FEBRUARY 6 1997
PREPARED TEXT OF CLOSING STATEMENT OPPOSED TO THE RESOLUTION
PROF. GERALD M. STEINBERG
BEGIN-SADAT CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES, BAR ILAN UNIVERSITY
The proposition before this House today is that "The best hope for peace in the Middle East lies in the immediate establishment of an independent Palestinian state". The answer is clearly and unfortunately negative. There are many sources of conflict and violence in the Middle East that are unrelated to this issue. A Palestinian state will not change the dangers posed by the Iraqi regime and its capabilities to field weapons of mass destruction, the instability and terrorism fostered by the fundamentalist regimes in Teheran and Khartoum, the civil war in Algeria, the Syrian occupation of Lebanon, and the corruption and economic catastrophes perpetrated by regimes in Cairo, Benghazi, and indeed throughout the Arab world. Even if a Palestinian state would not create an additional source of instability, it would also not bring about regional peace and tranquillity.
Indeed, at this time, and under present conditions, the declaration or creation of an fully sovereign Palestinian independent state, in the few kilometers between the Israeli coastal plain and the Jordan river and in the Gaza Strip, is the path to even greater instability, terrorism, violence, corruption and political repression in area in which these plagues are already all too familiar.
The issue before this house, and before the citizens and leaders of Israel and the Middle East, is not an abstract normative issue. In theory, all peoples, however they define themselves, should be entitled to self determination. This is the core of the Zionist movement and the foundation for the modern Jewish state of Israel. On this basis, we would conclude that other groups, the Bosnian Serbs, Kurds, Shias in Iraq, Corsicans, Tamils in Sri Lanka, Wales and Scotland, as well as the Palestinians were entitled to the same status.
But we live in a less than ideal world, in which unlimited sovereignty is often abused in order to deny self-determination to others, in which terrorism and aggressive war are common occurrences, and in which independence for some means death and loss of liberty for others. The history of the 20th century should remind all of us that naive and misplaced idealism has often been the foundation for war and genocide.
If we examine the likely nature of the proposed independent Palestinian state, given the current leadership and policies, we find many risks and little to reassure us that such a state would be a stable and civic neighbor over the long term. The history and wounds of violence and terror are too fresh to be ignored. Until a very short time ago, Palestinian organizations were all dedicated to the violent destruction of the State of Israel. Palestinian terrorism introduced air piracy and hijacking, suicide bombings, Olympic massacres, attacks on diplomats, and other forms of violence. In January 1991, just 6 years ago, Yassir Arafat was embracing Saddam Hussein, Palestinians were celebrating on their rooftops as Iraqi Scuds were falling on Israeli cities, and Saddam was the most popular name for newborn boys. The screams of the terrible suicide bombings of last year, which were planned and executed from areas under Palestinian control, still ring in our ears. Perhaps yesterday's terrorists can become today's peacemakers and police, but the risks are great and there is good reason for caution, particularly given the terrorism that has continued.
The 1993 Oslo agreement can potentially mark a historic turning point, but there are many uncertainties, and the transition has been too swift to inspire confidence in its permanence. Indeed, by their own accounts, and as public opinion polls have clearly shown, the Palestinian people have made a formal and unenthusiastic peace. This sounds too much like the German reaction to the Treaty of Versailles, which was readily renounced as soon as conditions allowed. Israel is still seen as a foreign entity, an agent of the West, a temporary Crusader state that usurped Arab land, and the deep Jewish historical, religious, and cultural roots in the Land of Israel are still unknown or rejected. It may take generations to reverse the damage of Arab rejectionism of the past 75 years, and until this fragile peace grows, a Palestinian state can easily be turned into a platform for renewed attacks.
Indeed, the violence, verbal and physical, is continuing, contrary to the spirit and the letter of the agreements with Israel. Under the terms of the Oslo Accords, the leadership of the Palestinian Authority (PA) pledged to refrain from incitement to violence against Israel. In the exchange of letters with the late Prime Minister Rabin on September 9, 1993, Chairman Arafat wrote "The PLO renounces the use of terrorism and other acts of violence and will assume responsibility over all PLO elements and personnel in order to assure their compliance, prevent violations and discipline violators." The Interim Agreement (Oslo 2) of September 28, 1995 states that Israel and the PA "shall seek to foster mutual understanding and tolerance and shall accordingly abstain from incitement, including hostile propaganda, against each other."
However, the violations are numerous and continuous. Palestinians leaders have not stopped referring to Israel as the enemy, nor have they stopped referring to terrorists, bus bombers, and murderers as heroes, and their acts of sadistic murder as "military operations". This language serves as the foundation and justification for continued terror. The Palestinian Covenant, with its denial of the legitimacy of Israel and the numerous calls for its destruction, has not been amended, despite numerous pledges to do so. Shortly after the Oslo agreement was signed, Arafat called for a Jihad to liberate Jerusalem. In October 1996, Hani al-Hasan, called Fathi Shikaki, the leader of Islamic Jihad "a giant among the giants of the Palestinian people, one of the giants of the nation. He was the teacher of generations"1 When Ichya Ayash (the "engineer"), leader of the Hamas suicide bombers who took so many innocent lives, was finally killed, thousands of Palestinians came to pay him homage. Arafat told a rally in Gaza: "We are committed to all martyrs who died for the cause of Jerusalem starting with Ahmed Musa until the last martyr Yihye Ayash."2 In another speech, Arafat called Ayash a "a hero of the Palestinian people"3 In October 1996, Chairman Arafat spoke at the Dehaishe refugee camp: "We know only one word: jihad, jihad, jihad. When we stopped the intifada, we did not stop the jihad for the establishment of a Palestinian state whose capital is Jerusalem. And we are now entering the phase of the great jihad prior to the establishment of an independent Palestinian state ...We are in a conflict with the Zionist movement and the Balfour Declaration and all imperialist activities."4 Muhammad Dahlan, a senior Gaza PA security official was straightforward: "The Palestinian Authority does not exclude the return to the armed struggle, and it will then use its weapons."5 In the midst of the violence that began in Jerusalem in September 1996, Arafat told Palestinian security forces in Gaza to "fight for Allah, and they will kill and be killed, and this is a solemn oath...Our blood is cheap compared with the cause which has brought us together and which at moments separated us, but shortly we will meet again in heaven...Palestine is our land and Jerusalem is our capital"6 A few days later, after the fighting had stopped, Arafat still called for "mass confrontations in all cities and villages to confront the Israeli aggression against Al-Aksa mosque."7
Thus, in their statements and actions, the Palestinian leadership provides evidence for those in Israel who fear that the peace process represents a change in tactics towards the unchanged goal of the elimination of Israel. From this perspective, the central problem comes from irredentism, and the fear that the Oslo process is a means towards the implementation of the 1974 PLO policy to destroy Israel in stages. The unamended Covenant is seen as a reflection of these unchanging goals.
On more than one occasion, Arafat has provided evidence that these concerns are more than justified. "This agreement, I am not considering it more than the agreement which had been signed between our prophet Muhammad and Quraish, and you remember that the Caliph Omar had refused this agreement and considered it a despicable truce ... But the same way Muhammad had accepted it, we are now accepting this peace effort."8 In a speech at Bir Zeit University, Faisal Husseini declared "Everything you see and hear today is for tactical and strategic reasons. We have not given up the rifle. We still have armed gangs in the areas and if we do not get our state we will take them out of the closet and fight again."9 Rashid Abu Shbak, a senior PA security official, pledged that "The light which has shone over Gaza and Jericho will also reach the Negev and the Galilee."10
At the end of the 20th century, we cannot take the naive view that the words of leaders are unimportant, the unrealistic hopes of dreamers, addressed to domestic audiences. We have been told this before, sixty years ago, after Hitler's mass rallies in Nuremberg and after Munich. Arafat's calls for violence and praise of martyrdom and jihad came before the September clashes in which the PNA urged thousands of civilian to attack isolated Israeli military positions, and then armed Palestinian forces using rifles equipped with sniper scopes killed 15 Israeli soldiers. The words of leaders express their objectives, and for this reason, we must take the plans and hopes Palestinian leaders as expressed in their own words with great seriousness. We cannot ignore the statements of Arafat and Nabil Shaath11, threatening that "If Israel rejects our demands there will be a reaction and we have a 30,000 man armed force."12 The language of violence has accompanied war and terrorism for three generations, and at the very least, before we take the risks of a Palestinian state, these words must change.
If, as is frequently claimed, Arafat and the PLO are the moderates in Palestinian society, where does that leave the other groups that enjoy considerable public support? What are the risks of a Palestinian state in which Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the PFLP, and other such hate-filled organizations play a major role or even become the dominant actors? This state will then become another Algeria, Iran, or Iraq, in which civil violence and external aggression inextricably linked.
The military impact of a Palestinian state must be examined in a wider regional context, in which Israel remains a very small state and in which some Arab states, such as Syria and Iraq, maintain a state of war and are continuing to build up there military capabilities. Even Egypt, with which Israel signed a peace treaty in 1979, continues to spend billions and to hold exercises clearly directed at Israel. While it is true that Israel would maintain overwhelming strategic superiority vis a vis a small Palestinian state, during a regional war, Palestinian forces could severely disrupt Israeli military operations. Small tactical missiles would hamper the operation and mobilization of Israeli ground forces, and anti-air missiles would curtail the activities of the Israeli Air Force.13
The threat posed by a Palestinian state would extend to other states in the region as well. In the past, Palestinian violence has destabilized Lebanon and Jordan. In September 1970, the PLO, with active Syrian assistance, sought to stage a coup designed to capture control of Jordan and turn it into a Palestinian state. How long would the Palestinian military and political leadership be satisfied with a small state, even if it included all of the West Bank regions of Judea and Samaria? With a large Palestinian population in Jordan, would we see a repeat of the events of 1970, with Syrian or Iraqi backing? And would a Palestinian state seek to extend its domain by fomenting unrest and encouraging secession among the Israeli Arabs in the Galilee? This scenario is more than merely plausible.
These dangers are exacerbated by the specter that the creation of an independent Palestine would add another failed state to the world, one that is located close to the intersection of Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Saudi Arabia. The world has gained a great deal of experience with failed states in Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, and Algeria. Iraq is another candidate for this status, and perhaps Syria in the event of a civil war after the death of Assad. Since the PNA was established in Gaza and Jericho in 1994, its performance has shown all the characteristics of a failed state, including corruption, economic failure, nepotism, intimidation, systematic police violence and torture.
A functioning state is, by definition, one in which the state has a monopoly on the use of force, providing security for its citizens and not allowing its territory to be used as a staging platform for terror. The Palestinian authority does not have, nor does it appear able to exert a monopoly on the use of force. Mr. Arafat has not made a good faith effort to disarm groups such as Hamas, the Islamic Jihad, and the PFLP (which was responsible for the murder of Eta Zur and her 11 year old son a few weeks ago). Just a few days ago, in Gaza, hundreds of members of the Hamas and Jihad fired machine guns in the air at the funeral for one of the killers of Nachshon Wachsman, (a young Israeli soldier who was kidnapped and murdered two years ago). Until the Palestinian Authority fulfills these basic obligations, it is unable to claim a right to statehood.
Failed states are also characterized by internal unrest and instability, reflecting internal conflict and the regime's lack of legitimacy. This description is applicable to the Palestinian National Authority.14 An Amnesty Report of Dec. 2 1996 stated that since the PNA was created in 1994, 2000 Palestinians, including journalists, businessmen, and human rights activists have been arrested and detained, most without charges.15 Eyad Saraj, the head of the Palestinian Committee for Citizens' Rights, has already been held 3 times. One year ago, the editor of an Arabic newspaper was arrested after he refused to run a story dictated by Arafat's office on the front page of his newspaper. Bassem Eid, a Palestinian who worked with B'Teslem, an Israeli Human Rights group, was kidnapped from his Jerusalem home and held in the Ramallah headquarters of the PLO's Force 17 for 24 hours, before an international outcry forced his release. During the Intifada, Eid was a hero to Palestinians for publicizing alleged Israeli abuses, but he was never threatened by Israel. He was branded an Israeli agent after criticizing the killing of between 750 and 950 alleged collaborators by PLO and Hamas forces. A recent report by B'Teslem and the Palestinian Human Rights Monitoring Group (created recently by Eid) concludes that no investigation meeting even minimal judicial standards was conducted.16
Rather than using its formidable police power to prevent terrorism which it is obligated by formal agreement to do, this power is being directed against journalists, domestic political opponents and those who seek to extend civil liberties, such as Bassam Eid and Eyad Saraj.
The abuse of police power against internal opponents also cannot be dismissed as merely a transitional issue. At least 12 detainees have died in custody, as a result of torture, which was described by Amnesty International as systematic.17 In its December 7 1996 edition, the Economist described the PNA as a military regime. 18 More of the same, in a Palestinian state, would clearly not be "the best hope for peace", but the reverse -- another Haiti or Somalia.
To survive and to avoid the consequences of failure, a state must also provide the framework for economic development and prosperity. Failure in this area creates conditions of unrest and instability. I will not argue, as some so patronizingly do, that a Palestinian state is a priori too small geographically and demographically to sustain economic development. That is the same argument used by the British and others in the 1930s and 1940s to justify opposition to the establishment of a Jewish state.
However, it is self evident that the challenges facing the Palestinians are enormous. After three years, we cannot find any evidence that the Palestinian leadership can create a viable economic foundation. The per capita GNP in Gaza is approximately $1000 and has declined under Palestinian control, while the very high jobless rate increased. The hundreds of millions of dollars in foreign aid that have already been transferred have disappeared without accountability, and without any significant new investment in infrastructure or job-producing industry. As a result, many foreign donors have stopped providing funds, as there is no evidence that the money is being used for the purposes for which it was intended -- namely to provide a foundation for economic development and stability in the areas under Palestinian control. The ritual of blaming Israel for this condition no longer can have any credibility, and there is no evidence to conclude that the creation of a state, under such conditions, would change this. Realistically, we have to conclude that in fact, with more independence, the mismanagement would only grow worse.
In much of the Arab world, from Cairo to Baghdad, mismanagement and corruption are the norm, while the Palestinian leadership continues to expect Israel to provide most of the income through jobs for Palestinians. A sovereign state cannot base its entire economy on the good will of its neighbors, particularly if, as in this case, the influx of foreign workers into Israel also increases the probability of terrorism.
Corruption is a major problem. For decades, the PLO has built up foreign currency reserves and created a major corporate empire. In 1993, the British National Criminal Intelligence Service estimated that the PLO had worldwide assets of $10 billion, with an annual income of up to $2 billion.19 With millions of Palestinians living in poverty, one would expect these assets to be used for national development rather than personal gain.
The Palestinian economy is mismanaged, or rather managed, as one analyst reported, "out of Arafat's hip pocket", without separation of personal funds, party or state accounts. The Washington Post revealed that Arafat maintains a former wife, Yassin, in an opulent villa in Tunis. PLO sources report that "She received from him great wealth. The jewels she has would be enough to build all Gaza anew." Calls from the donor states and the IMF for a proper system of accountability have been ignored. Investment laws have not been enacted, and the bloated bureaucracy is maddening . As a result, foreign investment is close to zero. The surrounding Arab states, including Kuwait and Saudi Arabia are reluctant to contribute, and even under intense American pressure, account for less than 5 percent of total external aid and investment. Even Palestinian investors have stood on the sidelines. Plans for industrial parks and cooperative factories at the intersection of Israel and Gaza, that were expected to provided thousands of jobs to Palestinians, were dropped when Palestinian officials blocked Israeli participation and insisted that the import of materials await the construction of a port in Gaza (an economic megaproject which is motivated by personal and political factors). 20 Other megaprojects, such as Arafat's reinforced command center, built in the Saddam Hussein style, vast villas on the Gaza coast, an airport that may never open, and an airline that may never get off the ground, are attempts to buy prestige, not an improved standard of living.
Although my mandate in this debate was to demonstrate that a Palestinian state, under current conditions, would not be "the best hope for peace", I would like to end by going further, and suggesting what steps might realistically be taken to further the process and contain the violence from which we have all suffered for at least three generations. If the risks of a fully sovereign and independent state in the traditional model as state now, there are other options. These include limited sovereignty and autonomy models, in which Palestinians would enjoy a maximal extent of political, economic, social and cultural independence, while responsibility for security would be withheld. Under such conditions, and with the development of stability and confidence building measures, as a decrease in the risks to Israel, the scope of independence and sovereignty could be extended gradually. This type of limited sovereignty is increasing being examined in other conflict situations, such as Bosnia, and should be considered in for the Palestinian situation as well.
The transition towards a more traditional state could also include a stage in which Jordan plays a wider role. A confederation might provide a foundation which, if successful, could lead to a state. In such an arrangement, the Palestinians still be able to manage their own affairs, health, welfare, education, and economics, while Jordan would work with the PNA in foreign relations and security.
I did not reach these conclusions easily or on the basis of ideology. Our lives would be much simpler and more optimistic if the resolution before this house were supportable, but, unfortunately, the facts all point in the opposite direction. Under current conditions, with the existing leadership, and the continued instability in the Middle East, there is no foundation to support the proposition that "The best hope for peace in the Middle East lies in an independent Palestinian state."