The recent talk of crisis, and even war, with Syria show how little we still know about policies and objectives in Damascus. Missile tests, irregular movement of Syrian troops, and an increased US naval presence off the coast of Lebanon, created an atmosphere of tension and uncertainty.

Syria is still a very tightly controlled dictatorship, and the purpose of these actions is totally unclear. The decision making process is entirely in the hands (or head) of President Assad and he, as usual, is not talking.

In the absence of explanations or reliable information regarding Assad's intentions, analysts and government officials provided their own interpretations. Based on previous behavior and the background of the analysts themselves, three separate and competing theories have emerged.

First, there is the "misperception and misunderstanding theory." This explanation was developed by Americans following the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, and applied to the outbreak of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. This model explains international crises in terms of poor communication between political leaders, who interpret every move by other states as evidence of hostile intentions, and prepare to respond to the "worst case."

The Syrians, according to the theory, responded to what they saw as threatening Israeli actions and training exercises, the hawkish image of the new government, and the presence of Sharon and Eitan -- the two major planners of the 1982 Lebanon War -- in the cabinet .

This theory is supported by defensive postures assumed by the Syrian troops (moving from Beirut to the Bekaa Valley). In addition, statements by Syrian military leaders and editorials in the government-controlled press, which warned Israel against launching an attack, and called on Israeli leaders to "count to 100 and even 1000 before involving itself" in a military operation against Syria.

From Israel, the image was reversed. The Syrian troop movements, coupled with the verbal threats, and reports that Hizbollah has received longer-range Katyusha rockets, raised concerns about changes in the balance of power. Similarly, the tests of the Syrian Scud-C and the Israeli Arrow, although scheduled far in advance and independent of any other actions, contributed to the tensions.

The spiral of actions and reactions escalated, and what might have started as a simple misunderstanding, became a crisis.

On the other hand, it is also possible that Syria was itself preparing an attack or seeking to increase the level of tension, using the excuse of reports of an alleged Israeli military move. This is consistent with the view that Assad's actions are part of a deliberate strategy to destabilize the region and weaken the Netanyahu government.

According to this theory, Assad has realized that this government does not intend to continue the negotiations where Peres had left off, and expectations of a quick Israeli withdrawal from all, or most, of the Golan Heights have been dashed.

This interpretation is supported by some academics and Labor Party politicians and MKs such as Hagai Merom. In public statements, Merom reported that Israeli military intelligence sources warned that a breakdown in the talks would lead to war. Merom headed the Knesset Committee on Defense and Foreign Relations until the elections, and he called for a special Knesset session to discuss this crisis.

The Golan Settlers' Committee and Likud MKs accused Merom of contributing to Syrian psychological warfare and deliberately misleading the public for partisan political purposes.

If the primary Syrian objective is, indeed, to gain control of the Golan Heights, and if Assad is willing to risk a massive Israeli response (without hopes for resupply from a major power, as in 1967 and 1973), this scenario is credible. On the other hand, there is no clear evidence to support this theory, and it is inconsistent with Assad's indifference with respect to the negotiations over the Golan in the past four years.

Militarily, the Syrians know they are no match for Israel, and in a clash, Assad would probably lose much of the army that he depends on to maintain his regime and his control in Lebanon.

The third explanation focuses on Lebanon, and the seriousness with which the Assad regime takes Netanyahu's "Lebanon First" proposals.

Between 800,000 and 1.5 million Syrians (estimates vary, reflecting again the high degree of uncertainty) are employed in Lebanese reconstruction. They provide a major source of jobs and foreign income for Syrian workers, (after oil sales and drug smuggling) and the social and economic stability of Syria is very dependent on these workers.

The Israeli attacks in Beirut and the rest of Lebanon during the "Grapes of Wrath" operation threatened to halt the building activity. There are no jobs for them in Syria, and if they are forced to return, this could cause major disruptions for the government.

A few weeks ago, Netanyahu warned that Hizbollah attacks in Southern Lebanon could escalate to involve Syrian bases. In a well-publicized tour of Israeli positions in South Lebanon, Netanyahu also noted that Israel would escalate in response to attacks, and reminded the Syrians that such an exchange would be painful to Damascus as well.

There is increasing evidence that Assad sees a challenge to Syria's role in Lebanon as the greatest threat to his regime and more important than Israeli withdrawal from the Golan. The Syrian leader's primary goal may be to consolidate his hold on Lebanon, while leaving the Golan as a political and military focal point for future generations.

Syria is attempting to use the current election process to solidify and legitimate its control in Lebanon, and the Israeli government's new policies introduced an element of uncertainty in this crucial period. Despite the formal rejection of the Israeli proposals to negotiate a settlement in Lebanon first, Assad has probably not decided how to respond, and may be primarily interested in avoiding a change in the status quo until after the Lebanese elections are finished in mid-September.

The warnings may be designed primarily to prevent unilateral Israeli actions that would upset Syrian plans during the election period, and the troop movements may be linked to Syrian interests in Lebanon, and not to Israel.

In the "Alice in Wonderland" politics of Syria, where nothing is what it seems, this public rejection may also be a sign of interest in discussing the future of Southern Lebanon, after the Lebanese elections. From this perspective, Netanyahu's policies constitute a major political change and challenge, but also an opportunity. If successful, Assad can gain international recognition of Syria's role in Lebanon, while also taking credit for pushing the Israeli army out.

The problem is that each of these explanations seems to make some sense, and there are other theories.

Despite five years of "direct negotiations" between Syrian and Israeli representatives, Syrian intentions and policies remain a mystery. Most of these negotiations are still conducted through American and other mediators, and Israeli and Syrian leaders still know very little about each other's perceptions, interests, and decision making processes.

The shuttle diplomacy conducted by the American government has allowed Assad to avoid direct discussions with Israel, and increased the misunderstanding and mispercepections.

As the current tension and various competing explanations have demonstrated, under these circumstances, the potential for misunderstanding, confusion and accidental conflict is still very high.