Historical revisionism, attacks on national myths, and assaults on sacred icons are not limited to Israel. In Egypt, Noble Prize winning novelist Naguib Mahfouz has triggered an intense debate by questioning the legacy of Gamal Abdul Nasser. According to Mahfouz, Nasser was a dictator who led Egypt to social and economic disaster. Instead of antagonizing the West and goading Israel, Mahfouz argues that if Nasser had opened Egypt to economic development and democracy, Egypt might now be the leader of the Arab world and the Middle East.
In 1952, after the Free Officers overthrew the corrupt Egyptian monarchy and proclaimed a new era in Cairo, Ben Gurion publicly extended "a hand of friendship" and offered the new leadership a package which included compensation for refugees, concessions along the Egyptian-Israeli border, and a land corridor to Jordan. However, Nasser rejected rapprochement, emphasized preparations (including employment of ex-Nazi German scientists) for the "next war with Israel" and adopted an anti-Western policy.
Under Nasser, the state was in total control of society, thereby closing the door to economic development or democracy in any form. In the effort to become the undisputed leader in the Arab world, he destabilized Jordan, Lebanon, and other states in the region. In 1955, the Egyptians acquired advanced weapons from Czechoslovakia (approved, of course, by Moscow), and in 1956, Nasser triumphantly nationalized the Suez Canal, taunting the British and French. The Egyptian forces were trounced, although Nasser was saved by the political intervention of the Soviet Union, with the acquiescence of U.S. President Eisenhower.
In 1967, Nasser abruptly evicted the UN buffer troops in the Sinai, deployed his army along the border, and closed the Red Sea to Israeli shipping. His extreme rhetoric and detachment from the implications of his words and military moves led Egypt into another disaster, even more catastrophic than the 1956 war. However, for four decades, the myth of Nasser as a great hero has gone unquestioned in Egypt.
Now, for the first time, Egyptians who read Mahfouz's autobiography or the extracts in the press will have to consider the view that the nationalization and the Suez war that followed was not Egypt's greatest triumph, but rather "a victory by ... media and propaganda." The novelist tells his readers that on the military side, Egypt was defeated and on the political side, the long term loss was even greater, because it put Egypt in direct conflict with the West.
Mahfouz has plenty of critics, and the Egyptian press has printed many comments since "Naguib Mahfouz, Pages from his Memoirs'' was published a few months ago. However, to their credit, some reviewers and readers also support his analysis and praise him for honesty and bravery in attacking Egypt's most sacred myth.
As Mahfouz noted in an interview, "These were events which we all lived through, and whether they were right or wrong, they are now history from which we should learn." If, indeed, some Egyptians are willing to consider his words seriously, they could take the lead in changing the stagnant and corrupt economy, and in introducing democracy, allowing Egypt to make up for the lost decades.
This debate also has important implications for present Egyptian policy and for President Mubarak in particular. Mubarak is far from charismatic, but has ruled Egypt for seventeen years. In many ways, Mubarak's Egypt is mired in many of the after-effects of Nasserism. Vested interests and bureaucratic inertia have blocked substantial change, and the economy and political process are still controlled by the state.
In its foreign policy, despite the peace treaty, the policy of "cold peace" is unquestioned, and the anti-Western and anti-Israeli chip-on-the-shoulder remains. The Egyptian intellectual and political elite's continuing rejection of contacts with Israelis, and their contribution to hostile and often absurd propaganda, is a throwback to the Nasserist period. Fearing a loss of status, Cairo's policy makers, many of whom began their careers under Nasser, block improvement in relations with Israel and regional economic cooperation. Egypt, perhaps more than anyone else, has the most to gain through such initiatives, but is again the main victim of its own policies.
In addition, the Mubarak government has pressed the Palestinians, and Arafat in particular, to take a tough line in negotiations with Israel. In this way, Egypt has demonstrated its power in a negative sense, as in the height of Nasser's era, but has been unable to make a positive contribution to the process.
Perhaps, one day, Egypt will heed Mahfouz's call for democracy and acceptance of mutual co-existence with Israel. The main beneficiaries would be the Egyptians themselves. In the meantime, by triggering this public debate, and questioning the myth of Nasserism, Mahfouz has made an important contribution towards these goals.