and religion, he has blocked one of the most promising moves towards change in this direction. (His motivations are uncertain, past behavior indicates that his political ambitions and desire for publicity may have been a major factor.)

Burg’s group proposed to keep the current system, but for converts, the year of their conversion would be listed on the identity cards. This technical “solution” pleased the Orthodox representatives, who would maintain exclusive control over the process, as well as the others who believed that this arrangement would give their converts from abroad equal status with the Israeli Orthodox converts.

This arrangement may satisfy the political agendas of the participants, but it is sure to be rejected by the majority of sane Israelis and perhaps by the Supreme Court. Having to carry identity cards is enough of an imposition on the right to privacy, but converts will be singled out whenever their children register for school, vote, or they deal with a government official. Furthermore, the details of each conversion will be stored in government offices, where politicians, seeking material to embarrass their enemies, will be able to examine each file. The children and grandchildren of converts would also be identified as such. Under Jewish law, converts must be treated exactly like everyone else, without any stigma, (“for you were strangers in Egypt”), but the learned rabbis and enlightened politicians who worked out this plan must have forgotten this principle.

This second proposal also does nothing to change the inefficient and degrading conversion process that is controlled by the Chief Rabbinate. At most, 2000 people are enrolled, and at this rate, it would take 100 years to convert all those who are now eligible. By that time, of course, their descendants will have multiplied many times.

This leaves the Neeman report as the only viable basis for dealing with the problem. Its acceptance requires the approval of the Chief Rabbinate, which, like all other political bodies, is reluctant to give up its current monopoly. Yet when faced with intense political pressure to prevent the division of the Jewish people, there is still is a chance that these rabbis will agree or be forced to accept the Neeman proposal. The Burg alternative would allow them to maintain their power, but once that option disappears, the Neeman recommendations for the creation of an independent consensus-based body to coordinate the conversion process will be back on the table.

The members of the Neeman committee and those who contributed to its efforts, such as Lubotzky, have made a fundamental contribution to the future of the Jewish people. Even if their plan is not accepted at this time, its fundamental logic remains the basis for future agreements. If the issue of conversion can be decoupled, to the extent possible, from the political realm, Israel and the Jewish people will emerge stronger and more united.