Yitzchak Rabin was murdered following his participation at a major peace rally in Tel Aviv. Under the circumstances, it is difficult to argue with the claim that Rabin's major legacy is the unqualified support for the Oslo process that he declared at that rally. Whenever there are disruptions in this process, and questions arise as to the wisdom of continuing, we are told that we must press forward, because this is what "Yitzchak would have wanted". Similarly, advertisements declare that any opposition to Oslo is tantamount to justification of the assassination.

As time passes, the question of Rabin's legacy becomes more pronounced. The mythological Rabin, posthumously endowed with the characteristics of Left- wing post-Zionism, needs to be separated from the historical Rabin. The myth is also a response, in part, to the vilification of Rabin by extremists on the Israeli Right, that took place before his murder and which also distorted the complexity of his policies and views. Neither extreme characterization does justice to the legacy of the late Prime Minister.

Following the terror of the assassination, it also became very awkward to question the interpretation of Rabin's family, and of Leah Rabin, in particular. However, their personal political views have become intertwined with those that are made in the name of the martyred Prime Minister. The evidence shows that during his long military and political career, Rabin did not seek or take policy advice from members of his family.

What are the core elements of the "historical Rabin"? For most of his public life, he was known as Israel's primary "bitchonist", consistently emphasizing security issues. He played an important role in the battles for Jerusalem in 1948, and as Chief of Staff, prepared the IDF for "the inevitable confrontation" that occurred in 1967. As Defense Minister under the National Unity Government created in 1985, Rabin ordered the army to "break the hands and feet" of Palestinians in the first days of the intifada. This was just five years before he gave the go-ahead for the Oslo agreement, and before standing, despite clear misgivings, on the White House lawn to shake Arafat's hand.

Rabin moved from a career in the IDF to Prime Minister in just nine years (1967 to 1976) on the basis of these solid security credentials. Despite the failure of his first brief stint in this office, he defeated Shimon Peres and was chosen to head the Labor party list in 1992 precisely because his tough reputation on security matters appealed to Israeli voters. During the campaign, he consistently pledged to seek an accommodation with the Palestinians without sacrificing Israeli security. The credibility of this combination allowed Rabin to become Prime Minister again (although by a very narrow margin).

After 1993, interpreting Rabin's legacy becomes more complicated. Once he signed the Oslo agreement with the Palestinians, he moved consistently to implement its terms, despite the waves of terrorist bombings in 1994 and 1995. He scorned and dismissed the growing opposition to the agreement, referring to protesting settlers as "propellers" spinning around in the air.

However, this did not mean a complete abandonment of the "bitchonist" elements of Rabin's personality. After Nachshon Wachsman was kidnapped by Islamic radicals, Rabin refused to release terrorists, as demanded by the kidnappers, and ordered the military to storm the building where Wachsman was held. Rabin also expelled hundreds of Hamas activists to Lebanon (a move that was costly, politically, and only served to enhance their image among radical Palestinians), and launched Operation Accountability against Hizbollah in Lebanon.

How would Rabin have responded in the wake of the wave of suicide bombings in the Spring of 1996? Would he have continued to support the Oslo process, despite Arafat's "yellow light", and embrace of terrorists as "martyrs"? Given his long record, it is possible that Rabin would have reversed course again, abandoning the failed peace effort, and perhaps even ordered a military response. In August 1993, he discovered that the draft text of the Oslo agreement did not include a clear renunciation of terrorism, and demanded that this be included. He eventually settled for a vague statement, but was not satisfied with the outcome. The suicide bombings of 1996 could have marked a turning point.

But is also possible that Rabin would have stayed the course, despite the polls showing that he was behind Netanyahu due to the continuing terrorism. Yitzchak Rabin was a very determined (stubborn) individual, and did not readily admit to having erred.

The truth is that Rabin's legacy is very complex, and simplistic slogans do not reflect the work and contributions of over 50 years of public life. No one can speak for him, or claim to know what he would have said or done under any specific circumstances. The members of his family, and the people with whom he worked most clearly have a special role in preserving his memory, but in terms of policies and perceptions, particularly in the security realm, the Rabin legacy is open to many interpretations.