Gerald M. Steinberg and Aharon Etengoff
BESA Center for Strategic Studies and
Bar Ilan University, Ramat Gan
Table of Contents:
Part 1: WMD and Missile Proliferation
Developments
1) The 2000 Nonproliferation Treaty
Review Conference
2) The U.N. General Assembly and 1st
Committee
3) U.N. Conference on
Disarmament
5) The MTCR and Control of Ballistic
Missile Proliferation
8) Space-related Military and
Arms Control Developments
Conclusion and Prognosis
The
proliferation of non-conventional weapons and the negotiation and
implementation of arms control regimes are central factors in determining the
nature of regional security and stability in the Middle East. However, when the actions or weapons
programs of individual countries are examined in isolation, or the focus is
placed exclusively on one type of weapons system, the results can be very
deceptive. For example, WMD and
missile developments in Iraq are often considered independently of the impact
they may have on similar Iranian programs. Similarly, studies and publications
dealing with the application of the NPT or the Chemical Weapons Convention in
the Middle East fail to consider the close interaction between these and other
regimes.
This
series of reports, beginning with 199[1],
is based on the realization that security issues, particularly in the Middle
East, are closely interrelated. In addition to analyzing WMD proliferation
trends and developments, this report includes an examination of the interaction
between global arms-control processes and regional frameworks in the Middle
East.
As
the evidence reviewed in this report demonstrates, the rate of proliferation of
WMD and ballistic missiles in the Middle East continued to accelerate during
2000 and 2001, but in assessing regional stability and security, these central
issues were often obscured by the tendency to focus narrowly on the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The
relative optimism generated by the results of the Gulf War and the Madrid
Middle East Peace Conference disappeared entirely, and in September 2000, the
“Oslo” framework collapsed into a campaign of violence and terrorism. The efforts to revive the multilateral
working group on Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) broke down, and various
arms control frameworks degenerated into anti-Israel “talk shops.”
Most
importantly, the inaction regarding accelerated Iraqi efforts to expand its WMD
capabilities during this critical period marked the build-up to renewed
confrontation. International
inspectors continued to be barred from Iraq; efforts to create a new inspection
regime (UNMOVIC) were stillborn, and the sanctions regime, designed to block
Iraqi access to weapons and technologies, collapsed. Consequently, Iraqi
efforts to develop non-conventional weapons and delivery systems continued
unhindered, and, with the exception of the U.S., Israel, and, to a limited
degree, the UK, policy makers in other countries remain passive. Instead of serious efforts to prevent
the Iraqi regime controlled by Saddam Hussein from restoring WMD and missile
capabilities, the debate in the UN focused on various versions of “smart
sanctions”, in the hope of reducing Iraqi access to funds and dual-use
technology. As demonstrated in
this report, these debates and the resulting policies allowed Iraq to continue
to expandits capabilities, and contributed significantly to regional
instability. Detailed information
on these activities was widely available from public sources, and the claims
from many governments and international organizations that they were unaware of
the Iraqi efforts are not credible.
Similarly,
Iran has also succeeded in becoming a major proliferator in the region. Construction of an ostensibly civilian
nuclear infrastructure in Bushehr has continued, providing the foundation for a
weapons program, and the long-range Shahab-3 missile has been tested and deemed
“operational”. Other countries in
the region, including Syria and Egypt, have also moved to strengthen their WMD
and missile capabilities. In addition to the chemical weapons possessed by both
states, and ballistic missile capabilities that have slowly increased, there is
also evidence of renewed efforts to develop nuclear weapons capabilities.
To
counter the ever-increasing proliferation of WMD and long-range missiles, the
Israeli government accelerated the deployment of ballistic missile defense
(BMD) systems as well as improvements in strategic early warning and deterrence
capabilities. In September 2000,
the Arrow 2 successfully destroyed an incoming test missile fired from an F-15
off the Israeli coast, marking the first time the Arrow 2 had been tested
against a missile on an attack trajectory.
The
mega-terrorist attacks against the U.S. that took place on September 11 2001
marked a major increase in the perceived threat of WMD attacks. As a result, the continued
proliferation of non-conventional weapons in the Middle East, and the efforts,
as well as the difficulties associated with the developing regional security
and stability gained even greater salience. In the wake of these developments, this study includes new
sections tracing the efforts by terrorist groups to acquire WMD.
As the data and analysis in this
report clearly indicate, the various arms limitation mechanisms and regimes
have failed to produce any tangible results in the Middle East. In fact, the evidence suggests that for
some countries, such as Iran, the arms control regimes, such as the NPT and CWC
are seen as opportunities for obtaining information, facilities, and even
material assistance in pursuing the very weaponsthat are the object of the
limitation mechanisms. While
playing a very active role in the activities and institutional structures of
these frameworks, Iranian officials and policy makers are also active in
seeking to undermine control systems governing suppliers and dual-use
technology transfer, such as the Australia Group (in the case of chemical and
biological weapons) and the MTCR (in the case of missiles).
Furthermore,
in many cases, the non-proliferation regimes and institutions are exploited in
order to enhance and sharpen conflict, rather than the reverse. For example, the 2000 NPT Review
Conference and the discussions of the Middle East in the First Committee of the
UN General Assembly did not further the cause of cooperative approaches to
regional security and arms control.
Egypt continued to use such meetings to pursue policies designed to
increase Israel’s diplomatic isolation by focusing on the policy of nuclear
ambiguity and rejection of the universality claims regarding the NPT. The degeneration of arms limitation
efforts into diplomat games to “score political points”, while acquisition of
WMD technology and weapons continues unabated, proved ultimately destructive
and destabilizing.
As
discussed in detail in the 1998/9 report in this series[2], the inspection and
verification regime, under the auspices of UNSCOM, was established in 1991 and
constituted the central element of the Gulf War cease-fire agreement. Under the terms of UN Security Council 687,
UNSCOM was charged with verifying the validity of Iraq’s “full, final, and
complete” declaration of its WMD, missile-capabilities, and facilities.
Although the inspection missions oversaw the destruction of 28,000 chemical
weapons, and 480,000 liters of chemical precursors, many aspects of the Iraqi
program remain hidden.
In
1998, continued Iraqi interference and confrontations culminated in the
expulsion of UN inspectors and the end of UNSCOM’s operations, followed by
Operation Desert Fox, a four-day U.S. led military campaign against Iraqi targets.[3] Subsequent efforts
to re-design the inspection and verification regime in the context of UNSCR
1284, which created UNMOVIC (UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection
Commission) were also rejected by Iraq, which “announced its firm and permanent
stance” in demanding an immediate end to the economic sanctions that were
imposed following the invasion of Kuwait in 1990.[4] In parallel, these sanctions, which
were designed to prevent the Iraqi government from purchasing weapons, dual use
technology, and related components, continued to unravel[5], despite the
efforts to institute a system of “smart sanctions”.[6] Taking advantage of this situation,
Iraq was able to reconstitute and extend its WMD capabilities considerably
during 2000 and 2001.
In
December 1999, after a long and difficult debate, the UN Security Council
(UNSC) approved resolution 1284, which created UNMOVIC. On January 27th 2000, the UNSC
unanimously approved the appointment of Hans Blix of Sweden, a compromise
candidate and former Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA), to head the nascent monitoring organization. In response to criticism from the Arab states and Europe
regarding the operation of UNSCOM and links of inspectors to the U.S. and other
governments, Blix declared that UNMOVIC would be a “UN operation,” and
emphasized that inspectors “cannot shoot their way to any sites.” Blix announced
that if Iraq blocked the entrance of inspectors, “the response will have to
come through the United Nations,” rather than through unilateral action by the
U.S.[7]
In
April 2000, Blix submitted an organizational and recruitment plan for UNMOVIC
staff, which was subsequently approved by the UNSC. The first phase was based on immediate hiring of a small
number of employees to prepare for inspections and monitoring; and in the
second phase, additional staff would be hired after the commission was granted
permission to enter Iraq. Blix’s
proposal also included a commitment to on-site, snap inspections, and
assurances that UNMOVIC staff would “neither see nor receive instructions from
any Government.” (UNMOVIC personnel are UN employees and,
unlike UNSCOM, are not “on loan” from individual UN member states).[8]
Blix
also appointed an advisory "college of commissioners”, and in June, they
submitted the First Quarterly Report to the U.N. Security Council. The report
repeated UNSCOM’s findings that Iraq was not cooperating with the
commission—and had not notified UNMOVIC of "dual use" technology
(useable either for peaceful or military purposes) imports. Blix reiterated that UNMOVIC would
neither share information nor conduct surveillance in conjunction with any
government, but he invited foreign governments to provide intelligence
information.[9]
In
September 2000, Blix announced that UNMOVIC was ready to "conduct a number
of preparatory inspection activities in Iraq… if and when Baghdad granted them
permission to enter the country."
However, Iraq adamantly rejected any form of cooperation with UNMOVIC.[10]
In
February 2001, two days of talks were held between UN officials and an Iraqi
delegation in an effort to end the impasse between the two, but without results.
Another plenary session of UNMOVIC’s College of Commissioners was also held in
February 2001, followed by the submission of the Fourth quarterly report to the
Security Council. The report detailed efforts to identify “unresolved
disarmament issues”, and discussed issues such as the potential use of overhead
imagery to complement on-site inspections.[11]
The
Fifth report was submitted on May 24, and noted that UNMOVIC staff had made
significant progress by reviewing UNSCOM material and other data collected
since 1998. The report concluded that: “…with the work completed to date, UNMOVIC
is ready to take up the full tasks mandated to it by the Council.” The Sixth report, presented in August,
reported that UNMOVIC had begun receiving overhead imagery from a commercial
provider; arranged for screening of open sources for information, and
wasseeking additional information from Governments. However, the report noted
that these activities “cannot serve as substitutes for the on-site inspection
and monitoring envisaged by relevant Security Council resolutions.”[12]
The
seventh plenary session of UNMOVIC’s College of Commissioners was held in
November, followed by the submission of the next report. The report noted that UNMOVIC had
completed the first phase of a draft inventory of unresolved disarmament
issues, which consisted of analyzing Iraqi declarations, reviewing inspection
reports and other material that the Commission inherited from UNSCOM. Work had
begun on the second phase, which included analysis of Iraq’s WMD programs, and
what verification steps remained.
UNMOVIC advanced training activities continued, and a major course was
held in the U.K. on the subject of biological weapons. [13]
Unhampered by the presence of inspectors, the Iraqi regime has been
able to expand its WMD and missile capabilities.[14] Iraqi missile capability has been an
issue of concern since the approval of UNSCR 687 and the creation of UNSCOM in
1991. Under the terms of UNSCR 687, Iraq is permitted to develop, manufacture,
and test ballistic missiles with arange of up to 150 kilometers. However, the
terms of 687 left a loophole that enables Iraq to maintain a robust ballistic
missile production capability. In June, press reports indicated that Baghdad
had carried out eight test flights of the 150-km range Al Samoud liquid fueled
ballistic missiles. Numerous reports regarding the development of missiles
exceeding the permitted 150-km range were also published. In August, ABC News
claimed U.S. intelligence sources suspected Iraqi might have financed
construction of a Scud missile assemblyplant in Sudan with the help of North
Korea. Additional sources claimed that Germany’s intelligence agency had
discovered a secret Iraqi solid-fuel missile factory (“Al Mamoun”) on the
outskirts of Baghdad. According to the London Times, Iraq contacted Russian
companies asking for assistance with the construction of a factory to assemble
key ballistic missile components. (The Russian Foreign Ministry denied the
reports.)[15]
In August, the CIA released a report detailing Iraq’s
clandestine missile program, which revealed that production facilities
destroyed by U.S. bombing raids in Operation Desert Fox had been rebuilt. The
report noted that the Al-Samoud missile program could be used in the
development of long-range missiles.[16]
In January 2001, the
U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) again noted Iraqi development of liquid and
solid-propellant SRBM’s within the 150 km range limitation, noting that
experience gained could be applied to “future longer range missile development
effort.” The DOD concluded that
“depending on the success of acquisition efforts and degree of foreign support,
it is possible that Iraq could develop and test an ICBM capable of reaching the
United States by 2015.” In addition, the report noted Iraq maintained a variety
of fighter aircraft, UAV’s, helicopters, artillery, and rockets, which could
potentially be utilized for delivery of WMD.[17]
An unclassified CIA
document reported that the short-range liquid-propellant Al-Samoud was most
likely “maturing” and that a “ low-level operational capability could be
achieved in the near term.” This assessment was based, in part, on the
appearance of four transporter-erector-launchers (TELs) with airframes at the
31 December 2000 “Al Aqsa” parade. The report also notes evidence of the
high priority of the solid-propellant missile development program and the
possibility that “longer range systems may be moving ahead rapidly.” The report
concluded that if sanctions were lifted, Iraq “probably would increase its
attempts to acquire missile-related items from foreign sources, regardless of
any future UN monitoring and continuing restrictions on long-range ballistic
missile programs.”[18]
In
August, CIA Deputy Director John McLaughlin reported evidence of Iraqi
concealment of missiles with a range of 650 kilometers, and capable of reaching
Iran, Israel, Saudi Arabia and Turkey.
In December, a new CIA report concluded that theIraqi program reflected
the goal of recovering the status of a dominant regional power, as well as a
responseto regional threats, noting that in the near future, “Iraq’s ballistic
missile initiatives will probably focus on reconstituting its pre-Gulf war
capabilities to threaten regional targets and probably will not advance beyond
MRBM systems.” In contrast, A German intelligence report concluded that Baghdad
could potentially develop medium range rockets capable of carrying a warhead
3,000 km by 2005, thereby placing Europe in range of Iraqi missiles.[19]
Despite
the expulsion of UNSCOM and other international monitors in 1998, the annual
inspections of known Iraqi nuclear facilities and storage sites were conducted
by the IAEA in January 2000 and 2001. The inspections included a physical
inventory verification of nuclear material at the Tuwaitha site.[21] However, the largely pro-forma
inspection would not have detected materials, facilities, or activities that
had not been declared by the Iraqi government.
Indeed,
the available evidence pointed to continued Iraqi efforts to produce nuclear
weapons. In March 2000, Paul
Leventhal, President of the Nuclear Control Institute, and one of the most
experienced experts on Iraqi nuclear efforts, testified before the U.S. Senate
Foreign Relations Committee. He
stated that: “important questions about Iraq's nuclear-weapons program remain
unanswered” and noted: “key nuclear-bomb components and weapons designs that
were known to exist were never surrendered by Iraq to UN inspectors.” In
addition, Leventhal recalled that over the “200 nuclear PhDs,” who were working
“on unknown projects, with no supervision by UN inspectors for more than a
year.” The testimony included a
reference to Iraq’s “worldwide network to procure foreign technology,” and the
disturbing lack of intelligence “about Iraq's efforts to enrich uranium for
bombs using centrifuges.” According to Leventhal, “the possibility remains that
a small centrifuge cascade for this purpose is hidden somewhere in Iraq.”
However, he emphasized that the greatest danger is the possibility that Iraq
“will acquire, or has already acquired, fissile material on the black market…
If Iraq obtains fissile material, it would be at most a few months—perhaps as
little as weeks or days—away from possessing nuclear bombs.” [22]
Richard
Butler echoed Leventhal’s concern at an appearance before the Israeli Knesset's
Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee in August. Butler stated that there were
no scientific or technical barriers blocking Iraqi development of nuclear
weapons, and noted that if Iraq managed to acquire the necessary raw materials,
it could develop nuclear weapons within a year.[23]
On December 24, the London
Sunday Times reported that Saddam Hussein had ordered his scientists
to resume development of a nuclear (bomb) program. Salman Yassin Zweir, (a
recent defector and design engineer previously employed by the Iraqi Atomic
Energy Commission), revealed that Iraq’s nuclear program had been revived in
1998. According to Zweir: "Saddam is very proud of his nuclear team…He
will never give upthe dream of being the first Arab leader to have a nuclear
bomb." Zweir also noted that Iraqi security elements had moved technical
components to conceal them from bombings and UN inspectors. "Only section
heads could speak to the inspectors. ….They lied and lied and lied."[24]
In
January 2001, the testimony provided by an Iraqi defector Dr. Khidhir Hamza,
highlighted continuing Iraqi efforts to acquire nuclear weapons continued to
surface, both from within Iraq and outside. (According to
Hamza, bombs were being produced in the Iraqi city of Hemrin, in close
proximity to the Iranian border).[25] U.S. officials rejected Iraqi claims to
have destroyed all equipment and facilities related to developing nuclear
weapons, noting that personnel and weapons design information has been
preserved.[26]
The CIA noted that Iraq has continued to work on a “low-level theoretical
R&D associated with its nuclear program.” The report also noted that: “A
sufficient source of fissile material remains Iraq’s most significant obstacle
to being able to produce a nuclear weapon.”[27] (According
to Hamza, the bottleneck [to a nuclear bomb] remains the supply of fissile
material. [28])
On November 7, 2001, the Iraqi newspaper, Babil, published by Saddam Hussein’s
son Udai, reported on a meeting between Saddam and the heads of the Iraqi
nuclear program and defense establishment. Hussein reportedly “praised the
initiatives of those warriors…and their innovations in the areas of the
specializations in line with the other warriors/fighters in the service of the
principles of the great Iraq and the glorious Arab nation.” Press reports cited
evidence of links between the Iraqi nuclear program and the use of Algerian
facilities.[29]
A U.S. DOD assessment noted
if Iraq managed to acquire fissile material from a foreign supplier, a nuclear
weapon could be manufactured in a significantly reduced time frame.[30]
During
2000 and 2001, reports from different sources, including U.S., European, and
Israeli intelligence organizations, indicated that Iraq had rebuilt a number of
suspected chemical[31]
and biological production facilities (damaged during Operation “Desert Fox”) in
an industrial complex west of Baghdad.[32] In 2001, the U.S. released details of
the reconstruction of two factories, and the resumption of chlorine production
at a third facility in the complex. One of the facilities is suspected of
producing pesticides, and a deadly biological agent known as ricin. Although
described as commercial, these factories have all been previously involved in
the production of chemical or biological agents, and were monitored by UN
inspectors. According to one official, "They could be making pesticides or
they could be making something more nefarious than pesticides." Similarly, former UNSCOM inspector Rod
Barton presented evidence that Iraq’s biological weapons program included
production of Brucella bacteria.[33]
In
March, The London Financial Times, cited a document from a report presented to
the UNMOVIC College of Commissioners dealing with the unresolved Iraqi CBW
issues, including the disposition of 500 to 700 155mm shells filled with
mustard gas and the volume of imported phosphorus trichloride. The report
indicated that Iraqi documents uncovered by UNSCOM confirmed that: “spray/drop
tanks for the dissemination of CW agents had been successfully tested with
mustard agent and that the necessary stocks of bulk CW agents had been reserved
for their filling.” The report also stated that the “production of Agent B
(anthrax spores) could be much greater than stated and, had such production
taken place, the remaining quantities would still retain significant activity
given the stability of this agent.”
In
September, London’s Sunday Express reported that, according to unidentified
security officials, Iraqi spies posing as asylum seekers were smuggling CBW
weapons into the UK. The article also reported British fears that Iraq was
producing large amounts of anthrax bacteria for sale to terrorist
organizations. According to some analysts, Iraq is also suspected of a link to
the anthrax attacks against the U.S., perhaps through Mohamed Atta, the leader
of the September 11th hijackers, who was reported to have met with an Iraq
intelligence agent in Prague several months before the hijackings.[34]
(See the section on terrorism in this report for more details on this link.)
The Increasing Iraqi Threat in the Region
The
importance of the evidence of the growing Iraqi WMD capability was reinforced
by the increasingly threatening tone of Iraqi rhetoric and actions during 2000
and 2001. InSeptember 2000, Saddam
Hussein used the opportunity presented by Palestinian-Israeli clashes to raise
the level of threats against Israel and the U.S. In October, the Iraqi leader returned to the themes used a
decade earlier, declaring that: “An end must be put to Zionism. If they
cannot [other Arab leaders], then Iraq alone is able to do so…They know that
the Iraqi people are great and ready to put an end to Zionism from this
moment.” Hussein reiterated his oft-repeated threat to “destroy Zionism” in
November, during a visit by Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov to Baghdad,
and again on December 24, during an annual Christmas message. In February 2001, Iraqi Revolutionary
Command Council member, General Ali Hassan al-Majeed inaugurated the first new
military unit of the “al-Quds (Jerusalem) army to liberate Palestine.” During
the inauguration ceremony, Al-Majeed condemned the presence of the “Zionist
entity (Israel) in the heart of the Arab nation.” In April, an Iraqi diplomat declared that Iraq would
“swallow Israel up” if attacked.
In August, Saddam Hussein declared that: “Volunteering to join Al-Quds
Army with seven million fighters was the most significant action ever had ...
you share the same status with the defiant people of Palestine…Long-live
Palestine, free from the River to the Sea and the Sea to the River...”[35]
Reacting
to these threats, in September 2000, U.S. officials confirmed that a Patriot missile
defense battery crew based in Germany had been put on alert for movement to
Israel. National security adviser, Samuel R. Berger stated that: "A
decision was made that it would be prudent to put these batteries on a shorter
leash time than ordinarily,” but claimed that he knew of no threat against
Israel from Iraq. Berger added that the alert had been ordered due to the
"vituperative statements" Saddam Hussein had recently made. A U.S.
Embassy official (in Israel) echoed Berger’s statement, saying that that the
Patriot battery was “only put on alert -- and publicly put on alert. It's a way
to send a message to Saddam Hussein that we're paying attention."
For
his part, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak downplayed the Iraqi rhetoric,
stating that: “I am not sure that we need to be concerned now…I don't know if
this Patriot missile battery really needs to be bothered…”[36]
In
October, as the Palestinian-Israeli confrontation intensified, U.S. and Israeli
intelligence detected the westward movement of the Iraqi Hammurabi Division,
(composed of approximately 15,000 Special Republican Guard troops). However, officials also noted that the
troop movements posed no immediate threat to Iraq’s neighbors.[37]
On
October 13, media reports indicated that a U.S. satellite had photographed two
Iraqi armored brigades that were moved to positions closer to Kuwait. On October 22, media reports revealed
that that the Iraqi forces on Iraq’s Western border had been reinforced—but
still lacked the air cover necessary for offensive action. In addition, Iraq
had reportedly placed between four and five armored divisions near the
Iraqi-Jordanian border, with one division located 100 kilometers from the
Syrian border.[38]
On
October 25, OC Operations Maj.-Gen. Giora Eiland told the Knesset Foreign
Affairs and Defense Committee that the Iraqi troop movements were mostly
symbolic, and did not pose a (short-term) military threat to Israel. He added
that the IDF had assessed that Iraqi troops would only be able to reach Israel
through Syria or Jordan in the event of a comprehensive regional war.[39] A short time later, the Iraqi troops
were withdrawn from the area.
In
January 2001, as tension on the Israeli-Lebanon border escalated, large
concentrations of Iraqi troops were deployed along the Syrian-Iraqi border. The
first deployment consisted of four or five divisions—but the troops were later
withdrawn. However, asecond deployment, consisting of a smaller amount of troops,
occurred shortly thereafter. In
February, Iraq positioned thousand of troops, artillery, and military vehicles
in close proximity to the Jordanian-Iraqi border. Thedeployment of surface to
airmissiles were not visually confirmed (according to press reports), but were
believed to be preparing for operations. Iraqi troop movements were only halted
after Israeli jets flew towards Syria and U.S. and British warplanes attacked
Iraqi targets near Baghdad. Evidence
of Iraqi support for terror attacks against Israel also surfaced, and Israeli
security services uncovered an Iraqi plot to detonate a car bomb in Ben Gurion
international airport (see the terrorism section of report).[40]
Publicly,
the Israeli government response to these threats was low-key. The Prime Minister’s Office issued a
statement stating laconically that “Israel is continuing to monitor the
developments and keep in close contact with the United States.” Chief of
General Staff Lt.-Gen. Shaul Mofaz noted that “ We are following events and at
this stage, there is no reason to change any of our daily routine.” However, in
2001, as discussion of a potential US attack on Iraq increased, and the
likelihood of Iraqi retaliation against Israel became more visible, the tone
changed. As Israeli Deputy Chief
of Staff Moshe Ya’alon noted, “A U.S. decision to embark on military activity
against Iraq could under certain conditions lead to an Iraqi decision to either
launch missiles, or send out aircraft to attack Israel.”[41]
The prospects of US military action during the last year of the Clinton Administration (2000) were always very low. Although officials continued to call for Iraqi compliance with U.N. inspection requirements, the Europe and the Arab states continued to press for easing of sanctions. Critics charged that the Clinton Administration allowed the sanctions regime to deteriorate and permitted Saddam Hussein to rebuild his stockpile of WMD.
The
election of Republican presidential candidate, George W. Bush in November 2000,
led to expectations of a fundamental change in U.S. policy towards Iraq. Bush and the Republican leadership had
strongly criticized the Clinton administration’s Iraq policy in the past, and
had vowed a tougher approach upon taking office in January 2001.
Indeed,
Iraq was a high priority for the Defense Department in the first few months of
the Bush Administration, and talk, as well as studies of regime change
increased. However, the main focus
of diplomatic activity in this period continued to be on “revitalizing the
sanctions regime” in order “to tighten the sanctions on weapons of mass
destruction, tighten the sanctions on armaments, tighten the sanctions on the
sorts of equipment and other materials that put the people of the region at
risk.”[42] Responding to pressure from Europe and
the Arab world, the Bush administration sought to soften the economic impact of
sanctions for the Iraqi civil sector, while strengthening restrictions on
dual-use items. U.S. Secretary of State, Colin Powell conceded that some
critics would view the revision as a watering down of sanctions, but noted
that: “Everyone I spoke to said you've got to go down this track."[43]
In May, the U.K. announced a joint proposal that would end
the prohibition on the transfer of civilian goods, while simultaneously
retaining sanctions on military and a detailed list of dual-use items, and
repeated that a complete lifting of the sanctionswould only occur upon
completion of UNMOVIC’s mission. Iraq rejected the new initiative, and a number
of Gulf States, as well as China and Russia, declared their opposition to wide
restrictions on “dual-use” equipment.[44]
On
June 1, in the effort to develop a consensus, the U.N. Security Council
unanimously delayed a vote on the “smart sanctions” proposal, and adopted
Resolution 1352, extending the “oil-for-food” program by one month, (rather
than the usual 180 days). During
this period, the list of dual-use items was discussed, and in an attempt to
gain the support of the French and Chinese Governments, the 23-page Goods
Review List had reportedly been reduced to 10 pages. However, the threat of a
Russian veto led to indefinite postponement of a decision.In November, the
Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 1382, which extended the
“oil-for-food” program and included a draft Goods Review List, which was to be
adopted by the Council (subject to any further alterations), with
implementation beginning on May 30, 2002.[45]
However,
the US government’s willingness to restrict its Iraqi policy to “smart
sanctions” shifted again following the September 11th terrorist attacks and the
subsequent anthrax dispersals.
These events led to discussion of possible Iraqi involvement (see the
section on terrorism below). At
the same time, as the war in Afghanistan expanded, the U.S. government
officials also spoke about subsequent phases, designed to destroy other sources
of terrorism and producers of weapons of mass destruction. On this list, Iraq occupies a prominent
position. On September 13th,
DeputyDefense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz warned that Iraq could be a major target
in America’s war on terror, as part of the support system and a major
state-sponsor of terrorism.[46]
Colin
Powell adopted a softer approach, noting that: "We are after ending
terrorism. And if there are states and regimes, nations, that support
terrorism, we hope to persuade them that it is in their interests to stop doing
that.” National Security Advisor, Condoleezza Rice stated that: “We don’t need
Sept. 11th to tell us that Saddam Hussein is a very dangerous man,” but
declared that the U.S. currently had no plans to attack Iraq.[47] At the same time, demands for Iraqi
compliance with U.N. inspection requirements continued, while U.S. and British
patrols in the “no fly-zone” launched limited “self-defense” strikes in
February 2000 against Iraqi anti-aircraft facilities.
The
rhetoric notwithstanding, the policies regarding Iraqi acquisition of WMD and
delivery systems during 2000 and most of 2001 (prior to September 11) were
largely rhetorical. With the focus
of the diplomatic activity in the UN, and the Clinton Administration focused on
other issues, including its own scandals and the efforts to resolve the
Arab-Israeli conflict, the political capital that would have been necessary to
act forcefully to change Iraqi policy and capabilities was invested
elsewhere. The myriad reports from
UNMOVIC and the endless UN Security Council debates over sanctions and
inspections highlighted the sense of “business as usual”, and the pressure on
Saddam Hussein to change his ways was minimal. After September 11,however, this inactivity set the stage
for the increasingly confrontational approach ledby the US to insure that Iraqi
WMD would not continue to develop without any barriers, and to resume the
emphasis on supervised destruction of these weapons as required by UNSC 687 in
1991.
The 1998/9 report on Middle East proliferation and
armscontrol described and analyzed Iranian efforts to acquire strategic weapons
(ballistic missiles and nuclear warheads) beginning under the Shah, and
continuing with the Islamic government. Although delayed by the Iran-Iraq war,
these efforts were accelerated in the early 1990’s. By acquiring extensive
technology and assistance from outside sources (primarily Russia, China, and
North Korea), Iran made substantial progress on ballistic missiles. In
parallel, the development of the Iranian nuclear infrastructure continued, and
evidence of the acquisition of biological weapons also increased.[48]
The Iranian emphasis on acquiring WMD and missile
capabilities was accompanied by a change in the Iranian political leadership,
which tended to deflect attention from themilitary buildup. In 1997, the
election of Mohamed Khatami as President of Iran was seen as an indication of the
increased power of “liberals” or “moderates” in the power struggle against
“conservatives” and radical “Islamists.” [49]
However, despite some political changes, Iran's radical
Islamic leadership maintains total control of military and security
decision-making. This regime has increased support for and provided
advanced weapons to prominent terrorist groups, including Hizbollah and Hamas,
and continues to pursue weapons of mass destruction. Significant evidence and reports regarding chemical and
biological weapons production and storage have been published, and the Iranian
nuclear weapons development program is accelerating, primarily via Russian
construction of the Bushehr nuclear power complex.
In addition, the testing of the Shahab 3 missile, as well as
progress towards longer-range missile systems increased regional concern
regarding the Iranian threat. Periodic declarations by Iranian officials
reinforce the concerns regarding the efforts to acquire WMD. In December 2001, former Iranian
president Rafsanjani stated that if Israel were to be attacked with a nuclear
bomb, it would be utterly destroyed, whereas the Islamic world would be “only
harmed”.[50] While such threats appear to be
primarily motivated by internal Iranian politics (in this case, an effort by
Rafsanjani to boost his “radical” credentials and divert attention from a
corruption case), they are taken very seriously in Israel and elsewhere.
The
combination of these efforts to seek WMD and missile capabilities, as well as
Iranian policies opposing the Middle Eastpeace process, and support for
Hizbollah terrorist operations, are major factors in the policies of the US
towards Iran.In February 2000, the U.S. Senate followed the House of
Representatives and unanimously voted to pass the Iran Nonproliferation Act
(H.R. 1883), which allowed sanctions to be enforced against Russia and other countries
providing WMD to Iran. In March,
(after vetoing a similar bill in 1998), President Clinton signed the Act into
law. Predictably, Russia reacted
harshly, and the ForeignMinistry declared that this policy “may significantly
undermine…Russian-American interaction in the field of non-proliferation and
export control.”[51]
However,
shortly afterwards (March 2000), in an abrupt policy reversal designed to
provide an incentive tothe Khatami-led forces in Iran, the U.S. softened its
stand regarding rapprochement towards Iran, and an import ban on Iranian luxury
goods was lifted. In June,
Madeline Albright declared that Iran would no longer be labeled a “rogue state”
but henceforth would be referred to as “a state of concern.”[52] In response, Iranian President Mohammed
Khatemi praised Albright, and stated that a “new turn” had occurred in Iran’s
relationship with the U.S. Nonetheless, Khatemi urged the U.S. to be more
ambitious in reconciliation efforts, and complained that “no concrete steps”
had been taken. “One knows where the problems are," he said,"but the
key to solving them lies solely in the hands of the United States." In
contrast, the secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council rejected
rapprochement efforts between the two states, and labeled the latest U.S. moves
as "new interference in Iran's domestic affairs."[53]
American
policy on Iran remained largely unchanged during the first year of the Bush
Administration, despite Iran’s continued efforts to acquire WMD and missile
capabilities, Teheran’s active efforts to thwart Middle East peace efforts (as
clearly demonstrated in the shipment of tons of weapons and explosives to the
Palestinian Authority in the Karine-A in January 2002), and support for
Hezbollah terrorist operations.[54]
In
August 2001, President George W. Bush President George W. Bush renewed the
Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) for five years. Washington based its policies
primarily on greater efforts to interdict WMD technologies destined for Iran,
and on attempts to support internal change in Iran. Following Khatami’s re-election as President of Iran in June
2001, Colin Powell expressed optimism that now, there was an opportunity for
fundamental changes in policy, but these hopes were soon abandoned.[55]
The events of
September 11 and the U.S. military action in Afghanistan had an important
impact on the relations between Washington and Teheran. Large-scale public sympathy for the
U.S. immediately following the attacks was coupled with Iranian support for the
defeat of the Taliban regime.
However, after the U.S. victory, Iranian leaders became concerned about
U.S. military domination in a neighboring country, as well as the strong
presence in Central Asia and Pakistan.
The U.S. also continued effort to prevent Iranian acquisition of WMD and
to warn against continuing support for terrorism through groups such as
Hizbollah and Hamas. As a result,
the potential for a change in the relationship began to decline again by the
end of 2001 (as seen in the inclusion of Iran in the “Axis of Evil” outlined in
President Bush’s State of the Union Speech in January 2002).
The Israeli response to these Iranian
policies was consistent with the direction taken in earlier years, but with
greater emphasis and the realization that the time available to halt the
Iranian nuclear and missile programs was rapidly running out. PM Barak and then Sharon repeatedly
raised Israeli concerns regarding the transfer of nuclear technology to Iran in
meetings with Russian officials, including talks with President Putin. The Russians reiterated that they
provided information only on conventional weapons, and nothing that could be
utilized to develop nuclear warheads. In September 2001, Gideon Frank, Director
General of Israel’s Atomic Energy Commission, accompanied PM Sharon to detail
Israel’s concerns regarding Iran’s nuclear program.[56]
Although
Iran is a signatory of both the NPT and CTBT, the evidence shows continued
efforts to acquire fissile material and technology for weapons development
conducted through a hidden networkof military and civilian organizations. The
emphasis on obtaining nuclear weapons is reflected in the extensive efforts to
acquire fissile material through both clandestine means from facilities in the
former Soviet Union and via investments towards indigenous production of
plutonium or highly enriched uranium. [58]
In
its annual report for 2000, the IAEA declared that Iran was fulfilling its
obligations under the various nuclear safeguards agreements. At the same time,
the evidence mounted regarding Iranianefforts to acquire nuclear weapons, in
part through the exploitationof arms control agreements. Iran has failed to
implement its pledge to adopt the IAEA enhanced safeguards, and a senior
diplomat stated that Iran would not accept the Additional Protocoland enhanced
safeguards as long as the U.S. blocked nuclear cooperation with other nations.[59]
Iranian efforts to procure materials and facilities for use
in nuclear weapons manufacture include attempts to acquire enriched uranium
from Khazakhstan; “fuel fabrication and reprocessing capabilities from Argentina;
research reactors from Argentina, India, China, and Russia; nuclear power
plants from Russia and China; gas centrifuge enrichment technology from
Switzerland and Germany, and a gas centrifuge enrichment plant from Russia; a
uranium conversion plant from China or Russia; and a laser enrichment plant
from Russia.” The completion of the ostensibly civil nuclear power complex in
Bushehr would provide the basis for creating a fuel cycle that could be
diverted for the production of fissile material for weapons production.[60]
If
Iran were able to obtain diverted fissile material, it could produce a nuclear
weapon within one to two years. However, without external sources of fissile
material, a significant time period would be required before indigenous fissile
production could begin. Israeli intelligence estimates indicate that Iran will
achieve “initial operational capability” for its nuclear force by 2005; and
perhaps earlier, if sufficient fissile material is obtained on the black market.[61]
A 2001 CIA report, entitled Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic
Missile Threat Through 2015, stated that most U.S. intelligence agencies
assessed Iran could develop a nuclear weapon by the end of the decade, but
could significantly reduce the timeframe by obtaining foreign assistance.[62]
Russia
continued to be the major source of technology and materials for the Iranian
nuclear program, despite repeated discussions with the US government and
pledges by Moscow to refrain from supplying military technology. In
2000, the contents of a letter from U.S. Vice President, Al Gore, to then
Russian Prime Minister, Viktor Chernomyrdin, was published, revealing details
on a 1995 agreement dealing with aspects of Russia’s nuclearcooperation with
Iran. In this agreement,
Chernomyrdin provided information regarding nuclear fuel deliveries to Iran,
but stated that this information was "not to be conveyed to third parties,
including the U.S. Congress. In return, the U.S. acquiescedto the sale of
conventional Russian weapons to Iran.[63]
In
U.S. Senate hearings, the Deputy Director of the DCI Nonproliferation Center
Norman Schindler testified that Iran was “seeking nuclear-related equipment,
material, and technical expertise from a variety of foreign sources, especially
in Russia.” In the guise of civil
projects, Iran is “developing whole facilities—such as a uranium conversion facility—that
could be used to support the production of fissile material for a nuclear
weapon.” Schindler also noted that “Tehran continues to seek fissile material
and technology for weapons development and has established an elaborate system
of covert military and civilian organizations to support its acquisition
goals.” He highlighted the construction of the 1,000-megawatt nuclear power
reactor at Bushehr, emphasizing that “it affords Iran broad access to Russia’s
nuclear industry.” Similar
comments were made by John A. Lauder, Director of the DCI Non-Proliferation
Center.[64]
During
this period, the number of high-level visits involving senior Russian and
Iranian officials relating to military cooperation reflected the importance of
this activity. In January 2000,
Russian Minister of Defense, Igor Sergeyvev, met with the Secretary of Iran’s
Security Council, Khasan Roukhani, and pledged increased cooperation in
developing its military and technical capabilities. Sergeyvev declared that:
“Russia intends to maintain the dynamics of its bilateral ties with Iran in the
military, military-technical, scientific technical, and energy fields.”[65]
Russian
construction and engineering crews continued to work on the Bushehr nuclear
power reactor, and in May, Iran's ambassador to Russia, Mehdi Safari, declared
the nuclear power station 40 percent complete, and on schedule tobecome
operational in 2002. However, US sanctions have reportedlyraised the costs of
necessary materials and reduced the quality ofIran’s acquisitions. Thus, the
date of completion remains speculative.[66]
U.S. intelligence reports have indicated that despite
assurances to the contrary, various Russian entities “are engaged in
cooperation with Iran that goes beyond this project.” While Bushehr is a
civilian nuclear reactor under IAEA safeguards, numerous reports note the
evidence that Iran is utilizing theproject to gain access to additional Russian
technology to use indevelopment of weapons. Discussions of the acquisition of a
heavy water moderated natural uranium-fueled nuclear reactor and related
facilities would be central to the production of weapons-grade plutonium.[67]
In
June 2000, the U.S. reported that Russia was exporting tritium gas to a nuclear
research center in Tehran.[68] Iranian efforts to acquire laser
enrichment technology from Russia provided additional evidence of nuclear
weapons program. American analysts declared: "there is no question that
the turn-key facility was intended for" Iran's nuclear weapons program.
This issue was also reportedly discussed between Clinton and Putin in July,
during the G8 meeting in Okinawa. The Russian government claimed that it was
unaware of the contract until early 1999—because the company providing the
technology had not sought an export permit (as laser enrichment was not listed
as sensitive technology requiring an export permit). In response to Russia’s
claim, a senior U.S. official declared that while certain Russian laser-related
equipment theoretically could be cleared for export to Iran, the Clinton
administration believed that, "taken as a whole package," the laser
facility clearly "was intended and designed for weapons-grade enrichment."[69]
The
issue was raised again in September prior to the Clinton-Putin summit meeting
at the UN. According to Russian officials, the contract "has been
suspended and is being reviewed" by the Russian government “pending a
joint investigation into whether the laser technology could help Iran acquire a
nuclear capability." (Under American pressure,Russia agreed to conduct an
investigation of technology transfer to Iran. State Department Spokesperson James Rubin declared that
although the "investigation revealed a number of violations of
procedures,” the “Russian Government’s decision to take action … demonstrates
Russia’s commitment to stopping the flow of sensitive technologies to Iran.”[70])
In
March 2001, Iranian President, Mohammad Khatami went to Russia and signed
cooperation pacts designed to bolster a lucrative arms trade, and to complete
construction of Bushehr. Khatami
and Putin issued a joint communiqué stating that Russia and Iran "will
continue their cooperation in the peaceful use of atomic energy" while
they also "confirmed their adherence to the commitments imposed by their
participation in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty."[71]
In
June 2001, the Washington Post reported that Russia had permitted a shipment
ofhigh-strength aluminum for the Iranian nuclear program. The aluminum alloy
was believed to be intended for the manufacture of rotor blades utilized in gas
centrifuges for uranium enrichment. According to U.S. officials, National
Security Adviser, Condoleeza Rice, discussed the issue with her Russian
counterpart, Sergei Ivanov. Ivanov reportedly responded in the form of a
written assurance that the aluminum was intended for aircraft manufacture. [72]
In
addition, Iran continues to receive nuclear and related weapons technology from
other countries, including China. In 1997, in response to American pressure,
China pledged it would not begin any new nuclear cooperation with Iran, and
would halt its existing projects. According to a 2001 DOD report, China appears
to have kept its 1997 commitments with respect to nuclear technology. Chinese
plans to build four nuclear power stations in various Iranian provinces were
cancelled, in part due to the cost ($12billion over a 10-year period), and in
part because the project had become mired in accusations of corruption against
a son of former Iranian president Hashemi Rafsanjani, who handles most of
Iran's trade with China.)[74]
Iranian Missile
Developments
Iranian
ballistic missile development is based on technology and expertise obtained
from Russia, China, and North Korea. [75] North Korean sales of missile
technology to Iran was particularly salient in this period,with sales
reportedly including at least12 No-dong motors for the Shahab-3. DPRK leader,
Kim Jong-Il, contradicted Iranian denials when he reportedly admitted (during
an August 13 luncheon with South Korean media executives) that his country has
been exporting missiles abroad to Iran and Syria in return for hard currency.[76]
In April, in a largely symbolic
response to the missile sales, the U.S. government-imposed sanctions against
the Changgwang Sinyong Corporation (North Korea) and three Iranian entities
(Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics, or MODAFL; the Aerospace
Industries Organization; the Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group; and the SANAM
Industrial Group) for engaging "in missile technology proliferation
activities." However, as part of a rapprochement process with North Korea,
the U.S. announced a general easing of sanctions on the “understanding and
expectation that North Korea will continue to refrain from testing any
long-range missiles for the duration of negotiations…aimed at improving…
relations.” Although negotiations between the U.S. and the DPRK continued for
some time, they ultimately yielded no results.[77]
U.S. government sources concluded that Iran began serial production of
the Shahab-3 in 2001, including subsystems and assembly, at the rate of 20
missiles per year.[78] As of December 2001, Iran reportedly
possessed several hundred SCUD Bs and C’s; 200 Chinese-manufactured CSS-8
SRBM’s; 300 North Korean produced Shahab-1 missiles;100 North Korean produced
Shahab-2 missiles; and the first locally assembled and produced Shahab-3’s.
Iran also reportedly began indigenous production of SCUDs and continues to work
on longer-range missiles that will be capable of striking targets in Europe
and, eventually, the US. In
addition, Iran began to emerge as a “third tier” supplier state, providing
missile technology and assistance to Syria, Libya, and other countries in the
region.[79]
On July 15, 2000, Iran successfully conducted its second
test of the Shahab-3 missile, reportedly using one of the North Korean motors
purchased in 1999. (The first test
was conducted in July 1998, but the missile did not complete a full trajectory.
A third test of the Shahab-3 in September 2000 also failed).[80] Thetest had been predicted by a number
of intelligence agencies, which were monitoring preparations.
Official
statements on the objectives of Iran’s missile development program differed
markedly. Iranian State Television declared that test part of Iran's ”policy of
strengthening its defense capability on the basis of the principle of
deterrence, and was “not in any way a threat to another country.” Defense MinisterShamkhani, however,
claimed that the aim of the technological development program was to launch
communications satellites, and not warheads. According to Shamkhani, "The
necessary basis for designing and producing carriers to put satellites in orbit
[has] been created.” In sharp contrast, Iranian Revolutionary Guard General,
Rahim Safavi, vowed that Iran would employ offensive missiles if Israel or the
US endangered Iran's security. Safavi stated that: "Iran's powerful
missiles were capable of striking an unbearable crushing blow.” However, Safavi
also characterized the Shahab 3 as “defensive.”[81]
No
additional Shahab 3 missile tests took place during 2001, but Iran continued
its ballistic missile development program, and the U.S. government concluded
that “Iran likely has the capability to deploy limited numbers of Shahab-3.”[82]
Iran
also continued to develop longer-range missilesin 2000, including the
two-stageShahab-4, (with a range long enough to reach Western Europe), and the
Shahab-5, which is expected to have a range of 10,000 kilometers. In addition,
Iran is developing a new missile named “Kosar.” According to Kenneth Timmerman,
the Kosar is based on the Soviet SS-5 missile; utilizes the same RD-216 liquid
fuel rocket motor, and is capable of achieving a range of 4,250 kilometers.[83]
In
the first quarter of 2000,press reports indicated that the DPRK was aiding Iran
with the upgrade of a naval cruise missile(the C-802), originally purchased
from China. Reportedly, the missile lacks advanced targeting systems; however,
the DPRK is assisting Iran in the development ofan “over-the-horizon”
designation system. In June 2000,
the Arabic media reported that Iranian President Mohammed Khatami was in China
to seal a "strategic partnership" that included cooperation on a new
generation of Silkworm anti-ship cruise missiles.[84]The U.S. believes
that Iran is capable of manufacturing the C-802—and this development posesa
significant threat to the region. Iran could combine the Silkworm platform to
develop a long-range missile with the capability for a large payload. According
to Aaron Karp, the range of such a missile could extend up to 800kilometers.[85]
In
November, following continued U.S. pressure, China announced plans to establish
comprehensive missile-related export controls procedures, as well as the
expected publication of a missile-related export control list. In exchange, the
U.S. announced that it would waive new sanctions against Chinese
"entities" accused of exporting ofmissile-related equipment to Iran
and Pakistan. In addition, the U.S. pledged to resume normal consideration of
applications to launch American satellites atop Chinese rockets.[86]
The
U.S. responded sharply to the Iranian missile test in July 2000. American government officials
reiterated the risks of weapons proliferation in the Persian Gulf region, and
the threat Iranian missiles posed to Israel and U.S. troops stationed in Saudi
Arabia. Defense Secretary Cohen declared that Iran's successful flight test was
part of a program to develop several types of long-range missiles. A State
Department official emphasized that the U.S.“continue[s] to place a high
priority on this important missile nonproliferation issue and to work closely
with other like-minded countries to stop the flow of sensitive missile items to
Iran.” An official in the National Security Council declared:“If we were ever
to achieve an official dialogue with Iran, this is certainly a subject we would
want to discuss.”[87]
In
June, Gen. Anthony Zinni, outgoing head of CENTCOM declared that it was only a
matter of time before Iran has a nuclear bomb, and long range missile
capability. Zinni emphasized that, "this will be a major step—because it
gives them a missile system that can reach out and touch places like Tel Aviv.”
Similarly, a CIA report entitled “Foreign Missile Developments and the
Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States through 2015,” revealed that
Tehran would soon deploy 1,300 km-range Shahab-3medium-range ballistic missiles,
allowing Iran to target Israel and other countries in the region.[88]
However,
analysts such as W. Seth Carus note that: “there is little agreement within the
intelligence community about the time required for Iran to acquire ICBM
capability. Given the high risks of underestimating the threat from Iran, it is
probably prudent to assume that Iran will possess a missile capable of striking
U.S. cities by 2010.” The primary difficulty is “the development of warheads
designed to permit effective delivery of NBC (nuclear, biological, and
chemical) weapon.“[89]
In
Israel, the Iranian missile developments, including the test of the Shahab 3,
are seen as particularly destabilizing. Deputy Defense Minister Ephraim Sneh
noted in July 2000 that: "The successful test run is a worrying sign. We
have to go up one, two oreven three levels in our defense abilities. …. Iran actively and relentlessly
undermines the peace process through various terrorist organizations… When such
a regime has a long-range capacity combined with a tremendous effort to combine
it with nuclear projects, it is of great concern to Israel.” Sneh added,
without offering details, that Israel “is prepared to forestall'' the dangers
of Iran's weapons technology.
PM
Barak, participating in the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations at Camp David at
time of the missile launch, declared that: "The strength of the IDF and
the strengthening of Israel by peace agreements are together our answer to this
launch." However, an unnamed official with Barak echoed Sneh’s words:
"This missile is a signal not only to us but to the region as a whole. It
threatens the whole region and goes to show the need to immediately stop
financial aid to Iran." [90]
While
Israeli security officials have emphasized that the test launch did not pose an
immediate threat, they noted that Iran is improving its strategic capability.
According to a senior IDF source, the successful launch “reflects an Iranian
ambition to be able to cover Israel and other countries in that range."
The source added that Iran has achieved initial operational ability, but only
has a few individual missiles, rather than dozens of organized batteries, at
its disposal. However, Israeli analysts predict the missile will be fully
operational in two years—and note that in a crisis, a limited missile launch is
possible.[91]
Iran
biotechnology industry isincreasingly advanced, with considerable
pharmaceutical experience, and an infrastructure to support its biological
weapons program. Efforts to obtain
dual-use biotechnical material from Russia, China, and Western Europe are also
continuing.[92] According to intelligence assessments,
although Iran has ratified the BWC, the pursuit of offensive biological warfare
capabilities continued during 2001.
Research is taking place on standard agents such asanthrax and botulin
toxin, and Iran has shown an interestin obtaining materials that could be
utilized to produce a variety of toxins. In addition, the working assumption is
that Iran may have deployed biological weapons for delivery through spraytanks
mounted onaircraft, ships, missiles, and perhaps with individual terrorists,
but success in developing effective dissemination of BW agents remains unclear.
Iran
has acceded to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), but U.S., Israeli and
some European intelligence analysts have concluded that Iran retains a
considerable chemical warfare capability, and has deployed chemical missile
warheads. In addition, Iran has continued to obtain chemical production
technology, expertise, and precursor chemicals from Russia and China. In June
2001, the US State Department imposed trade sanctions on a Chinese company
under the Nonproliferation Act of 2000, apparently related to the transfer of
chemical weapons related materials. A Chinese foreign ministry official
responded that: “These companies are engaged in normal international chemical
trade, which is in line with the spirit and goals of the Chemical Weapons
Convention… China holds that internal laws and stipulations must never override
international laws and it is irrational for the United States to impose
sanctions against Chinese companies using the excuse of so-called ‘internal
laws’.”[93]
Teheran
is also believed to be conducting nerve agent research, and military training
indicates planning to operate in a contaminated environment. [94]
The
government of Iran has denied these allegations, and Dr. Jean Pascal Zanders of
SIPRI notes that: “Iran destroyed its CW production plants and its munitions
after the [Iran-Iraq] War… submitted declarations on its past programs to the
OPCW and declared the production of 500 tons of agents.” Zanders also asks “why
the CWC mechanism to deal with such situations” has not been triggered? “Why
hasn’t any state country called upon a challenge inspection?”[95] Indeed, at the close of 2001,
discussions of possible challenge inspections of Iran by theOPCW were
increasing, while critics also noted the limitations of any formal
international inspection mechanism. (For additional information on developments
relating to Iran in the framework of the CWC and OPCW, see Part 2, section 6 of
the report.)
The
Iranian drive to achieve a significant WMD and missile capability continued
unabated and accelerated during 2000 and 2001, despite the intensity of the
political reform process. Indeed,
the government established by President Khatami seemed to endorse these
efforts, although it was far removed from the actual decision-making and
acquisition processes in these areas.
Diplomats and other officials who went to Teheran to discuss the
implications and dangers of proliferation, and Iranian compliance with its
undertakings within the international non-proliferation agreements that they
signed was far from complete. In
retrospect, this period may emerge as the critical time in which the
variousIranian WMD and missile programs crossed the threshold between low-level
testing and early development, and full scale production of operational
capabilities.
Egypt
has possessed a chemical weapons capability since the early 1960s, when CW
agents were used in the war in Yemen, and is also considered to possess a
biological weapons stockpile. In addition, the Egyptian military has steadily
improved and extended the range of its ballistic missile arsenal, and although
it is a signatory to the NPT, there have been signs of renewed interest in
developing nuclear weapons.
There
is considerable evidence of accelerated Egyptian efforts to expand the range
and accuracy of its ballistic missile force, primarily based on technology and
components acquired from North Korea.
According to an unclassified CIA report (2001): "Egypt continues
its effort to develop and produce ballistic missiles with the assistance of
North Korea. This activity is part of a long-runningprogram of ballistic
missile cooperation between these two countries." In January, the Washington Times
reported that a North Korean company based in China had sold Egypt specialized
steel used for missile fabrication.
In
March 2001, during a visit to the U.S., Israeli Prime Minister, Ariel Sharon,
discussed Egyptian-North Korean missile links with a group ofgathering of
American legislators. In April, U.S. officials reported that Egypt had acquired
medium-range missiles, based on the SCUD C (500km range) from North Korea.[97]
In
June, a U.S. intelligence official estimated that there were between 50 to 300
North Korean missile technicians in Egypt. According to the official, the
Egyptians will gain “wide exposure” to North Korean technology. Another official noted that, “Egypt is
pretty much going to get what Iran got" from the North Koreans.[98]
There
is also evidence that Egypt has acquired technology from countries other than
North Korea, including guidance systems for medium-range ballistic missile.
According to European intelligence sources, the Egyptians bought the components
from Germany through front companies, which were delivered to Japan, where they
subsequently disappeared. Reports suggest that the components were sent to
North Korea for modification—then shipped to Egypt.[99]
The
Egyptian efforts led American legislators to question continued U.S. aid to
Egypt. In May, during budget hearings, Senator Mitch McConnell, questioned
Secretary of State Colin Powell over the amount of U.S. aid contributed to the
Egypt’s military. The same month,
during a House International Relations subcommittee on Middle East and South
Asia, (D) California Rep. Brad Sherman asserted that U.S. military aid to Egypt
($1.3 billion annually) was utilized for a military buildup that threatens
Israel. Sherman noted that
Egyptian defense acquisitions costshave exceeded $5 billionover the past eight
years and he asked Assistant Secretary of State, William Burns if “this level
of military spending something that we should encourage or subsidize, and what
is the state of talks between Egypt and North Korea regarding the acquisition
of the No-Dong class missile with an 800-mile range?" Sherman also asked
if it made“ sense for us to be providing money to Egypt if they spend this
fungible money on something like an 800-mile-range missile?"[100]
Egyptian
officials consistently deny the claims regarding missile acquisition, and
during talks with Congress and other American officials, Egyptian President
Hosni Mubarak rejected assertions that his country had purchased missiles from
North Korea. Similarly, Egyptian
Ambassador to the U.S., NabilFahmy declared that: "The allegations that we
are developing a joint project with the North Koreans are false.” Fahmy
confirmed that contacts over missiles between Egypt and North Korea took place
five years ago, but “was a limited program, and that’s where it stopped.”[101]
In
November, despite Congressional objections, the Bush administration announced
the sale of Harpoon Block II missiles to Egypt. The Harpoon
Block II missiles ordered by Egypt (unlike those in the Israeliarsenal) can be
launched from ships, jet fighters, and land. The Harpoon e has a range of
approximately 150-175 kilometers, is guided by a Global Positioning Satellite
System (GPS), and is capable of hitting land targets with high precision, i.e.,
within10 meters of the selected target. The Harpoon Block II carries a 250-kg
warhead.[102]
The
$400 million dollar sale of more than 50 seaborne Harpoon missiles is justified
as providing Egypt with the ability to protect to the Suez Canal, which would
be of “value to shipping generally and to U.S. warships that use this channel.”[103] Israeli defense officials expressed
concern over this planned sale and a Knesset study headed by MKYuval Steinitz,
warned that the Egyptian Navy, armed with Harpoonand Standard missiles, would
pose a major threat to Israeli shipping, and could reach targets hundreds of
kilometers away. According to the Israeli Defense Ministry, Egypt’s military
buildup is eroding Israel’s qualitative superiority. Major General Yedidia Ya’ari, Commander-In-Chief of the
Israeli Navy stated that the balance of naval power in the Middle East “has
changed over the past 20 years, since the Yom Kippur War, and has changed
primarily because of the strengthening of the Egyptian navy with American
weapons…”[104]
Egypt
reportedly maintains a significant chemical warfare capability, and has linked
refusal to sign the CWC to Israeli rejection of the NPT. Egyptian officials
have claimed that the acquisition of chemical (and biological) weapons is
justified, and even a necessity.[105]
Egypt’s
primary chemical weapons facility is located in Abu-Za’abal, which is supported
by the local insecticide and pharmaceutical plants. Secondary facilities are situated in
Abu-Rawash, an aerosol can filling point, and adjacent to the Ben-Suaf air
force base. A primary research and development plant is located in the National
Research Center in Doki. Egypt has produced significant amounts of mustard;
phosgen; psychomimetic incapacitating agents; sarin and VX nerve gas. These
agents have been loaded onto landmines, artillery shells, aerial bombs,
rockets, and missile warheads.[106]
The
Egyptian nuclear program began in 1954, and progressed with the acquisition of
a 2MW research reactorfrom the Soviet Union in 1961. Following the 1967 War, Egypt’s nuclear program slowed,
after many of its nuclear experts emigrated abroad and economic difficulties
increased.[107]
Nevertheless, serious work in the nuclear sphere continued.
In
the mid 1970’s, as part of the shift away from alignment with the Soviet Union
and the start of peace negotiations with Israel, the U.S. agreed to provide
Egypt with eight nuclear power plants.
The U.S. proposal required accession to the NPT, and Egypt ratified the
treaty in 1981. However, following Israel’s decision to forgo the American
plan, the U.S. offer to Egypt lapsed. In September 1992, Egypt signed a
contract with Invap, Argentina's nuclear organization, to build a 22-megawatt
research reactor at Inshas. Construction began in March 1993, and the reactor
went online in 1998.[108]
In
addition, Egypt operates a hot cell complex for plutonium extraction research,
and a pilot nuclear fuel factory that is utilized to process indigenous natural
uranium. Egyptian officialshave stressed the goal of obtaining an independent
uranium fuel production capability, as reflected in contracts signed with
Australia, Canada and Niger to purchase mining technology—as well as aid in
processing uranium ore. Egypt also maintains scientific projects under the
tutelage of the IAEA, and has bilateral agreements regarding the peaceful use
of atomic energy with Germany, the United States, Russia, India, China, and
Argentina. In addition, the U.K.and India provide assistance to Egypt in
scientific research training, and atomic projects.[109]
Although
the evidence indicates that Egypt halted its nuclear weapons efforts in the 1960s,
some Egyptians have called for a renewed effort towards this goal. Following
the 1998 Indian and Pakistani tests, reports of Egyptian-Syrian and Saudi
Arabian cooperation in this area increased. In August of 2001, Egypt and South
Korea signed an accord to cooperate in the development of nuclear power.
According to Egyptian officials, the accord was limited to civilian
applications of nuclear technology.[110]
Egypt
has consistently sought to avoid “falling behind” any other Arab state in the
procurement and deployment of weapons and military technology, and has been
willing to expend considerable resources to maintain this position, despite
chronic poverty, unemployment and economic crisis. Egypt has a relatively developed scientific and
technological infrastructure, and in this sense, is somewhat less dependent on
external expertise once the initial design phase iscomplete and major
manufacturing facilities are acquired.
In some areas, such as chemical weapons and missiles, Egypt was a
pioneer for a long time, and in response to the growth of such activities in
Iraq, Iran, Syria and Libya, has amplified its programs in these areas.
The
decision made in the 1980s to abandon a nuclear weapons program for the time
being is in the process of extensive re-evaluation, despite Egypt’s accession
to the NPT. Following the Iranian
tests of the Shahab 3 missile and other regional developments in this
direction, Egypt redoubled its missile acquisition and development program,
primarily in cooperation with North Korea. As a result, the Egyptian efforts in each of these areas is
likely to accelerate in the next few years, andwill need close monitoring to
prevent sudden developments and surprises that could fundamentally alter the
strategic balance in the region.
Syria
is not a signatory to the CWC, and maintains both a chemical and biological
weapons program, and continues to develop and improve its SRBM capabilities,
primarily through assistance from North Korea, Russia and China, and in
cooperation with Iran. Although a
signatory to the NPT, there is increasing evidence of Syrian interest in
developing a foundation for possible future development of nuclear weapons.
Syria
possesses several hundred SCUD B, C, Nodong and SS-21 short-range ballistic
missiles (SRBM’s), with the capability of launching chemical and biological
warheads. Damascus also receives
assistance from North Korea, China, and Russia in the production of liquid fuel
missiles, and worksin close cooperation with Iran.[112] In July 2001, Syria launched a
SCUDmissile reportedly armed with a chemical warhead. The missile was
launchedin the Haleb region of northern Syria, and landed 300 kilometers away
in southern Syria.[113] According to the U.S. DOD, Syria is
also “laying the groundwork for a future option to develop a modern,
solid-propellant SRBM,” and during 2001, this activity accelerated.[114]
Syria is not a party to the CWC, and
has maintained a chemical warfare capability for numerous years, including
mustard gas (obtained from Egypt), Sarin, cyanide, and is attempting to develop
the nerve agent, VX. According to Dany Shoham, Syria
received unofficial assistance from Russia for the development of VX and other
chemical
agents that are produced primarily in Damascus and Homs. However, it should be noted that Syria
remains dependent on foreign sources for essential elements (including
precursor chemicals and production equipment) of its chemical warfare program.Damascus
cooperates with Egypt, Iran, and most probably Libya, in the acquisition of
chemical and biological agents and materials, as well as other expertise.[115]
Syria
has signed, but not ratified, the BWC, and there are persistent reports on its
efforts to develop biological weapons.
Since 1988, Syria has produced botulinum and ricin toxins, as well as
anthrax and cholera. According to Danny Shoham (an Israeli researcher), Russian
scientists are aiding in the development of anthrax, as well as the subsequent
loading of the agent onto warheads, for “Syria apparently intends to attain the
capability to biologically arm all types of its long-range surface-to surface
missile warheads.” Shoham also notes that: “it is reasonable
to assume that this goal can be realized in the course of a few years, if it
has not yet been attained.” (However, a U.S. DOD assessment concludes that Syria has not begun
“any major effort to put biological agents into weapons.”[116]
Syria
has ratified the NPT, (but has not the signed the CTBT) and does not have an
active or advancednuclear program, but appears to be following the pattern in a
number ofother states in the Middle East and elsewhere by gradually building a
foundation in nuclear technology. This foundation is largely based on civil
research and dual-use applications, including a small 30kW neutron research
reactor in Damascus, which is operated under IAEA safeguards.[117]
The fertilizer plant at Homs is owned and operated by the Atomic Commission of
Syria, and this plant is being prepared for recovering uranium from phosphates.
According to the Federation of American Scientists, in 1979, Syria reportedly
initiated a military nuclear program—and has not provided the IAEA with
complete information regarding these activities.[118]
During
the past decade, Syria has attempted to expand its infrastructure, via
cooperation with China, Russia, Argentina, and other countries.[119]
In 1999, Syria signed a comprehensive
nuclear cooperation agreement with Russia, which included the construction of a
small, light-water research reactor, also slated to be under IAEA safeguards.
In its 2001 report on WMD, the CIA stated: “Broader access to Russian expertise
could provide opportunities for Syria to expand its indigenous capabilities,
should it decide to pursue nuclear weapons. We will continue to monitor
Syria’s nuclear R&D program for any signs of weapons intent.”[120]
Syria
lacks the scientific and industrial infrastructure found in Egypt and, to a
lesser degree, Iran, and lacks the oil income of Iraq and Libya. As a result, in the development of WMD
and missiles, Damascus generally lags behind, but not by a great deal. Claims on the leadership role in the
region, and rivalry with other countries as well as strategic objectives in the
confrontation with Israel have propelled Syrian efforts to expand the chemical,
biological and missile capabilities.
In addition, as resources for Syrian conventional weapons decline, the
emphasis on WMD and missiles in likely to grow further.
The
contours and central elements of the Israeli strategic doctrine, based on
preemption, deterrence and the threat of massive and unacceptable retaliation,
have remained essentially unchanged for decades.[121] This doctrine is the result of the
regional threat environment, including the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction and delivery systems, and the continuing hostility and rejection of
Israeli legitimacy. While this
environment became somewhat less threatening following the 1979 peace treaty
with Egypt, the escalating statements of intention and the capabilities of
Iraq, Iran, Syria, and othercountries are perceived as evidence of continuing
existential threats to Israeli national survival. The failure of the Oslo negotiations, the campaign of
Palestinian terrorism, and the support from Iraq, Iran and other countries,
heightened the instability in the region, and increased Israeli concerns and
responses.[122]
Although
Israel’s nuclear posture has not changed since 1969, when the secret agreement
was worked out with the U.S. government (in which Israel pledged not to test or
declare itself a nuclear weapons state), the proliferation of WMD systems in
the region has led to re-examination of this posture. In particular, the approaching end to the Israeli nuclear
monopoly has resulted in consideration of the need for a survivable
second-strike system. In May 2000,
Ha’aretz published a report claiming the Israeli Navy was developing a “second
strike” policy based on the newly delivered Dolphin-class submarines.[123]
In June, the London Sunday Times reported that Israel had secretly carried out
a test launch of nuclear capable missiles from two Dolphin-class submarines in
the Indian Ocean.[124]
According to the report, the tests were designed to simulate retaliation to
nuclear strike from Iran. The report also claimed that each of the three
Dolphin-class submarines will be fitted with four cruise missiles, and that two
submarines would be deployed at sea, (one in the Red Sea and Persian Gulf, the
other in the Mediterranean), while a third would remain on standby. These reports were immediately denied
by the IDF, but the subject continued to be discussed in the international and
Arabic media.[125]
In
October, the third Dolphin class submarine arrived in Israel, and Der Spiegel
reported that the German government had provided Israel with the financial and
technical means to launch a nuclear “second strike.” German officials promptly
denied that the government has transferred any nuclear assistance.[126]
In
March 2001, Ha’aretz reported that Prime Minister Ariel Sharon (who took office
following elections in February), like his predecessors, had affirmed the
continuity of Israel’s policy of nuclear ambiguity. According to Ha’aretz,
Sharon convened a meeting with Atomic Energy Commission Director General Gideon
Frank to discuss the issue, and was expected to renew the U.S.-Israeli “nuclear
understanding” in a meeting with President Bush at the end of March.[127]
In
September, former Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was reported to
have argued that since efforts to halt Iran’s nuclear weapons development had
failed, Israel should end the policy of “nuclear ambiguity,” and move towards a
second strike capacity. Analysts
saw this statement as a hidden critique of Sharon’s policy, but the issue
quickly disappeared from the public debate.[128]
While
public debates on Israel’s nuclear deterrent policy are quite rare, in February
2000, this policy was challenged by a group led by Israeli Arab leaders who
raised the issue in the Knesset (Israel’s legislature) following publication of
parts of the transcript from Mordechai Vannunu’s trial in the Israeli
press. MK Issam Mahoul charged
that: "Israel .. created legitimacy for the other countries in this part
of the worldto arm themselves with nuclear weapons.” Mahoul’s claims were rejected by a number of MKs from the
mainstream parties, and representing the government, MK Chaim Ramon defended
Israel’s policy of ambiguity, asking whether the Arab MKs wanted “to announce
to Iran and Iraq exactly what we have?" and repeated that the NPT “does
not provide a fitting solution for our region as proved in the case of Iran and
proved in the case of Iraq." [129] No one else spoke on this issue, and
the subject was closed after a 52-minute discussion.
In
another break with the past, in November 2001, Israel’s commercial Channel Two
television broadcast a documentary entitled “The Bomb in the Basement. ” It was based on interviews with key
participants in the nuclear program, including Foreign Minister Shimon Peres.
The official policy of nuclear secrecy was also challenged in the cases of
Avner Cohen and Yitzhak Yaakov.
Cohen, whose book, Israel and the
Bomb, was first published in the U.S. despite denial of permission
by the Israelicensor, was questioned by police upon his arrival in Israel in
March 2001. Although no formal charges were filed, the Justice Ministry noted
there were grounds for interrogation.
In April 2001, the Israeli press revealed thatYitzhak Yaakov had been
arrested to prevent publication of confidential information on Israel’s nuclear
program.. Yaakov had served in the Israeli army between the years 1955-1973,
including in the position of Director of Development of Weapons Systems. [130] (In 2002, Yaakov was convicted and
given a light sentence.)
Developments in Israeli-US Strategic Relations
2000 began with the acceleration of
activity in the Middle East “peace process”, in both the Syrian-Israeli track
and in the negotiations with the Palestinian, and these developments had
important strategic implications.
Under the policies promoted by the Barak government, Israel was
preparing to give up substantial territory and strategic depth in the context
of peace agreements. In this
context,various measures to offset the negative impact on Israeli security were
considered, including a formal Israeli-U.S. defense treaty. U.S. and Israeli
defense officials also discussed a “strategic upgrade package” including
Tomahawk cruise missiles (the transfer of which is restricted under the terms
of the Missile Technology Control Regime).[131]
Negotiations over various types of
defense pacts and strategic upgrades, including expanded U.S. pre-positioning
of weapons, continued throughout the year. On February 27, Israeli Deputy Defense Minister Ephraim Sneh
revealed that that Israel had requested new intelligence-gathering systems,
early warning stations, and means "to forestall long-range threats from
Iran and Iraq."[132] These discussions continued even after
the negotiations with Syria ended, and also after the failed Camp David summit
in July.[133] The draft proposal included
upgrading Israel’s status to that of a “strategic ally”; cooperation in
countering biological and chemical terrorism; joint development of advanced missile
defense systems; and a memorandum of understanding to replace annual aid
allocations with a long-term framework. (This last item
reflected the tension generated by Israeli plans to sell a number of PHALCON
airborne battle management stations, based on a Russian airframe and Israeli
electronics, to China).[134] Later, additional elements were
introduced, including Israeli access to information from US space intelligence
gathering systems; agreement on the purchase of the F-22 fighter plane.
However, U.S.-Israel talks ended without a new defense treaty or formal upgrade
in strategic relations. In January
2001, a memorandum of understanding was signed to phase out civilian economic
aid while increasing the level of military assistance.[135]
In 2001, the elections of George
W.Bush and Ariel Sharon, and escalating Palestinian terror attacks, changed the
framework of the relationship. In
their first meeting in Washington, the Iranian missile and WMD threats, as
wellas missile defense, were central issues. These issues also dominated the broader bilateral strategic
discussions, and after the September 11 terror attacks against the US,
strategic cooperation between Israel and the U.S. increased dramatically,
particularly with respect to responding to the threat of WMD-based strategic
terrorism.[136]
While Israel’s primary strategic
emphasis on deterrence remains and has been strengthened, in parallel, the
operational development of missile defense systems has accelerated. The Israeli government initiated
development of the Homa (“Wall”) ballistic missile defense (BMD) project in
1986, and this system now includes the Arrow 2 interceptor, the "Green
Pines" fire-control radar, command and control, and other sub-systems. (The Green Pine radar early warning and
fire control system is capable of detecting and tracking incoming missiles from
a distance of 500 kilometers, and the battle management system is able to
process 14 intercepts simultaneously).[137]
On September 14, 2000, the Arrow 2
successfully destroyed an incoming test missile fired from an F-15 off the
Israeli coast. On September 23rd, the Green Pine radar detected a Syrian Scud D
test launch. On October 17th, after an increase in Saddam Hussein’s bellicose
rhetoric, and the deployment of two Iraq divisions in close proximity to Jordan
and Syria, the Arrow 2 was officially declared operational.[138] In July 2001, the system’s radar
tracked the flight path of a Syrian SCUD missile from the time of launch until
impact. The SCUD, which Israeli press reports claimed was armed with a chemical
warhead, was launched in the Haleb region of northern Syria, and landed 300
kilometers away in southern Syria. (The Syrian SCUD launch came in the midst of
heightened tension between Israel and Syria. IAF warplanes had earlier
destroyed a Syrian Army radar station in Lebanon’s Bekka valley in response to
Hizballah attacks on IDF outposts located on Mount Dov.) On August 27th, the ninth test ofthe
Arrow 2 was conducted, anddowned a live rocket, after it was launched from an
IAF F-15 fighter, and assumed the flight path of an incoming SCUD. Officials
noted it was the highest altitude and furthest distance the system had ever
been tested.[139]
According to media reports the IAF has
scheduled the first test-firing of an Arrow missile in the U.S. against a real
SCUD missile for 2003.[140]
Beyond the Arrow 2 system, (designed
for the interception of warheads at distances of 50 to 90 kilometers from their
targets), research and development has begun in Israel on boost-phase intercept
to destroy offensive missiles in the first stages of their flight.[141]
In addition to the emphasis on active
defense (the Arrow and follow-up systems), Israel has also implemented a broad
system of passive defense, including gas masks for every citizen and
shelters. A survey commissioned by
the IDF’s Home Front Command in October 2001 concluded that Israel and its
population were prepared for a biological or chemical attack. Prof Alan (Avi)
Kirschenbaum, of the Behavioral Science Department of the Technion’s Industrial
Engineering and Management faculty, noted that the preparation of the general
public to cope with non-conventional warfare was remarkably high.According to
Kirschenbaum, "If terrorists were to try and spread anthrax around, for
instance, therelevant agencies would be ready to deal with it, as would the population
in general.”[142]
On October 15th, as anxiety increased
following the anthrax[143]
attacks in the U.S., the Israeli FinanceMinistry authorized the Health Ministry
to allot a preliminary amount of five million NIS ($US1.2 million) towards
medication and equipment for emergencies.
In addition, written directives on responding to a possible orbiological
terrorist attack had were prepared.
At the same time, additional funds were sought to prepare a stockpile
that would provide the materials and medicines for a longer period.[144]
In November, as the prospects of Iraqi
retaliation against Israel inresponse to a potential American strike increased,
the Israeli General Staff met to discuss the possibility that such an attack
would include the use of chemical or biological weapons. Israeli Radio and
Yediot Achronot reported the IDF was concerned thatsuicide bombers could
deliver chemical and biological agents, as two bombers were found to be
carriers of hepatitis B. However, according to Dr. Meir Oren, director-general
of Hillel Yaffe Hospital in Hadera, “hepatitis B is endemic in the Middle
East,” making it unlikely that the bomber was specifically selected due to his
carrier status. Oren also noted that the Hepatitis B carried
by the suicide bomber posed no danger to the public.[145]
In December, media reports indicated
that Israel had completed development of an anthrax vaccine more effective and
safer than the vaccine currently in use in the U.S. (The vaccine was reportedly
developed at the Nes Ziona biological Institute. According
to Yediot Aharonot, the Israeli
vaccine has two major advantages
-- it can be administered in one shot, and does not produce side
effects. [146] In 2001, Israeli civil defense planners
also began to consider immunization against smallpox.
While there were no dramatic developments in terms Israeli strategic capabilities and policies during this period,the existing trends were further entrenched. Despite the closely held nature of the Israeli nuclear strategy, some public discussion and other pieces of evidence pointed to increased preparations for the development of a survivable second-strike option.In terms of strategic defense, development of the Arrow missile system continued, and was declared to have reached an interim operational stage, while other measures were taken to protect the population from what that growing threat of WMD attacks. The ongoing Palestinian terror campaign, as well as the impact of September 11 and the increasing preparations by the US for a challenge to Saddam Hussein and other rogue states and organizations in the region addedurgency to the Israeli policy and actions.
Reports were also published regarding
al Qaeda’s efforts to obtain chemical weapons, including claims of cooperation
between Bin Laden and the regimes in Iraq and Sudan. Three sites in Afghanistan were initially identified as
possible CW facilities: a possible cyanide gas production factory in Derunta, a
fertilizer plant in Mazar-i-Sharif, and an anthrax vaccine facility in Kabul.
On November 27th, General Tommy Franks, commander of U.S. forces in
Afghanistan, stated that the military was investigating more than three dozen
Taliban and Al Qaeda sites suspected of having materialsused in the construction
of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons. U.S. forces searching for WMD had
recovered samples and documents, as well as “chemical compositions,” that had
been sent to the U.S. for analysis, but noted that no signs of sarin nerve gas
had been found. In December, the
Wall Street Journal reported that two computers containing files related to
al-Qaeda’s pursuit of WMD had been discovered in Kabul with information related
to chemical and biological weapons. In addition, evidence was found detailing
al-Qaeda’s efforts to produce botulinum toxin, ricin, and cyanide.[151]
Concerns regarding terrorist WMD
capabilities were reinforced after a cache of partially burnt documents
containing diagrams of missiles, bombs, and nuclear weapons was found in an
abandoned house once occupied by members of Al Qaeda. Some analysts determined that
the diagrams suggested Bin Laden may be attempting to construct a fission
device, similar to the bomb dropped on the Japanese city of Nagasaki during
WWII.[152] Later, U.S. intelligence agencies
concluded that al Qaeda might have been closer than previously thought to
obtaining plans or materials to construct a crude radioactive “dirty bomb.”[153]
Media reports also indicated that al
Qaeda and the Taliban had asked ten Pakistani nuclear scientists for assistance
in developing a nuclear weapons program in Afghanistan. According to senior
U.S. and Pakistani officials, several of the scientists agreed, but conditioned
their work on Pakistani Government approval. Two of thedetained scientists
reportedly claimed they had met bin Laden at least twice during visits to
Afghanistan under the auspices of a development organization.[154]
At the same time, as Palestinian
terror attacks against Israeli civilians increased in frequency and scope,
attempts to develop and disseminate chemical weapons also grew.
There were a number of Palestinian
attempts to detonate explosives containing chemical agents during 2001. In
December, a car bomb packed with pesticides was timed to explode several
minutes after two suicide bombers blew themselves up in Jerusalem. That month,
a suicide bomber who detonated himself near a Jerusalem hotel was found to be carrying
a bomb containing a similar chemical mixture. In addition, the London Times reported that leaders of the
military wing of Hamas, the radical Islamist group, decided to include chemical
weapons in their arsenal.[155]
Captured Hamas leaders such as Abass
al-Sayed provided additional details of attempts to design a combined chemical-conventional
bomb, including cyanide poison.
Other Palestinian detainees, belongingto both Fatah and Hamas,
acknowledged that combinations of agents, such as rat poison and improvised
nerve gas, were being tested (In at least two cases, the
explosive charges carried by a suicide bomber were immersed in rat poison). In addition, an
IDF sweep of Ramallah found a supply of bromine, a volatile liquid that
dissolves human tissue. The bromine was discovered in Arafat’s
compound during Operation Defensive Shield in 2002.[156] Israeli security sources also found
evidence that these groups “are trying to get hold of sarin and other nerve
gases.” On August 13th, Al-Manar,
a Lebanese based Palestinian weekly, printed an article by Taufiq Abu-Khosa,
Deputy Chairman of the Palestinian Center for Information Sources (Gaza)
entitled “Will We Reach the Option of Biological Deterrence?” The article,
revealed “serious [Palestinian] thinking” about the acquisition of biological
weapons. [157]
Conclusion
The increasing efforts by Palestinian
to obtain and in some cases, to use chemical and biological agents reflects the
general trend towards the inclusion of non-conventional mass killing weapons in
the arsenals of terrorist groups and non-state actors. As noted above, Al Qaeda has engaged in
similar efforts, and this trend can be expected to expand to other groups
espousing different ideologies and pursuing different objectives.
These activities and the dangers they
pose cannot be divorced from the proliferation of WMD among the state actors in the region. As the norms that had prevented the
spread of such agents of mass killing break down, and the practice of acquiring
and incorporating chemical, biological and radiological weapons in the arsenals
of individual states becomes increasingly accepted, there is every reason to
expect terror groups and non-state actors, including Hamas, Hizbollah, Islamic
Jihad, Fatah (in its various guises), al Qaeda, and others to follow this path.
The 1998/9 Middle East Arms Control
and Proliferation Report presented and analyzed the history of tension between
Egypt and Israel on the question of Israel’s policy of nuclear ambiguity and
non-adherence to the NPT . As
noted, Egypt has pursued this effort in many different frameworks, including
the UN General Assembly, meetings of the International Atomic Energy Agency,
and negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament. Successive Israeli governments have consistently rejected
these pressures, which would mean the end to deterrence based on a nuclear
weapons option. For over forty years, Israeli leaders have maintained and
supported this policy, as necessary for national survival in the face of
external threats.[158]
During the 2000/1 period, issues
relating to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) continued to be of
central importance. Under the terms of the treaty, a major review conference is
held every five years, with lower-level preparatory (prepcom) meetings convened
in the interim. The 2000 NPT Review Conference, held in New York from April 24th
to May 20th, dealt with most of the issues that had been central in
the previous meeting.
The 1995 conference marked a major
landmark, as the NPT treaty was extended indefinitely. During the conference,
the status of the three non-signatories (India, Pakistan, and Israel) was a
central issue, and Egypt spearheaded a major effort designed to isolate Israel
and press for a change in Israel’s nuclear status.[159] The language of the 1995 final
statement, and a special Middle East Resolution (whose legal status was
disputed) focused on the objective of universality, and highlighted Israeli
exceptionality, but also emphasized the link between the need for Middle East
peace and the application of the NPT in the region.
This outcome was reflected in the
1998-99 prepcoms, as well in other frameworks, such as the meetings of the IAEA
and the UN First Committee-General Assembly.[160] (See relevant sections in this
report). Egypt continued to seek
increased pressure on Israel; and proposed the specific mention of Israel’s
exceptionality in the final conference statement, as well as the creation of follow-up
mechanisms.[161]
In the months prior to the 2000 NPT
Review conference, the US and Egyptian governments held intensive discussions
to prevent the sort of last-minute conflict which characterized the 1995
conference. An agreement was eventually reached in which the U.S. (despite
Israeli objections) approved wording that addressed the issue of“non-adherence”
and named Israel as the only non-NPT party in the Middle East. In return, Egypt
acquiesced to the explicit mention of Iraqi NPT violations.[162]
A week before the conference opened,
Norman Wulf, who headed the U.S. delegation, reiterated American policy in this
issue, noting that “Israel has stated that it is prepared to surrender its
nuclear weapons in the context of a just, stable, and enduring Middle East
peace…The United States is making every effort we can to bring about just such
a peace,and we believe once that is achieved, that Israel can and should join
the NPT as a non-nuclear weapons state."[163]
The conference began with a series of
formal presentations by the delegations, U.S. Secretary of State Albright
declared: "In the Middle East,our 1995 resolution recognized that it is
the broader peace process which improves prospects for the zone free of all
weapons of mass destruction that each of us would like to see take shape in the
region. …So while the United States does not oppose attention in this year's
conference to universal adherence in the Middle East, we believe it should be
fair and balanced within the region and with other serious issues outside the
region."[164]
Egypt
reiterated the call for the creation of a "mechanism to monitor and
follow-up” the implementation of the 1995 Middle East Resolution. Ambassador Ahmed Aboul Gheit restated
the standard Egyptian position, emphasizing the principle of universality, and
arguing that: “The NPT cannot have
any credibility with the statesof the region as long as one state is exempt
from its provisions…” The Egyptian draft included proposals to appoint a
special envoy and to create a committee including delegates from the three
“depositary states” (U.S., UK, and Russia) to hold talks with Israel, and
report to subsequent review conferences.[165]
The proposal was endorsed by Iran,
Saudi Arabia and other Arab states.
As expected, the remnants of the NAM (Non-Aligned Movement) backed the
Egyptian effort, including establishment of a subsidiary body and the special
responsibility of the depository states.
In addition, the NAM proposals supported a NFWZ in the Middle East (and
South Asia) "on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the
states of the region.”
The New Agenda
Coalition (created for the 1995 NPT conference and still influential) also
supported the Egyptian position in a working paper calling for the
“establishment of nuclear weapon free zones…especially in regions of tension,
such as the Middle East.” The NAC called on “those states that have not yet done so…to adhere
unconditionally and without delay to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons,” and singled out thethree states that operate unsafeguarded
nuclear facilities, urging them “to reverse clearly and urgently the pursuit of
all nuclear weapons development or deployment…”[166]
The U.S. maintained a relatively low
profile on the Egyptian proposal, despite the significant deviation of the text
from the terms that had been agreed upon by both parties. In contrast,
the British played a more visible role, rejecting Egypt’s proposal that the
depositary states assume “special responsibility” in this regard. However, the
UK endorsed the appointment of a special envoy to the Middle East on behalf of
the NPT parties “with the task of assisting the states of the region in their
endeavors to establish a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction.” France also
indicated its displeasure over a proposal that the review conference establish
precedents for inter-sessional work.[167]
The key event of the conference took
place on May 3rd, when the five Nuclear Weapons States (as defined in the
NPT) -- United States, Russia,
China, Britain and France --
issued a basis statement on global nuclear disarmament. They reaffirmed
theimportance of indefinite extension, and the commitment to all decisions
reached in 1995—including resolutions on the Middle East.[168] However, this statement did not include
an explicit mention of Israel—and referred only to the declared non-NPT nuclear
powers: India and Pakistan.[169]
When the focus shifted back to the
Middle East, the Egyptians repeated that the NPT “cannot have any credibility
with the states of the region as long as one state is exempt from its
provisions.”[170]
However, in sharp contrast to the negotiations that took place in 1995, talks
over the 2000 final declaration were conducted with little public rancor.
After a consensus was reaching on
including explicit mention of Israel in the final documents, the quid pro quo demanded by the U.S.
regarding Iraq was a major source of disagreement in the closing days of the
conference. As is noted in the
Iraq section of this report, intense conflict continued on the questions of
inspections and sanctions.[171] Numerous Arab States, as well as Russia
and China, rejected language that labeled Iraq a violator of the NPT. The
Chinese delegate declared that there was "no evidence" of (current)
nuclear non-compliance,and the Iraqis reiterated their standard response,
claimed to be complying with IAEA safeguards, while accusing the United States
of violations.
At this stage, US envoys Robert
Einhorn and John Holum reportedly agreed to soften the wording onIraqi
non-compliance, but maintained language noting that since the "cessation
of IAEA inspections in Iraq on 16 December 1998," the IAEA "has not
been in a position to provide any assurance of Iraq’s compliance under UN
Security Council Resolution 687." This language was reflected in the final
document. In a summary statement, U.S. ambassador to the NPT conference, Robert
Grey declared: "We think this document's got some balance because it does
mention Iraq along with Israel…We couldn't have one without the other."[172]
The U.S.-Egyptian agreement was
reflected in the final conference statement (completed on May 20th). The
statement recognized that “all States of the region of the Middle East, with
the exception of Israel, are States parties to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.”
This marked the first time that Israeli exceptionality was explicitly
mentioned. The final declaration
also reaffirmed “the importance of Israel's accession to the NPT and the
placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards...”
While the final
declaration can be considered a victory for Egypt, the conference also endorsed
significant aspects of the Israeli position. Indeed, the parties reiterated the
call for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone ”on the basis of arrangements freely
arrived at among the States of the region concerned,” and invited all states to
“take practical steps towards that objective.”
Egypt’s
initial demands for some form of official monitoring and reporting mechanism,
designed to increase pressure on Israel, was also significantly diluted in the
agreed text.Indeed, the final declaration does not critique the actions, or
inactions, of any particular state, and is thus not a major challenge to
Israel. The final text simply requests “all States Parties, particularly the
nuclear-weapon States, the States of the Middle East … to report through the
United Nations Secretariat to the President of the 2005 NPT Review Conference,
as well as to the Chairperson of the Preparatory Committee meetings … on the
steps that they have taken to promote the achievement of such a zone and the
realization of the goals and objectives of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle
East.”
Paragraph
9 of the Middle East section of the final document also reflects a feeble
response to the Egyptian demand for an explicit follow-up mechanism. This section “requests the President of
the 2000 NPT Review Conference to convey the Final Document of the Conference,
… to the Governments of all States, including those States Parties unable to
attend the Conference and to States that are not party to the Treaty” (i.e.
Israel). The declaration also
includes a demand that the depository states accept a “special responsibility”
in dealing with Middle East issues and Israel, noting “the statement by the
five nuclear-weapon States reaffirming their commitment to the 1995 Resolution
on the Middle East.”
Other issues of importance to the
Middle East, including the continuing debate on responses to Iraqi violations,
(see discussion below), and negotiation of the strengthened safeguards
agreements (developed in response to the failure to detect Iraqi violations),
were also included in the final statement. Paragraph 4 notes “that nine States parties in the region
have yet to conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements with the IAEA and
invites those States to negotiate such agreements and bring them into force as
soon as possible.” Iran is among these states, although not explicitly listed
by name (see discussion of this issue in the section on Iran above).[173]
As a non-signatory, Israel did not
formally attend the conference, and its observer group kept a low profile,
reflecting the assessment that “It is best not to make our presence felt in
order not to encourage anti-Israeli pronouncements."[174] At the same time, the Israeli
government stated its position, stating that: "We hope that our friends
will not lend their support to any measure that would criticize, single out, or
pressure Israel."[175]
On May 12th, Israeli Foreign Minister,
David Levy referred to the issues under discussion in New York, stating that
his country had not signed the NPT because both Iraq and Iran posed too great a
threat to be ignored. Levy noted
that “It is a fact that the technology purchased by Iran is intended in order
to develop weapons of mass destruction and long range missiles…We have not
reached a state of tranquility and calmness that we can say the friends of
Israel can guarantee the future.”[176]
Publicly, Israeli officials expressed
dissatisfaction with the US-Egyptian agreement, primarily because it was done
without including Israel in the process. In addition, the agreement was
perceived as a further erosion of the American position. Nevertheless, despite
Egypt’s ostensible diplomatic victory, the Egyptian and Arab campaign against
Israel made little substantive progress.
In the final text, the references to Israel in the Middle East
Resolution were similar to the 1995 text, including the linkage between the
peace process and the framework of a nuclear weapons free zone. And although
Israel was mentioned explicitly in the resolution—the NPT conference moved
further towards condemning Iraq for blatant violations of the NPT.[177]
Conclusion
Although an agreement was achieved at
the close of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, the various Middle Eastern issues
that plagued the sessions will not disappear. Egypt can be expected to continue
with its campaign to ostracize Israel, regardless of the meager results accrued
during the 2000 conference. In response, Israel will continue to seek to
prevent the erosion of its position.
The
inclusion of ambiguous mechanisms for future discussions, in the text of the
final document, is also seen as likely to increase disagreement on thisissue.
Egypt will be able to utilize the open-ended language of Paragraph 1 of the
Middle East Resolution, which states that its importance “remains valid until
the goals and objectives are achieved,” in continuing its campaign within
various frameworks—including prepcoms and the 2005 NPT Review Conference.
The annual session of the U.N. General
Assembly and the sessions of the First Committee on Disarmament and
International Security serve as important venues for statements of national
policy on arms control related issues, and for the introduction or advancement
of initiatives. The 55th Session,
which opened on September 12, 2000, marked the first major international
meeting following the 2000 NPT Review Conference. As expected, the delegations from the Arab states and Iran,
encouraged by the perceived erosion of Israel’s political position, sought to
augment perceived gains. Egyptian
Foreign Minister, Amra Moussa referred to the importance of the “establishment
of a comprehensive regional security system.” Reiterating various aspects of what has become known as the
Mubarak Plan (first presented in 1990), Moussa outlined a regional security
system that would “ensure the control and quality of armaments in the region,”
and repeated the call for a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in the Middle East.
Iranian FM
Kharrazi made similar comments on this topic: “Serious and comprehensive
international pressure should come to bear on Israel to accede to the [NPT] treaty
and put its installations under IAEA safeguards.” Iraqi
Foreign Minister Mohammed Said Al-Sahaf joined the chorus, referring to the
“Zionist entity”, occupied “Arab Palestine” and a “huge arsenal of weapons of
mass destruction of all kinds, be they nuclear, chemical or biological
long-range ballistic missiles.” He
attacked the Israeli position on the NPT, and repeated the charge that of
“double standards” in allowing “the Zionist entity” to maintain its weapons
while strictly enforcing resolutions pertaining to the disarmament of Iraq.
Al-Sahaf also demanded an end to UN sanctions and declared that they “amounted
to genocide.”
Israeli
representatives responded to the Arab and Iranian demands for a NFWZ by
reiterating the position that arms control agreements were best reached in the
framework of regional agreements. On September 18th, Acting Israeli Foreign
Minister, Shlomo Ben-Ami, stated: “Israel attaches great importance to the
eventual establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the
region. In order to reach that goal, direct negotiations between all states of
the region must be held.” Ben-Ami also explained Israel’s concern over “the
expanding stockpiles of conventional weapons in the region,” and the threats
posed by Iraq and Iran.
[178]
In the framework of the UN General
Assembly meeting, the sessions of the First Committee provide a widely attended
forum in which the details of arms control related issues are discussed in
detail. Following the individual
national presentations, the debate and voting on specific resolutions indicate
changes in policies, and often set the tone for related activities in other
frameworks dealing with proliferation, arms limitation and WMD issues.
In 2000, the First Committee focused on
the full spectrum of topics, including the future of the ABM Treaty (Israel
joined the US and three other countries in voting against the Russian
resolution) and regional arms
control issues relevant to the Middle East. After the Egypt, Iraq, Syria and
Iran repeated their positions, the Israeli representative, Jeremy Issacharoff, presented a
broad overview of Israeli arms control policy, covering a wide spectrum of
issues. Issacharoff voiced Israeli
objections to the concentrated Arab attacks against Israeli policy, and noted
that the Agenda item and resolution entitled “The Risk of Nuclear Proliferation
in the Middle East,” reflected a“transparent political attempt to single out
Israel in an amplified way.” According to Issacharoff, the resolution diverted
“attention away from real and pressing proliferation issues…and ignore[d] the
ongoing problem of Iraq and the continu[ed] effort of Iran in the nuclear and
missile arena.”[179] (See the detailed discussion of this
resolution below.)
In
addition, Issacharoff discussed other arms control issues, and stated that
Israel “remained an adherent to the Missile Technology Control Regime, and
supported [the] efforts of the international community to prevent proliferation
through the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the Australia Group and the
Wassenaar Arrangement.” Issacharoff reminded the Conference that Israel signed
the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1993—and noted,“with concern,” that “certain
Arab countries have not signed or ratified this Convention.”
Issacharoff also
discussed Israel’s participation in the U.N. Register of Conventional Arms, but
pointed out that a “significantly wider participation of our Arab neighbors
inthe UN Register would serve to enhance mutual confidence and underline the
continued importance of focusing attention on the dangers of conventional
weaponry.”[180]
First
Committee - Major Middle East Resolutions - 2000
1)Establishment
of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Middle East
As it has done for
many years, Egypt submitted a draft resolution entitled “Establishment of a
Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Region of the Middle East.” The text was the
same as that submitted in 1999, with the exception of minor adjustments
referring to UN resolutions updated on an annual basis. The resolution was adopted without a
vote, and called for “practical and urgent steps required for the
implementation of the proposal to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the
region of the Middle East”. All the states in the region were asked to “adhere
to the treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons”, but no time frame
was mentioned, enabling Israel to go along with the consensus.
In addition, the resolution called
upon “all countries of the regions that have not done so… to agree to place all
their nuclear activities under International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards,”
and noted “the importance of ongoing bilateral Middle East peace negotiations
and the activities of the multilateral Working Group on Arms Control and
Regional Security…”[181] (The reference to the ACRS working
group was included, despite the fact that thisprocess has been frozen for many
years, reflecting disagreements over Egyptian demands for an end to the Israeli
policy of nuclear ambiguity).
For a number of years, the Egyptian
delegation has introduced this resolution, with incremental revisions. In contrast to other resolutions that
are traditionally approved by consensus, this resolution remains highly
controversial and contentious. In
the initial draft, the Egyptian delegation attempted to build on the 2000 NPT
Review Conference, and included three explicit references to Israeli nuclear
deterrent policy, including a call for Israel, “the only State in the region
that is not party to the [NPT] to accede to the Treaty …
… without further delay.”
As in previous years, the 2000 draft was the object of intense
negotiations, particularly between the EU and Egypt. (The Israeli government views this resolution as inappropriate
for discussion in this forum, and does not enter into discussions regarding the
specific language that is introduced).
The text also called on Israel “not to
develop, produce, test, or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons, and to renounce
the possession of nuclearweapons, and to place all its unsafeguarded nuclear
facilities under full-scope International Atomic Energy Safeguards,” and
recalled “the decision adopted by the 1995 [NPT] Conference in which the
Conference urged universal adherence to the Treaty…and called upon all States
not yet party to the Treaty to accede …particularly those States that operate
unsafeguarded nuclear facilities.”[182]
The revised resolution included
somewhat “softer” language, noting that: “Israel remains the
only State in the Middle East that has not yet become party to the Treaty on
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” and added an operative paragraph that
“welcomes the conclusions on the Middle East of the 2000 Review Conference of
the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.”[183]
However, the relatively minor semantic
adjustments did not alter the negative impact or end the controversy generated
by the resolution. Meir Itzchaki, (a member of the Israeli delegation), declared the text “contentious, divisive, and one-sided.”
The resolution included selected quotes from the 2000 NPT Review Conference Final
Document, and, as Itzchaki noted, the references do not reflect the balance of
the full document. (The NPT document also named Israel in the operative part
ofthe resolution, which it did not do the previous year).[184]
U.S. Ambassador Robert Grey concurred,
stating that “This year's resolution continues the tradition of a one-sided
attack on one country in the region and it presents an inaccurate picture of
the nuclear weapons proliferation problem in the region.”
Grey listed a number of inaccuracies
and omissions, including:
· No mention of the one country in the region that has been found in non-compliance with the NPT;
· No mention of the steps being taken by certain countries in the region to develop the capability to acquire nuclear weapons despite being parties to the NPT;
· No mention of Middle East States that have failed to live up to their NPT obligations by concluding safeguard agreements;
·
No call on Middle East States to
join the CTBT and to sign the Additional Safeguards Protocol with the IAEA.[185]
The final resolution was adopted by 157 “yes” votes, 3 “no” votes (Israel, the U.S. and Micronesia), and 8 abstentions.
3)
Transparency in Armaments
On November 20, the resolution on Transparency in Armaments (Resolution 55/333U), co-sponsored by Israel, was adopted with 149 in favor, 0 against, and 16 abstentions. The resolution recalled previous ones, and reiterated “that an enhanced level of transparency in armaments contributes greatly to confidence-building and security among States and that the establishment of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms constitutes an important step forward in the promotion of transparency in military matters.”[186] While Egypt and other Arab states did not oppose the resolution, most have not submitted reports to the UN register. (It should also be noted that Israel co-sponsored additional resolutions dealing with small arms limitations and disarmament.)
4)
Controls on Ballistic Missile Proliferation and Testing
While development and testing of
ballistic missiles continue, the Iranian government is simultaneously active in
arms control forums, particularly in regard to submitting proposals to limit
the testing and deployment of missile systems. (A similar pattern is being followed with respect to Iranian
chemical weapons development and procurement.)
In 1999, the Iranian government
submitted a draft resolution on missile-related arms control, and a similar
resolution was presented in the 2000 session. The preamble stated: “the need to promote regional and
international peace and security in a world free from the scourge of war and
the burden of armaments,” and expressed support “for the international efforts
against the proliferation and developments of weapons of mass destruction.” The
resolution also noted that Iran was“ convinced of the need for a comprehensive
approach towards missiles, in a balanced and non-discriminatory manner, as a
contribution to peace and security.”
The operative paragraph ”requested
that the Secretary-General, with assistance of a panel of governmental experts,
prepare a report for the consideration of the General Assembly as its
fifty-sixth session on the issue of missiles in all its aspects.” This proposal suggests an Iranian
effort to supplant the existing MTCR regime, similar to Iranian proposals to
disband the Australia Group on chemical weapons precursors. See the discussion
of the OPCW in this report.) The
Iranian resolution was adopted,with 90 voting for, 60 abstaining (including
Israel and the U.S.), and zero “no” votes. [187]
5)
The Implementation of the CWC
On
October 16, 2000, Canada and Poland submitted a draft resolution that stressed
the necessity of universal adherence, full implementation, and compliance with
the CWC. The resolution also
expressed its appreciation for the work of the OPCW (Organization for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons) and its role in verifying compliance. The
resolution was adapted by consensus. However, the Egyptian representative
stated that while Egypt had not demanded a vote, its concurrence with the
consensus could only be perceived within the context of sympathy for the goals
of the resolution. According to the representative, the total prohibition of
all WMD in the Middle East was a necessity. In an effort to single out Israel’s
nuclear program, Egypt stressed that all states in the region, without
exception, should participate in that prohibition.
The
Israeli representative noted that when Israel signed the CWC, the expectation
had been that others in the region would do so as well—but most of the
countries in the region had refused to accept the Convention. In addition,
Israel noted that the security concerns of Israel had not diminished, and
stressed that a positive change in the security situation would be a major
requirement for ratification of the CWC.[188]
6)
New Agenda Coalition Draft Statement
In
recent years, the New Agenda Coalition has been among the most active groups in
dealing with nuclear arms control issues, and tends to reflect the particular
interests and policies of the Egyptian Government in dealing with the Middle
East. On September 28th, The NAC presented a draft resolution entitled “Towards
a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World: the Need for a New Agenda,” which expressed
concern over the “the continued retention of the nuclear weapons option by
those three states that operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities” and are not
NPT signatories.” The draft
statement also called upon all states not yet party to the Treaty “…to accede
as non nuclear-weapon states,” and singled out “those states that operate
unsafeguarded nuclear facilities.” After negotiations, the revised draft also
emphasized the importance of the Final Document of the NPT Review Conference,
noting “the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States … to
accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals …” The text also raised the issue fissile
material cut-off negotiations that had begun inthe Conference on Disarmament,
reflecting an effort to keep this issue alive. 146 delegations voted in favor
of the resolution, and 3 (India, Israel and Pakistan) voted against. In addition, there were 8 abstentions
(Bhutan, France, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Mauritius, Monaco, Russian Federation,
Uzbekistan).[189]
The 56th Session -
2001
The 56th Session of the United Nations
General Assembly opened in October 2001, delayed by the events of September
11th. Beyond the emphasis on terrorism, the General Assembly policy statements,
as well as the detailed debates in the First Committee, generally focused on
the standard arms control themes, including issues relating to SALW and
landmines.
As expected, the Egyptians led the
annual Arab attacks on the Israeli nuclear program by calling for “the
implementation of the results of the Sixth [NPT] Review Conference,” which
“reaffirmed the importance of Israel’s accession to the NPT.” The delegates from other
Arab states followed in a similar manner, including calls for international
pressure on Israel to place its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards.[190]
Milad Atieh of Syria stated that his country had always stressed its support
for the creation of a NWFZ in the Middle East, and was gravely concerned by
Israel’s obstruction of such a zone. [191] The Iraqi representative complained
that the Arab region suffered from a great imbalance in armaments, as the
“Zionist entity” possessed all the weapon of mass destruction, which it was
developing in cooperation with the United States and others. The Iranians agreed, pointing to
Israel’s WMD and missile programs.[192]
The Israeli representative, Jeremy
Issacharoff, responded by stating that effective arms control measures could
only be achieved and sustained in a region where wars, armed conflicts, terror,
political hostility, incitement, and non-recognition were not featuresof
everyday life. As such, the political reality in the region mandated a
practical step-by-step approach, culminating ina comprehensive peace and the
eventual establishment of a verifiable zone free of ballistic missiles and of
chemical, biological, andnuclear weapons. According to Issacharoff, such a zone
should emanate from, and encompass all of the states in the region, by virtue
of thefree and direct negotiations between them. Issacharoff noted that it was
in that spirit that Israel had joined consensus in the committee for more than
20 years on the resolution for more than 20 years on the resolution regarding
the establishment of a Middle East NWFZ.[193]
The Egyptian draft resolution entitled
“Establishment of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Region of the Middle East”
was the same as that submitted in 2000, with the exception of minor adjustments
referring to UN resolutions updated on an annual basis. It was again adopted by
consensus, including Israel.[194]
This Egyptian resolution was also
similar to the one introduced in the 2000 session, and the U.S. reiterated its
opposition to “this one-sided initiative,” In addition, the U.S. voiced regret
over “the selective use of one-sided references” from the NPTRC Final Document.
Israel again rejected the “blatantly one-sided, contentious and divisive,” text
which “undermined rather than enhanced” confidence between countries in the
region. Israel also referred to the “somber experience of UNSCOM” in Iraq, as
well as other efforts underway to acquire WMD, and noted that since the
resolution was introduced, the region had experience numerous developments
“directly related to the proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass
destruction.” Thus, according to Israel, its singling out was
“counterproductive,” and did not “lend the Committee any credibility,” as the
new NPT references introduced the previous year were “unbalanced and
selective,” utilizing the Treaty as ammunition for “yet another political
assault against Israel.”
The resolution was adopted by 153
“yes” votes, 3 “no” votes (Israel, Micronesia, and the U.S.) and six
abstentions. [195]
The final resolution on Transparency
in Armaments (sponsored by the Netherlands, and co-sponsored by 100 others,
including Israel) as adopted on October 31st by 121 in favor, 0against, and 22
abstentions. The resolutions recalled previous ones. The majority of the Arab
countries abstained (on Operative Paragraph 6 as well); however, Egypt, Kuwait,
Lebanon and Syria rejected a separate vote on paragraph 4 (b), which requests
theSecretary-General, with the assistance of a governmental experts panel, to
prepare a report on the continuing operation of the UN Register. Libya,
speaking on behalf of the League of Arab States, stated that the League
supported transparency measures such as the UN Register of Conventional Arms,
but also sought to expand the list to include information on sophisticated
conventional weapons and WMD, including nuclear weapons. In to the view of the Arab League, the
Middle East was a “special case” due to the lack of qualitative balance in
armaments, as Israel continued to posses and develop sophisticated weaponry,
and was the only state in the region not to have joined the NPT.[196]
4)
Implementation of the CWC
In the debate on this resolution,
which was also introduced and adopted in 2000, Egypt stated that it
“sympathized” with the intent of the resolution, but stressed the need for a
NWFZ in the Middle East. Egypt reiterated that it would not join the CWC as
long as Israel did not accede to the NPT, and did not consider itself part of
any consensus decision. Israel stated that its decision to sign the Convention
reflected its “moral vision and commitment to a world free of chemical weapons,
unfortunately” others in the region, including those that had utilized chemical
weapons inthe past, or were believed to be improving those capabilities, had
failed to sign the CWC. Israel also stated that these parties had indicated
that their position would not change even if Israel became a CWC state party,
and noted that its security concerns had increased since it signed the
Convention. However, Israel stated that accession was possible if there was an
“overall change” in the security situation.”[197]
Since it was established early in the Cold War era, the Conference on
Disarmament (CD), meeting in Geneva, provided an important framework for the
negotiation of arms control agreements, including the NPT, CWC and CTBT. These global regimes have had major
impacts on the countries of the Middle East, while representatives from Egypt,
Israel and Iran have also played an increasingly important role in the CD’s
deliberations. However, in the
past few years, core disputes between the major participants have blocked the
work of the CD, and its future as a viable body is now in doubt.
The 2000 session of the CD opened in January, and adopted an agenda
similar to that of the previous session, with the traditional references to the
“cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament”; “prevention of an
arms racein outer space” (PAROS); security guarantees; “comprehensive programme
of disarmament; and “transparency in armaments.” However, the agenda did not explicitlyinclude the issue of
Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT)—despite the general agreement to examine
the subject in 1999.[199]
As has been the case for a number of
years, the debate over a work program reached an impasse, reflecting the
differences between the U.S., China, Russia, and other major participants.
During the second week of the conference, CD President, Harald Kreid (Austria),
submitted an informal compromise proposal, reportedly based on three ad hoc
working groups negotiating nuclear disarmament, PAROS, and FMCT. The proposed
negotiating mandate of the FMCT working group was identical to the one first
adopted in 1995, and briefly activated in 1998.[200]
Kreid’s proposal was not accepted, and further efforts were also unsuccessful. At the end of February, the Ambassador from Bangladesh circulated a“non-paper” based on the establishment of two special coordinators to try and form an agreement on subsidiary bodies and their mandates. However, the non-paper failed to break the impasse, reportedly because Western countries demanded a return to the FMCT June 1999 proposal. Continuing efforts failed to reach a consensus.
In conclusion, the 2000 session of the
CD, for the second consecutive time, came to an end without establishing
subsidiary bodies, awork program, or having begun any negotiations. As a result, confrontations and
decisions regardingthe difficult questions raised by the FMCT did not take
place in the year 2000.[201]
This pattern was repeated in 2001.
During the first plenary held in January, the CD adopted an agenda virtually
identical to the program approved in 2000. At the request of Germany, the 2001
agenda included a reference to the decision to “to resume its consultations on
the review of its agenda.” On May 17, the Conference adopted a decision to
appoint three special coordinators, who would review the CD’s agenda,
membership, and working methods (the Ambassadors of Germany, Bulgaria and Sri
Lanka were appointed as special coordinators in June). However, no agreement
was reached over the CD’s work program, particularly on the FMCT, PAROS, and
global nuclear disarmament. In
addition, in Washington, the new Bush Administration looked on global arms
control negotiations with particular skepticism, expressing concerns that these
activities are counter-productive in terms of efforts to achieve the goals of
non-proliferation.[202] As the end of the
third session drew to a close without any tangible signs of progress,
delegations discussed the possibility of enabling the three special
coordinators to continue their work in early 2002.[203] The 2001 session
of the CD, for the third consecutive time, ended without establishing a work
program, or having begun any negotiations.
Following two
very unproductive years, the future of the CD is increasingly uncertain. The formation of a number of ad hoc
frameworks to negotiate on specific issues, such as the verification protocol
for the 1972 Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention, or the global convention
on land mines, demonstrated that for serious discussions, many states prefer to
bypass the rigidified procedures of the CD. The global structure of this framework is not very conducive
to the negotiation or discussion of region-specific proliferation and arms
limitation issues, particularly with respect to the Middle East. Instead, the CD, like the UN First
committee and other global frameworks, is often used for propaganda and
political attacks, rather than for substantive discussions.
Negotiation of the Comprehensive
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was completed in September 1996. The treaty was
subsequently opened for signature.
According to the treaty, Entry into Force (EIF) required ratification by
a list of 44 specific countries, including the five nuclear weapons states
listed in the NPT, as well as other technologically advanced states, explicitly
including India, Pakistan, Israel, Egypt, Syria, Iran, Algeria and other Middle
Eastern states (the absence of Iraq reflects this state’s pariah status).
However, the U.S., Russia, and China have not ratified the treaty. Thus, the
obstacles to implementation of the CTBT are formidable, and not centrally
related to the Middle East.
Israel played a major role in the
negotiation of the CTBT, which coincided with the Israeli decision to join the
Conference of Disarmament, first as an observer, and later as a full member in
September 1996. The final text reflects many Israeli proposals and positions,
particularly with respect to verification. This helped to ensure the Israeli
government’s decision to sign the CTBT in September 1996. (This
was the first nuclear-weapons related treaty that Israel agreed to sign since
the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty, and the first one with intrusive verification
provisions.)[204] However, a final decision on
ratification was postponed pending American ratification, if and when this
takes place.
Nevertheless, the political frameworks
related to the functioning of the CTBTO (the organization created to oversee
preparations for the operations of the Treaty regime after EIF), did not serve
to encourage Israeli participation. To some degree, the regional organization
of the CTBTO marks an improvement over the IAEA, in which Israel is the only
state that is not part of a regional group and thus ineligible for the Board of
Governors. (This issue was
addressed during the IAEA General Conference in September 2000, and a
compromise procedure was adopted which will change Israel’s status.) In the CTBT, the regional framework
groups Israel with other signatories in the MESA category (Middle East and
South Asia), but instead of providing the basis for cooperation and
communication, the discussions in this group tend to be very conflictual,
including Iranian efforts to expel Israel.[205] However, proposals to move the
Israeli delegation to another regional grouping were rejected.
In a broad sense, the U.S. decision
against ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) slowed the development of
verification systems and other institutional processes. Work on the onsite
inspection manual continued, as did the activities of the Independent
Commission onthe Verifiability of the CTBT. The 14-member commission, including Dr. Mordechai Melamud
from the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission, wasappointed by the London based
NGO, VERTIC (Verification Research and Training Center) in August 2000. (The
participation of a representative reflects Israel’s continuing involvement in
verification activities of the CTBT, both in the context of the CTBTO and in
additional frameworks.)
At
its meeting in London during October, the Commission adopted a consensus report
concluding that the CTBT treaty can be verified with “high probability.” The
report noted that an intricate and perpetually shifting verification system, in
addition to existing verification capabilities, would deter potential
violators. In addition, the Commissioners stated that components of the IMS
already in operation are capable of detecting a test below 1 kiloton in certain
regions, particularly Central Eurasia. The report concluded by recommending
that states provide political, financial, and technical support to verification
of the CTBT as soon as possible, and suggested that the international community
support the greater exchange of data for between the IMS and non-IMS sources.[206]
The Second Conference on Facilitating
the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was
held in New York from November 11th to the 13th (2001) and adopted a final
declaration calling on all states that have not signed or ratified the CTBT to
do so as soon as possible. The
U.S. boycotted the Conference, reflecting the Bush Administration’s view of the
CTBT. In addition, the U.S.
announced it planned to deny support for, and would not participate in certain
non-IMS activities of the CTBTO linked with preparations for on-site
inspections. Further opposition to the CTBT was illustrated during the 56th
Session of the U.N. First Committee, when the U.S. called for a vote on a
procedural decision to maintain the CTBT on the 2002 U.N General Assembly
Agenda. The U.S. representative
opposedthe inclusion of the CTBT on the agenda and called for the vote to
demonstrate the degree to which America “did not support the CTBT.”
The American
position on the CTBT was sharply criticized by Iran, reflecting Teheran’s general
policy of maximum involvement in international arms limitation frameworks. For example, Iranian officials noted
that the U.S. withdrawal from negotiations on the operational manual for
on-site inspections would interfere CTBTO’s preparations for the entry into
force.
Most other Middle Eastern countries
did not become involved in CTBT issues during 2001, with the exception of
Libya, which announced that it would sign the CTBT. (Since the lifting of sanctions following agreement on trial
of the Lockerbie bombing suspects, Libya has also pledged to sign the CWC and
has become more active in various arms control frameworks. Skeptics argue that this is part of a
strategy touse these regimes as a facade for continued weapons development and
acquisition.) At the conference,
the Israeli representative noted that the CTBT was part of a “long standing
policy of supporting international non-proliferation efforts with due
consideration to the specific characteristics of the Middle East and our
national security needs.” In addition, Israel stressed its contributions to the
CTBT verification regime. [207]
During
the 1990’s, the rate of missile proliferation accelerated, adding to the
instability in conflict areas, particularly Middle East.[208] As noted in Part I of this report,
North Korean, Russian, and Chinese missile technology exports to Iran, Syria,
Egypt and Libya became prime areas of concern. Iran’s Shahab 3 program, reports of more advanced and longer
range missiles, as well as concerns regarding Iraqi missile capability, led to
efforts to strengthen the norms and agreements on technology exports developed
in the context of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). The
MTCR was developed in 1987 by a number of countries (led bythe U.S.) to
coordinate and exchange information regarding export controls for missiles and
missile-related technology (extended to cruise missiles). As of 2001, the regime included 33
members, based on an invitation-only process.
Although Russia is formally a member
of the MTCR and China has agreed (under American pressure) to accept earlier
versions of the export limitation regime, implementation in both cases is
intermittent and problematic, while North Korean exports are outside this
framework. In addition, emerging
third-tier suppliers of missile technologies, including Iran, Iraq, and Syria
are likely to expand the proliferationprocess significantly. These developments were reflected in a
statement by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan in 1999 calling for
“multilaterally negotiated norms against the development of such weapons. …
International agreements on such norms would substantially improve prospects
for future progress on existing bilateral and multilateral disarmament and arms
control treaties.”[209]
At the MTCR preparatory meeting in
Paris (April 23 to 25, 2000), the concepts developed initially in the 1999 MTCR
Plenary (in Noordwijk, Netherlands) and related to an International Code of
Conduct, (ICoC), were developed further.
The U.S., Britain, and France (later joined by Canada) presented drafts
which proposed a set of principles, commitments, and confidence-building
measuresthat would be accepted by and extended to states that are not members
of the MTCR. In this meeting, the
participants alsocalled for stepped-up dialogue with non-MTCR parties to limit
their roles in missile proliferation (including the emerging third tier
suppliers such as Iran); a system of pre-launch notification for missile and
SLV launches; as well as the creation of international standards for missiles.[210] Efforts to coordinate policy on
dual-use issues, such as space launchers, gained greater attention, and the
U.S. expanded the number of licenses provided for Russian launches of
commercial space payloads as part of the effort to divert exports from military
to civil applications.
These concepts were developed further
in 15th Plenary, held in Helsinki, in October 2000. In addition to focusing on strengthening controls on exports
of ballistic missile technology, the discussions also included the increasing
dangers to stability posed by indigenous missile programs. The result was a two-track process,in
which track focused on strengthening the MTCR regime, and the other was based
on incorporating non-members in the ICoC framework.[211] The draft “Code of
Conduct Against Missile Proliferation” included steps to improve transparency
and increase confidence building in regional contexts, including
pre-notification of launches. This document highlighted dangers posed by
ballistic missile proliferation, and the need for restraining new long-range missile
deployments as well as preventing deployment of existingsystems. In addition,
the Code of Conduct called upon parties not to aid the ballistic missile
programs of others, called for pre-notification of missile launches, but also
took a soft position on dual-use issues by confirming the right of civilian
space launch services.[212]
At this point, the ICoC exercise
became formally separate from the MTCR, and took a narrow course between
seeking cooperation and avoiding opposition from countries opposed to the
regime. The opposition to the ICoC and tightening the MTCRis primarily led by
Russia and Iran, bothof whom have developed counterproposals to the regime. The
Iranian effort to supplant the MTCR is based on the initiatives introduced in
the UN First Committee and General Assembly (see the appropriate section of
this report). The Russian government has presented an alternative to the ICoC
in the form of a Global Control System (GCS) on missile activities. The first
such proposal was presented at the G-8 summit in June 1999, and additional
details were provided in March 2000, during an expert-level meetingin Moscow.[213]
In order to develop these concepts
further, representatives from 80 countries met in Warsaw in May2001. Israel, along with India and Indonesia,
were the only non-MTCR members to participate, and these efforts were opposed
by Egypt and Syria.(In a follow-up meeting in Paris in February 2002,
additional delegations from Egypt,Iran and Pakistan attended).
In 2001, the 16th plenary meeting,
held in September, took place in the shadow of the September 11thterrorist
attacks against the United States. Deliberations on the ICoC continued, and
input from non-member countries was highlighted in the effort to develop a
wider (“universal”) approach. The participants agreed that the code should be
transparent and inclusive, with negotiations (scheduled to be held in France
during February 2002) open to all states.
In response, many of the countries of the Middle East agreed to
participate, including Israel (the only full adherent to the MTCR, although not
a formal member of the regime), Iran, and Egypt, but Syria and Iraq, refused
the invitation (as did North Korea).[214]
At the same time, many of these
issueswere also discussed in two other frameworks, which, in some ways, can be
viewed as competing with (or perhaps complementing) the MTCR and ICoC
negotiations. In March, Russia
convened an international conference to promote its GCS proposal.[215] In addition, the
Iranian-sponsored UN Panel of Government Experts on Missiles began its sessions
in August 2001. Representatives from 23 countries are involved (10 MTCR members
and 10 non-members), including Egypt, Israel, Iran, India and Pakistan.The goal
of thisexercise is to produce a report on “missiles in all their aspects” to
the UN Secretary General.
In the MTCR/ICoC framework, as well as
in the UN Expert Panel, the emphasis on transparency remained problematic. On the one hand, transparency regarding
missile acquisitions, deployments, and testing is designed to strengthen
regional security and stability by reducing the element of uncertainty and
surprise. However, as Mark Smith
has noted, “transparency programmes that lack a clear strategic aim and context
run a real danger of becoming legitimising devices, by implying that agreeing
to exchange of information confers endorsement on behalf of the international
community.”[216] In addition, in conflict
situations and crises, transparency, in the form of pre-notification of missile
tests or space launches, could increase the level of tension and lead to
pre-emptive attacks. These
concerns have been voiced by Israeli representatives both to the ICoC discussions
and also in the UN panel of Government Experts on Missiles.
Another point of dispute focuses on
the dual-use issue related to the development of independent spacelaunch
vehicles (SLVs). Since the
technology of space launchers is identical to that of ballistic missiles such
programs are seen as a back-door to the development of missile
capabilities. The Iranian emphasis
on the right to develop space launchers, and the official claims that missile
tests are part of civil space program, has highlighted this concern,
particularly from the Israeli perspective. Some analysts have proposed measures including inspections
of SLV facilities, information exchange, and incentives to forgo independent
national SLV development.
Reflecting the potential impact of
these discussions in the Middle East, the Israeli government, led by the
Foreign Ministry, has adopted a position of “constructive engagement” in
discussions of the ICoC and in the Experts Committee, while also opposing
proposals that would to undermine the MTCR. In this spirit, Israel, as the only MTCR adherent,
encourages other countries in the region to adopt a similar policy as an
important CBM. The Israeli policy
emphasis focuses on discussion of second and third tier proliferation in the
region, incorporation of short-range rockets (less than 150 km)into the
limitation regime (such as those supplied by Iran to Hizbollah and deployed in
Southern Lebanon), and controls on dual-use technology such asSLVs. (As a “space-fairing nation”, with
active and successful launch and satellite development and operation
capabilities, Israeli interests and perspectives on this issue are similar to
those of the US, France, and Russia.)
On the issue of transparency, the Israeli position reflects the
tradition concern that in the conflict environment of the Middle East,
premature transparency could be a source of additional instability.
Conclusion
Agreement on a code-of-conduct for
ballistic missile proliferation that will be effective in the Middle East will
require resolution of the transparency and dual-use issues. Such an agreement seems unrealistic
under the existing conditions of intense conflict and continuing proliferation.
As detailed in the 1998/9 Middle East
Proliferation and Arms Control report, the proliferation of chemical weapons in
the region accelerated following Iraq’s extensive use of chemical agents during
the war with Iran. These actions
led to intensive efforts to reach an international treaty to prohibit the
manufacture, acquisition, stockpiling, retention, transfer and use of chemical
weapons; as well as assistance, encouragement, or inducement to anyone engaged
in prohibited activities. The Chemical Weapons Convention, which entered into
force in 1997, requires all chemical weapons and related productionfacilities
to be eliminated within ten years.[217]
As of December 31, 2001, 145 states
had either ratified or acceded to the convention, while another 29 states had
signed but not ratified.[218]
The CWC has received a mixed reception in the Middle East, and the Egyptian
government has tried to make Israeli acceptance of the NPT a prerequisite for
Arab adherence to the CWC[219]. Although Israel signed the treaty in
1993, ratification continues to appear unlikely in the short-term.
The stalemate regarding the policiesof
the major Middle Eastern countries regarding the CWC remained largely unchanged
in 2000 and 2001. Egypt, Syria,
and Iraq did not change their positions as non-signatories, and although Libyan
statements indicated the intention of changing policy, theappeared to be more
rhetorical than substantive.
During the UN General Assembly meeting in November 2001, Libya announced
its intention to accede to the CWC. This was repeated in discussions with to
the OPCW Director-General, as well as on the opening day of the 5th BWC Review
Conference, and to diplomats in the Netherlands. Nevertheless, Libya has yet to
follow up on it declaration.[220]
In Israel, the ratification process
remained on hold, reflecting questions regarding the ability of the OPCW to
verify compliance, particularly by Iran, as well as the growing regional CBW
threat.[221]
Although Yemen and the United Arab Emirates ratified the CWC during 2000
(joining Jordan, Morocco, Algeria and Oman), the fundamental obstacles to broad
or universal compliance in the Middle East remained and were reinforced.
One of the central dimensions in the
regional aspects concerns the expansion of Iranian involvement in the
activities of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
(OPCW). In 2000, Iran’s
ambassador, Seyed Shamseddin Khareghani, who was appointed the “coordinator of
the cluster of pending and unresolved issues,” delivered reports to the OPCW
Council onresults of verification activities, including inspections. Iran was
also one of the co-sponsors (along with Pakistan and Cuba) of a draft
resolution on the fostering of international cooperation in developing
commercial chemical production technology, which was presented to the third
session of the Conference of the States Parties (CSP). [222] As discussed in the section in
this report dealing with the BWTC, the repeated Iranian emphasis on increasing
access to technology through membership in arms limitation regimes has
reinforced questions regarding the motives and objectives of the government in
Teheran.
The limitations on the transfer of Schedule 1 chemicals
(those most directly applicable to chemical weapons, and with the least
application to commercial or other non-military products) from state parties to
non-state parties went into effect with the entry into force of the Convention,
and limitations on the transfer of Schedule 2 chemicals came into force in
April 2000.However, technical differences between states parties (regarding the
transfer of the salts of Schedule 1 chemicals) were not resolved during the
Fifth Conference of States Parties held in May 2000. In addition, the Fifth CSP accepted the Executive Council’s
recommendation to reduce the threshold at which the transfer of Schedule 2
chemicals is banned pending further study of the issue.[223] (The delay in resolution of the issue
and in the imposition of some trade limitations may have prevented some
economic damage to the states that have not ratified the CWC, including Israel,
Egypt, Syria and others.) Although
a ban on Schedule 2 transfers to non-states parties came into force in April
2000, the OPCW did not implement a mechanism for enforcing compliance with this
ban, and enforcement measures remained a subject of discussion among the states
parties and within the Technical Secretariat.
At the twenty-third sessionof the
Executive Council of the OPCW in February, Director-General Bustani again
emphasized the issue of universal accession to the treaty, particularly in the
Middle East, declaring that acceptance of the CWC could play a vital role in
countering the ongoing violence and tension. The Director-General proposed the
convening of an informal meeting of the Council on universality, with a focus
on the Middle East. Although the Council endorsed the initiative, such a
meeting was never convened. During the Council session, Bustani also
highlighted the need for implementing legislation, noting that at the beginning
of 2001, only 53 state parties, or 38 percent of the Organization’s membership
had passed legislation incorporating the CWC into their national legal
framework.[224]
The sixth CSP took place in May,
attended by 500 participants, including 108 state parties, one signatory state
(Israel), two non-signatory states (Andorra and Libya) as well as
representatives from international and non-governmental organizations.[225]
The focus of the Conference was on the Organization’s continuing financial
difficulties, as well as the destruction of chemical weapons in the Russian Federation.
Issues pertaining to the Middle East received little attention. The Conference
did adopt a decision regarding transfers of Schedule 3 chemicals to non-states
parties. Under the CWC, thestates parties until April 29, 2002, to decide what
restrictions to apply to such transfers. Nevertheless, the states parties
decided to implement a requirement to utilize end-use certificates when
transferring Schedule 3 chemicals to non-states parties,while discussing more
restrictive measures, such as a ban.
The end-use certificate requirement
was put into place by a decision of the Conference at its sixth session. The
Conference decision allows for an exception with regard to products containing
30 percent or less of a Schedule 3 chemical and/or products identified as
consumer goods packaged for retail sale or for personal use. The Council
andConference continued talks over the possibility of imposing a ban on
transfers of Schedule 3 chemicals to non-states parties, an action that could
have significant economic impact on states such as Egypt and Israel. This
subject will likely be addressed and resolved during the Review Conference in
April 2003.
At the twenty-sixth session of the
Executive Council, the Council established an open-ended working group to
prepare for the first Review Conference, to be held in 2003. During the sixth
CSP, it was decided that the working group would be responsible for making
recommendations to the Council on substantive and organizational aspects of the
Review Conference. In addition, the working group would cooperate with the
Secretariat in the preparation of background material, and report on its
progress to each subsequent session of the Council. The first meeting of
theworking group was held in November. Argentina was appointed Chair, and Iran
was appointed as one of the vice-chairs. Issues discussed during the first
meeting included: the format and conduct of the First Review Conference, the
involvement of NGOs in thereview process, as well as their role at the
Conference.[226]
As of December 31 2001, 1,114 inspections had been completed
or ongoing at 500 sites in 49 state parties. Inspections of chemical weapons
and chemical weapons-related facilities had taken place in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, China, France, India, Iran, Japan, Russia, the UK, the USA, the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and an anonymous state party.[227] Although there were numerous reports
regarding the possibility of a planned challenge inspection of Iran, there were
none, and no request were received in 2001 or in the history of the Convention.
The OPCW remains a highly politicized
body, whose effectiveness in preventing the proliferation of chemical weapons
to both states and non-state actors (terrorist organizations) remains to be
demonstrated. In terms of the
Middle East, in particular, many key states have not ratified the convention,
and the evidence regarding others, such as Iran, points to continued possession
of significant chemical weapons capabilities. The organizational, administrative, and economic crises that
have marked the OPCW’s existence have yet to be resolved, and its future is
very much in doubt.
The 1972 Biological and Toxic Weapons
Convention (BTWC) was negotiated and adopted as a very broad statement, without
verification or enforcement provisions.
In the past decade, as the threat ofuse of such weapons has increased,
efforts began to address the verification issue, focused on the Ad Hoc Group
(AHG) of the State Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and
Toxin Weapons and on theirDestruction, meeting in Geneva.[228] The issues are extremely complex,
largely reflecting the inherent difficulties of the verification process in the
case of BTW, and progress towards a consensus agreement was slow.
The MiddleEast dimension of the BTWC
andthe efforts to reach a verification protocol is significant. Accordingto many sources, biological
weapons remain a major component of the Iraqi arsenal (see the section of this
report on Iraq), and other states, including Iran, Syria, Libya, Sudan, and
perhaps Israel.[229] Some of the countries in the region,
including Iran (state party), Iraq (state party) the UAE, Syria, and Egypt
(Syria, the UAE, and Egypt signed, but did not ratify), are signatories and
state parties to the1972 Convention, but others,including Israel, are not.[230]
As in the case of other global arms limitation and prohibition regimes, including the CWC, Iran is particularly active on this issue and in the discussions of the ad-hoc working group. During 2000, Iran submitted working papers on the “Settlement of Disputes on Transfer Denial” (WP.426); and “Technical Justification for Limited Size of the Area of Investigation (WP.434). The latter paper presents a proposal to limit the area of inspection for biological weapons, claiming that the “ultimate traveling distance of bio-aerosols could not be more than 10 km from the source of release.” (Other sources concluded that biological aerosols under optimum conditions can travel hundreds of kilometers.)
For Israel, the verification issues
under discussion in the meetings of the States Parties are of central
importance, and as a result, at the early stage of this process, the Israeli
government considered signing the convention, but decided against changing its
policy on this issue. [231]
During earlier meetings, the Ad-hoc
Group made what was termed “substantial progress” in negotiating the rolling
text of the verification protocol.
According to some reports, there were expectations that a draft
agreement could be initialed by the negotiators during the discussions in 2000
or perhaps the following year, in order to be ready for presentation at the
Fifth BWC Review Conference in November 2001. However, the conflicts remained, and the AHG was unable to
reach a consensus on provisions governing the transfer of agents and dual-use
equipment, the role and mandate of visits, and procedures for launching
investigations.[232]
In the opening session of the 22nd
session of the AHG in 2001, Ambassador Tibor Toth of Hungary, (the Chair of the
Group), argued for using the concept of a “vision text,” (the Chair’s proposal
of the contents of a completed protocol) to break the deadlock. A number of
delegates responded favorably, but Libya, Iran, and Pakistan objected. Iranian
Ambassador, Ali Ashgar Soltanieh, sharply criticized the notion of a vision
text, stating that its introduction“would endanger the friendly and cooperative
atmosphere” and ruin negotiations as well as the Protocol. Nevertheless, on March 30th, Toth
released“the Chair’s composite text.” Afterwards, Iran, Libya and other states
continued to object to the use of this framework as the basis for further
negotiations.[233]
At the 24th session (July) the impact
of the election of the Bush Administrationwas felt for the first time, when the
U.S. delegation announced opposition to the current draft Protocol, as well as
to future efforts to negotiate an agreement. Ambassador Donald Mahley stated that while no nation was
more committed to countering the biological weapons threat than America, “the
current approach to a Protocol” was not “capable of strengthening confidence in
compliance with the Convention,” would not improve the verifiability of
compliance, and would “do little” to deter countries seeking biological weapons,“
nor could the it deter illicit activity.[234]
Many of the other participants,
including the EU, Russia, and the members of the Non-aligned movement voiced
“regret” over the U.S. decision. The Non-Aligned Movement released a statement
expressing similar sentiments.
The Iranian delegation declared that
the U.S. had “openly questioned the decisions made by consensus years ago,
ignoring all rules of the game in international negotiations.” As work on the draft continued
(without the US) Iran also circulated a draft proposal, which emphasized the
right to transfer of technology and expertise, as included in ArticleX of the
1972 Convention (which discusses scientific and technological exchange for
peaceful purposes and technical cooperation). The focus on technology transfer
to signatories is a standard and strongly emphasized aspect of Iranian policy
in many otherarms limitation agreements and regimes, including the NPT and CWC,
and raises concerns that Iran is using these vehicles in order to obtain
dual-use technologies and expertise to use in its own weapons development
efforts. Indeed, according to press reports, western delegations suspected that
the primary motivation for the Iranian position was to add a reference that
would undermine the Australia Group (a suppliers’ regime controlling chemical
and biological exports).
This session ended with agreement on
some issues, but without completing negotiations on a verification protocol, or
releasing an agreed report on the Group’s activities. [235]
After the September 11th terrorist
attacks, and subsequent anthrax outbreak, media reports indicated that the Bush
Administration sought to re-design the BWC with the participation of several
key allies.
On November 1st, President Bush issued
a statement that underlined his administration’s commitment to “strengthening
the Biological Weapons Convention as part of a comprehensive strategy for
combating the complex threats of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism.”
Bush proposed a series of steps emphasizing “national criminal legislation
against prohibited BW activities; the establishment of a U.N. procedure for
investigating suspicious outbreaks or allegations of biological weapons use,
and the establishment of procedures for addressing BWC compliance concerns.”
The new U.S. approach to the BWC
stands in marked contrast to previous proposals, which attempted to require
treaty members to formulate a regime that would conduct mandatory inspections
ofplants in which biologicalweapons could be manufactured. European response was mixed, and
diplomats confirmed that while their governments were ready to work with the
US, they preferred the original approach to the BWC.[236]
The Fifth Review Conference of the BWC
opened on November 19 2001.
Shortly after the Conference began, John Bolton, U.S. Undersecretary of
State for Arms Control and International Security, cited the evidence that
Iraq, Iran, North-Korea,Libya, Sudan and Syria maintain BW capabilities. Bolton stated that the U.S. was also
very “concerned about the use of biological weapons by terrorist groups such as
al Qaeda,” and reiterated the reason for its opposition to the BWC draft
compliance Protocol. Bolton
expanded on the proposals outlined in the November 1st Bush statement.[238] The U.S. proposals called on the
Conference to demand “non-compliant BWC state parties to terminate their
offensive biological weapons programs and comply full with their obligations.”
In addition, the U.S. suggested the Conference ask for a halt from Signatories
pursuing such programs, and demanded the Conference (under article V of the
Convention) agree that: “any non-compliance…could undermine confidence in the
Convention.”
In response, the Iran delegate
continued to insist “on the validity of the [AHG's] mandate" and announced
its "readiness for continuing negotiation in a multilateral framework.” In
addition, Iran noted that the BWC does not prohibit the use of BW, and proposed
that states parties add the word "use" in the Convention's title as
well as Article 1. Iran also again
raised the issue of technology transfer, stating that the preservation of
national export controls and “arbitrary” parallel regimes after the entry into
force of a Protocol would render “serious damage” to the universality of the
Convention.[239]
In response to the U.S. proposal, Iran noted its satisfaction with current
state of Article V, and suggested that the Conference ask state parties “to
refrain from unilateral and discriminatory action in resolving any concerns
with regard to the implementation of the Convention. Iran also responded
harshly to previous American allegations over biological weapons activity, and
proposed that “countries refrain from baseless allegation and accusation
against each other,” and to ensure that complaints “include factual and
concrete evidences and documents confirming its validity.”
Although a first draft of the Final
Declaration was circulated on December 6th, the Conference was suspended
without its adoption on the 9th after the U.S. proposed the termination of the
AHG, in exchange for, inter alia, the consideration of “new measures or
mechanisms for effectively strengthening the BWC,” and the possible establishment
of expert groups without negotiating authority. In conclusion, the BWC Fifth
Review Conference ended without the adoption of a final statement or the
adoption of a Protocol.[240]
In
general, when the arms control and non-proliferation efforts in the Middle East
are examined from a broad perspective, there are few signs of success or even
impact. This failure can be attributed to a number of overarching factors.
First, the regional and global efforts have been haphazard and
inconsistent. Second, the concept
of universality in both the NPT and CWC regimes is seriously flawed, for it
does not differentiate between stable and unstable regions, or between status
quo and revisionist states. Third, the relentless Arab and Iranian led campaign
to isolate Israel has undermined the legitimacy and effectiveness of regional
disarmament forums. And fourth, many arms control frameworks appear to have
become a tool for politically active states, such as Iran, to feign compliance,
and in exchange, obtain access to regulated technology and weapons.
As
the evidence presented in this report has made clear, 2000 and 2001 were
depressingly unexceptional with respect to Middle East arms control and
proliferation, and these issues will continue to plague the region for the
foreseeable future. The various
frameworks developed to counter the threat of proliferation in the Middle East
were shown to be decidedly inadequate. The “dual containment” policy created by
the Clinton Administration, as well as the policies of denial adopted by much
of Europe, despite the clear and easily obtained evidence, did not present
significant impediments to the Iraqi and Iranian WMD and missile acquisition
programs. The dangers posed by
both countries, as well as the concomitant proliferation efforts by Egypt,
Syria, Libya, Algeria and other states -- continue to increase, and the need
for a fresh approach is evident. Any new initiatives must address the specific
nature of the very distinct regimes and strategic position of each of the
states in the region, including Iraq and Iran, as well as the explicit threats
that each poses to stability.
Given this diversity, concept and policies based on a single approach to
proliferation are bound to fail.
Iraq
remains the most immediate threat, with a formidable arsenal of weapons to
terrorize its neighbors. The opportunity may have already been lost for
stopping the renewed Iraqi chemical biological weapons programs before they
pass the point of no-return, meaning that any serious challenge and effort to
force compliance with the obligations under the 1991 agreement and resolution
will be viewed as too costly. The
evidence indicates that as of the beginning of 2002, the Iraqi nuclear weapons
acquisition efforts had not yet succeeded, but time was clearly running out for
action in this dimension as well.
The international sanctions regime proved ineffective in pressuring the
Iraqi regime to forgo the efforts to acquire these weapons, and “the
international community” did not show the will to take stronger action. The terror attacks on the U.S. in
September 2001 clearly highlighted the dangers of Iraqi acquisition of WMD
capabilities (particularly for those who saw close connections between Al Qaida
and the Iraqi regime under Saddam Hussein), but there was no evidence of a
major policy change in European capitals with respect to Iraq.
In
addition, the evidence demonstrates that during the 2000-2001 period, Iranian
efforts to acquire WMD and long-range ballistic missiles accelerated, in part,
as a reaction to the growing Iraqi capabilities. In addition to the continued development of the Shahab 3
missile, based on North Korean and Russian technology, the nuclear development
program funneled through the Bushehr “civil” reactor complex being constructed
by Russia indicated the major commitment in Teheran to becoming a nuclear power
within five to ten years.
However,
in sharp contrast to neighboring Iraq, Iran maintains a functioning civil
society, and the debate over internal reform continues. Thus, while the nuclear and missile
development efforts are also continuing, the possibility of a change in regime
and priorities has not been entirely eliminated. In this context, it is possible that political change in
Iran might take place before acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability,
allowing for a possible decision by a future government to halt this process
before it reaches “the point of no return”. A less strident and hostile government, and the end to
direct support to terrorist groups such as Hizbollah and Hamas, would lead
other countries, including the U.S., to recognize Iran’s legitimate
conventional arms requirements in exchange for an Iranian decision to
relinquish the nuclear weapons option.
Such a major policy change must be considered to be very unlikely,
particularly as future governments, regardless of their specific orientation
(Islamic, reformist, secular, etc.), would still face the same security
situation in the region.
Realistically,
the prospects for arms control in the Middle East are lower now than they were
a decade ago. Without an end to
the factors that promote proliferation, the number of states and regimes with
access to the full range of weapons of mass destruction will increase rapidly
in the upcoming decade. At this
stage, in the place of export controls and non-proliferation, stability will
depend on the difficult challenge of mutual deterrence in a multi-polar
environment rife with a long history of intense conflicts. The prospects of success in such a
demanding situation are not very good.
REFERENCES
[1] Gerald M. Steinberg, “Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Developments in the Middle East: 1998-1999,” Mideast Security and Policy Studies, no. 44, (Ramat Gan: BESA Center for Strategic Studies, Bar Ilan University, September 2000), http://faculty.biu.ac.il/~steing/conflict/1999_Middle_East_Report.htm.
[2] Ibid, pg. 4.
[3] Scott Ritter, Endgame: Solving the Iraq Problem – Once and For All (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1999), pp. 219-220.
[4] Steinberg, 2000 p. 14.
[5] “UN-Iraq Stalemate Remains Intractable,” Disarmament Diplomacy, no. 48, July 2000.
[6] David Albright and Kevin O'Neill, “The Iraqi Maze: Searching For A Way Out,” The Nonproliferation Review, vol. 8, no. 3, Fall-Winter, 2001.
[7] “UN Appoints Head of New Iraq Commission; Senior UN Officials Quit Over Impact of Iraqi Sanctions,” Disarmament Diplomacy 43, January/February 2000; Barbara Crossette, “Annan Faces Growing Split Over Arms Inspectors for Iraq,” New York Times, 19 January 2000.
[8] Matthew Rice, “UN Security Council Approves UNMOVIC Plan,” Arms Control Today, vol. 30, no. 4, May 2000; “UNMOVIC Releases Modified Readiness Report,” Arms Control Today, vol. 30, no. 7, September 2000.
[9] “Iraq Arms Inspector Won’t Share Info,” Associated Press, 18 September 2000
[10] “No Movement Over UNMOVIC,” Disarmament Diplomacy, no. 47, June 2000; “Blix Sees U.N. Weapons Inspectors In Iraq In 2001,” Reuters, 6 December 2000.
[11] “UN-Iraq Talks To Continue, No Breakthrough Reported,” Disarmament Diplomacy, no. 55, March 2001; “News Chronology,” The CBW Conventions Bulletin, no. 52, June 20001, pp. 40-41.
[12] “News Chronology,” The CBW Conventions Bulletin, no. 54, December 2001, p.32; “News Chronology,” The CBW Conventions Bulletin, no. 53, September 2001, p. 32.
[13]“News Chronology,” The CBW Conventions Bulletin, no. 55, March 2002, pg. 19.
[14] See Anthony H. Cordesman, “Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East, Regional Trends, National Forces, Warfighting Capabilities, Delivery Options, and Weapons Effects,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 2002, http://www.csis.org/burke/mb/index.htm #mid; also Amatzia Baram “An Analysis Of Iraqi WMD Strategy,” The NonProliferation Review, vol. 8, no. 2, Summer 2001.
[15] Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation (PPNN) Newsbrief 50, 2nd Quarter 2000, p.28; PPNN Newsbrief 51, 2000, p.23; “German Intelligence Agency Says it Has Found Secret Iraqi Missile Factory,” Associated Press, 25 August 2000; Barbara Starr, “N. Korea, Iraq in Scud Pact?” ABC News, August 10, 2000.
[16] CIA “Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 July Through 31 December 1999," August 2000, http://www.cia.gov; Gideon Alon, “Saddam Said to Be Rearming Missiles,” Ha’aretz, 19 July 2000.
[17] Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, January, 2001).
[18] CIA “Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January Through 30 June 2001," January 30, 2002.
[19] “German Intelligence: Iraq May Have Nukes in Three Years,” Reuters, February 25, 2001; Office of the Central Intelligence Agency, Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015, (Washington, DC: CIA, December, 2001); Statement by Director of Central Intelligence George J. Tenet before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on the "Worldwide Threat 2001: National Security in a Changing World," (Washington, DC: CIA, December, 2001).
[20] For additional information on Iraqi nuclear activities, see “Why Saddam Husayn Loves the Bomb and the trouble likely brewing in Iraq”, Middle East Quarterly, vol. 7, no. 1, March 2000; Michael Eisenstadt, “Can the United States Influence the WMD Policies of Iraq and Iran?” Nonproliferation Review, vol. 7, no. 2, Summer 2000.
[21] “Atomic Energy Inspectors Inspect Iraqi Nuclear Sites, ”Associated Press, 22 January 2000; PPNN Newsbrief 49, 2000, p.17; “IAEA Inspects Iraqi Nuclear Materials,” Arms Control Today, 31:2.
[22]Testimony of Paul Leventhal, President, Nuclear Control Institute, before the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, 22 March, 2000, www.nci.org.
[23] Gideon Alon, “Saddam Said to Be Rearming Missiles,” Ha’aretz, 19 July 2000.
[24] Marie Colvin, “Saddam Builds New Atom Bomb,” (London) Sunday Times, 24 December 2000.
[25] Douglas Davis, “Defector: Iraq Has Two Nuclear Bombs,” Jerusalem Post, 29 January 2001; “Did Iraq Conduct a Nuclear Test?” Trust and Verify, March-April, 2001, www.vertic.org
[26] Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, January, 2001). See also David Albright & Kevin O'Neill, “The Iraqi Maze: Searching For A Way Out,” The Nonproliferation Review, vol. 8, no. 3, Fall-Winter, 2001; Steven Dolley and Paul Leventhal, Overview of Nuclear Inspections in Iraq, 4 June 2001, www.nci.org.
[27] US CIA “Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January Through 30 June 2001," Washington DC, January 30, 2002.
[28] “Khidhir Hamza: ‘I Can Forsee Saddam Controlling the Middle East’,” Middle East Quarterly, vol. 8, no. 4, Fall, 2001; Janine Zacharia, “Iraq Close To Building Nukes – Defector,”Jerusalem Post, 21 June 2001; “Understanding the Lessons of Nuclear Inspections and Monitoring in Iraq: A Ten-Year Review,” ISIS, 14-15 June 2001.
[29] “Saddam Hussein Meets with Heads of the Iraqi Nuclear Program and Defense Establishment, MEMRI, November 8, 2001, citing Babil (Baghdad), 7 November 2001; Reuven Pedatzur, est Fears Algeria Makes Saddam Nukes, Ha’aretz, 21 June 2001.
[30] Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, January, 2001).
[31] Khidhir Hamza, “Each Day We Wait, Saddam Grows More Powerful,” Wall Street Journal, 10 December 2001; “News Chronology,” The CBW Conventions Bulletin, no. 55, March 2002, p. 26.
[32] ““Iraq Rebuilt Weapons Factories, Officials Say,” New York Times, January 22, 2001; The CBW Convention Bulletin, 52, June 2001; CIA “Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January Through 30 June 2001," January 30, 2002," January 30, 2002.
[33] The CBW Convention Bulletin, 52, June 2001, p.33, 38; Steven Lee Myers & Eric Schmitt, “Iraq Rebuilt Weapons Factories, Officials Say,” New York Times, 22 January 2001.
[34] Karmon, E, “The Anthrax Campaign - An Interim Analysis,” The Institute of Counter-Terrorism, Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya, 30 October 2001; “News Chronology,” The CBW Convention Bulletin, 52, June 2001, pp. 40-44; “News Chronology,” The CBW Convention Bulletin, 54 December 2001, pg. 33.
[35] “Saddam Hussein calls for popular support of Palestinians,” Jerusalem Post, 16 August 2001; “Iraq Specifically Threatens Israel,” MENL, 12 April 2001; “Saddam Calls for Jihad Against Israel,” Reuters, 24 December 2000,“Iraq Sees Beginning Of End Of Embargo,” Disarmament Diplomacy, no. 52, November 2000; “An End Must be Put to Zionism,” Iraq News, 4 October 2000.
[36] Deborah Sontag, “Israel Is Not Rattled by Iraq, but U.S. Alerts Missile Unit,” New York Times, 2 September 2000.
[37] “U.S. Says Elite Iraqi Troops Move From Baghdad,” Reuters, 12 October 2000.
[38] Ze'ev Schiff, “Iraq dispatches more troops to border with Jordan, U.S. reports,” Ha’aretz, 22 October 2000.
[39] Amir Oren, “Iraq pulls back from Jordanian border,” Ha’aretz, 1 November 2000; Arieh O' Sullivan, Nina Gilbert, and David Rudge, “OC Operations: Iraqi troop movements 'symbolic',” Jerusalem Post, 26 October 2000.
[40] “Iraq Sponsors Bombers,” Jane’s Foreign Report, 3 August 2001; “Saddam Moves Troops to Jordanian Border Again,” MENL, 26 February 2001; Ze’ev Schiff, “Syria Approved Iraqi Troop Movements Near Border,” Ha’aretz, 24 January 2001.
[41] “News Chronology,” The CBW Convention Bulletin, no. 55, March 2002, p. 18; Arieh O’Sullivan, “Defense Officials: Iraqi Attack Unlikely,” Jerusalem Post, 19 February 2001.
[42] “UN-Iraq Talks To Continue, No Breakthrough Reported,” Disarmament Diplomacy, no. 55, March 2001; David Albright & Kevin O'Neill, “The Iraqi Maze: Searching For A Way Out,” The Nonproliferation Review, vol. 8, no. 3, Fall-Winter, 2001; Colum Lynch, “Albright Blames Iraq Leader for Protracted Sanctions,” Washington Post, 13 September 2001.
[43] Aluf Benn, “U.S. Devising New A New Iraq Policy, Ha’aretz, 22 February 2001; Alan Sipress, “U.S. Favors Easing Iraq Sanctions,” Washington Post, 27 February 2001; Ben Barber, “Powell Defends Sanctions Policy,” Washington Times, 7 March 2001.
[44] “Uphill Struggle for New UK, US Iraq Sanctions Plan,” Disarmament Diplomacy, no. 58, June 2001.
[45] “News Chronology,” The CBW Convention Bulletin, no. 55, March 2002, pg. 19; “Military Action Against Iraq Retakes Center Stage,” Disarmament Diplomacy, no. 59, July-August, 2001.
[46] Stephen F. Hayes, “Target Iraq? We Will, If Paul Wolfowitz Has His Way,” Weekly Standard, 1 October 2001.
[47] Barbara Slavin, “Pentagon Builds Case To Bomb Iraq,” USA Today, 20 November 2001; “UN-Iraq Relations Remain Stalled as Fears of New War Grow,” Disarmament Diplomacy, no. 61, October-November, 2001.
[48] Steinberg, 2000, pg. 16.
[49] Ibid pg. 17.
[50] “Iran: Rafsanjani warns of high cost of US support for Israel,” BBC Monitoring, 15 December 2001.
[51] Matthew Rice, “Clinton Signs ‘Iran Non-Proliferation Act,’ Arms Control Today, April 2000, vol. 30, no. 3; Audrey Hudson, “Senate OK’s Sanctions On Arms Sales To Iran, ”Washington Times, 25 February 2000.
[52] Steven Mufson, “U.S. Drops Term 'Rogue State',” Washington Post, 20 June 2000.
[53] William Drozdiak, “Iranian Leader Calls for Closer U.S. Relations,” Washington Post, 12 July 2000; “Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Blast U.S. Gesture,” Associated Press, 18 March 2000.
[54] A detailed analysis of Iranian involvement in terrorism is beyond the scope of this study. For information on Iranian arms supplies to Hizbollah, see the section of this report on terror.
[55] Carol Giacomo, “Powell Puts Onus On Iran To Build Ties,” Reuters, 6 July 2001; “Iran-Libya Sanctions Act Renewed,” Arms Control Today, vol. 31, no. 7, September 2001.
[56] Aluf Benn, “Sharon Finds A Russian Anti-Terror Soulmate,” 5 September 2001; Michael Dobbs, “U.S., Russia At Odds on Iranian Deal,” Washington Post, 15 June 2001; “Israel Tells Russia of Concern About Transfer of Nuclear Know-How to Iran,” Agence France Presse, 8 June 2000; Aluf Benn, “’Oil Hikes To Translate Into Iranian Nukes,” Ha’aretz, 19 June 2000.
[57] For additional information on Iran’s WMD abilities, and an analysis of policy, see Michael Eisenstadt, “Can the United States Influence the WMD Policies of Iraq and Iran?” The Nonproliferation Review, 7:2, Summer 2000.
[58] Michael Eisentadt, “The Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran: An Assessment,” MERIA, vol. 5, no. 1, March 2001; Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, (Washington, DC: January, 2001) p. 46; Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, January, 2001) p. 46.
[59] PPNN Newsbrief no. 50, 2nd Quarter, 2000, p.7; Kenneth Katzman, “The Persian Gulf: Issues For U.S. Policy, 2000,” CRS Report For Congress, 3 November 2000; see also Geoffrey Kemp, "Iranian Nuclear Weapons and U.S. Policy," Nixon Center Program Brief, no. 2, January 2000.
[60] Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, (Washington, DC: January 2001) pp 46-47; Michael Eisenstadt, Iranian Military: Capabilities and Intentions (Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1996), pp. 9-25, 108-109.
[61] Aluf Benn,“The Russian Iranian Connection,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 57, no. 1, pp. 11-19; Michael Eisentadt, “The Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran: An Assessment,” MERIA, vol. 5, no. 1, March 2001.
[62] Office of the Central Intelligence Agency, Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015, (Washington, DC: December 2001); Aluf Benn,“The Russian Iranian Connection,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 57, no. 1, pp. 11-19; Eisentadt, MERIA, 5:1, March 2001.
[63] “Gore-Chernomydin Agreements Over Iran In Spotlight,” Disarmament Diplomacy, no. 51, October 2000; Bill Gertz, “Letter Shows Gore Made Deal,” Washington Times, 17 October 2000; John M. Broder, “Russia Ending Deal On Arms Negotiated By Gore,” New York Times, 23 November 2000; David Hoffman, “Russia Dismisses Threat Of Sanctions,” Washington Post, 24 November 2000
[64] Statement by John A. Lauder Director, DCI Nonproliferation Center to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on Russian Proliferation to Iran's Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missile Programs, 5 October 2000; Statement by A. Norman Schindler, Deputy Director, DCI Nonproliferation Center to the International Security, Proliferation and Federal Services Subcommittee of the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, on “Iran's Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs,” 21 September 2000.
[65] PPNN Newsbrief no. 49, 1st Quarter, 2000, p.4; Anthony Cordesman, “Iran And Nuclear Weapons, (working draft), Center For Strategic and International Studies, 7 February 2000, pg. 17, http://www.csis.org; “Russia, Iran To Expand Cooperation On Nuclear Power Engineering, Oil, Gas,” Agence France Presse, 4 August 2000.
[66] “Iranian Nuclear Reactor 40 Percent Complete Says Ambassador,” Agence France Presse, 23 May 2000; PPNN Newsbrief no. 51, 3rd Quarter, 2000, pp.4-5, 6-7; “Czech parliament bans exports for nuclear plant in Iran,” Associated Press, 5 April 2000
[67] CIA “Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January Through 30 June 2001," January 30, 2002; Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, (Washington, DC: January 2001) pp. 35-36.
[68] Tritium is a radioactive gas used primarily to enhance the explosive power of nuclear warheads. See also Bill Gertz, “Russia Sells Missile Technology To North Korea,” Washington Times, 30 June 2000.
[69] Walter Pincus, “Russia: Laser Deal With Iran Blocked,” Washington Post, 20 September 2000; Judith Miller, “Russia Sends Mixed Signals On Laser System To Iran,” New York Times, 20 September 2000.
[70] “Russia Criticizes US for Interference over Export Control Policy,” Disarmament Diplomacy, no. 46, May 2000; Judith Miller, “Russia Sends Mixed Signals On Laser System To Iran,” New York Times, 20 September 2000.
[71] “Russia, Iran Stress Atomic Cooperation, Non-Proliferation,” AFP, 16 May 2001.
[72] Michael Dobbs. “U.S., Russia At Odds on Iranian Deal,” Washington Post, 15 June 2001.
[73] Nathan Guttman, “Bush Seeks Deal With Putin On Iranian Nukes,” Ha’aretz, 14 November 2001; James Risen, “Nuclear Items Sold by Russia to Iran Pose an Obstacle,” New York Times, 11 January 2001; Michael Eisenstadt, “Russian Arms and Technology Transfers to Iran: Policy Challenges for the United States,” Bulletin Of The Atomic Scientists, vol. 31, no. 2, March 2001; Susan B. Glasser, “Russia, Iran Renew Alliance Meant to Boost Arms Trade,” Washington Post, 13 March 2001; Michael Wines, “Putin to Sell Arms And Nuclear Help To Iran,” New York Times, 13 March 2001.
[74] Douglas Davis ,“Iran’s Khatami Winding Up China Visit,” Jerusalem Post, 15 June 2000; “Iran Says Nuclear Issues Not Discussed in China,” Reuters, 26 June 2000; Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, (Washington, DC: January 2001), p. 36.
[75] “N. Korea Sends New Missile Shipment To Iran,” MENL, 18 April 2001. CIA “Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January Through 30 June 2001," January 30, 2002; “Iran Delegation Visits Russian Missile Factory,” AFP, 13 March 2001.
[76] “Iran Denies North Korea Helped With Missiles,” Associated Press, 1 November 2000; Alex Wagner,“U.S.-N Korean Missile, Terrorism Talks Resume; North Korea Admits to Exporting Rocket Technology, Arms Control Today, vol. 30, no. 7, September 2000; Kil Byung-ok, “Iranian Diplomats Flatly Deny Missile Deals With N. Korea,” Korea Herald, 9 November 2000; Bill Gertz, “N. Korea Sells Iran Missile Engines,” Washington Times, 9 February 2000.
[77] “US-North Korea Discussions Continue,” Disarmament Diplomacy, no. 48, July 2000; “Progress Suggested In Russia-North Korea Missile Discussions,” Disarmament Diplomacy, no. 49, August 2000; “U.S.-D.P.R.K. Talks Make Little Progress,” Arms Control Today, vol. 30. no. 10, December 2000.
[78] “Iran Launches Serial Production of Shihab-3,”MENL, 17 October 2001; Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, January, 2001) pp. 36-38; Michael Eisentadt, “The Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran: An Assessment,” MERIA, vol. 5, no. 1, March 2001.
[79] Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, (Washington, DC: January 2001) pp. 36-38; CIA “Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January Through 30 June 2001," January 30, 2002; Office of the Central Intelligence Agency, Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015, (Washington, DC: December, 2001).
[80] Bill Gertz, “Iran Missile Test Fails After Takeoff,” Washington Times, 22 September 2000; “Iran Tests Ballistic Missile,” Reuters, 15 July 2000; W. Seth Carus, “Iran And Weapons Of Mass Destruction,” The American Jewish Committee, June 2000, pg. 9.
[81] “Iranian Missile Threatens Israel, US,” Jerusalem Post, 23 December 2000; Bill Gertz, “Iran Missile Test Fails After Takeoff,” Washington Times, 22 September 2000; Hearing Of The International Security, Proliferation, And Federal Services Subcommittee Of The Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, 9 February 2000; “Iran Says It Tested First Surface-To-Surface Missile,” Associated Press, 31 May 2001.
[82] Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, (Washington, DC: January 2001) pp. 36-38; CIA “Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January Through 30 June 2001," January 30, 2002.
[83] “Important New Iranian Missile Test Near, U.S. General Says,” CNN Interactive, 2 June 2000; Bill Gertz, “N. Korea Sells Iran Missile Engines,” Washington Times, 9 February 2000; Mark Hewish, “Ballistic Missile Threat Evolves,” Janes International Defense Review, October 2000, p. 40.
[84] Bill Gertz, “Cohen Sees Iran Making Progress With Missiles,” Washington Times, 18 July 2000; Douglas Davis, “Iran’s Khatami Winding Up China Visit,” Jerusalem Post, 15 June 2000; Ze’ev Schiff, “China Helping Iran and Syria Develop Long-Range Missiles,” Ha’aretz, 4 June, 2000; “Israel Strengthens Ties With China,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, May 2000.
[85] Aaron Karp, “Lessons of Iranian Missile Programs for U.S. Nonproliferation Policy,” Nonproliferation Review, Spring-Summer 1998, p.20; PPNN Newsbrief no. 49, 2000, p.16.
[86] “Breaking News: U.S.–China Missile Export Agreement,” Carnegie Endowment, 21 November 2000; Steinberg, 2000, p. 19
[87] “U.S.: Iran Tests Raises Concerns,” Associated Press, 15 July 2000; Bill Gertz, “Cohen Sees Iran Making Progress With Missiles,” Washington Times, 18 July 2000.
[88] Statement by Robert D. Walpole, National Intelligence Officer for Strategic and Nuclear Programs, to the International Security, Proliferation and Federal Services Subcommittee of the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, on “The Iranian Ballistic Missile and WMD Threat to the United States Through 2015,” 21 September 2000.
[89] Carus, 2000, p. 11.
[90] Margot Dudkevitch, Danna Harman, and Reuters, “Israeli Official: New Iran Missile Threatens Region,” Jerusalem Post, 16 July 2000; “Iran Tests Ballistic Missile,” Associated Press, 15 July 2000.
[91] Amos Harel, “Iran Tests Missile That Puts Israel Within Reach,” Ha’aretz, 16 July 2000; Amir Oren, “Israel Readying For Iran’s Shihab-3 Test,” Ha’aretz, 26 June 2000; David Rudge, “Officials: Israel Not Iran’s Immediate Missile Target,” Jerusalem Post, 17 July 2000; Margot Dudkevitch, Danna Harman, and Reuters, “Israeli Official: New Iran Missile Threatens Region,”Jerusalem Post, 16 July 2000.
[92] Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, (Washington, DC: January, 2001), p. 36; CIA “Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January Through 30 June 2001," January 30, 2002.
[93] “The CBW Convention Bulletin,” no. 53, September 2001, p. 39; Michael Eisentadt, “The Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran: An Assessment,” MERIA, vol. 5, no. 1, March 2001.
[94] Michael Eisentadt, “The Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran: An Assessment,” MERIA, vol. 5, no. 1, March 2001; Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, (Washington, DC: January 2001) p. 36; Testimony of Robert J. Einhorn, Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 5 October, 2000.
[95] “The CBW Convention Bulletin,” 53, June 2001, pp. 44-45 (part II).
[96] For an extensive overview of Egyptian WMD, see Anthony H. Cordesman, “Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East, Regional Trends, National Forces, Warfighting Capabilities, Delivery Options, and Weapons Effects,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, revised 31 January, 2002.
[97] “Mubarak Denies North Korea Missile Link,” MENL, 6 April 2001; Bill Gertz, “Beijing Using Front Companies To Grab U.S. Arms Technology,” Washington Times, 26 January 2001; Eli J. Lake and Richard Sale, “Egypt Buys Missiles From North Korea,” UPI, 18 June 2001; “U.S. Acknowledges Concern Over Egypt’s No-Dong,” MENL, 31 July 2001.
[98] Eli J. Lake and Richard Sale, “Egypt Buys Missiles From North Korea,” UPI, 18 June 2001; “North Korea To Sell Missiles To Egypt: Report,” AFP, 26 November 2001.
[99] Steve Rodan, “Egypt Obtains German Components For Missile Program,” MENL, May 2001.
[100] Eli J. Lake and Richard Sale, “Egypt Buys Missiles From North Korea,” UPI, 18 June 2001; “U.S. Acknowledges Concern Over Egypt’s No-Dong,” MENL, 31 July 2001.
[101] “Mubarak Denies North Korea Missile Link,” MENL, 6 April 2001.
[102] “Israel Warns U.S. Of Egyptian Arms Buildup,” MENL, October 2001; Amnon Barzilai, “A Deadly Threat, Courtesy Of America,” Ha’aretz, 4 December 2001; “Israel Warns U.S. Of Egyptian Arms Buildup,” MENL, October 2001.
[103] Nicholas Kralev, “Powell Defends Missile Deal With Egypt,” Washington Times, 30 November 2001; Aluf Benn, “U.S.-Egypt Arms Deal Worries Israel,” Ha’aretz, 16 October 2001.
[104] Amos Harel,“Navy Chief Warns Of Egyptian Threat From Sea,” Ha’aretz, 17 October 2001
[105] Shawn Pine, The Egyptian Threat and the Prospects for Warin the Middle East (Ariel Centerfor Policy Research, 2000), pp. 31-45; Ephraim Dubek, Uvechol Zot Shalom: Hehasei Israel-Mitzraim [Peace Nevertheless: Israeli-Egyptian Relations] (Tel-Aviv:Yediot Ahronot, 1998), pp. 308-309; Dany Shoham, “Chemical And Biological Weapons In Egypt,” The Non-Proliferation Review 5, 3/1998, pp. 48-49.
[106] Dany Shoham, Chemical And Biological Weapons In The Arab Countries And Iran – An Existential Threat To Israel? (Shaarei Tikva, Israel: Ariel Center for Policy Research, 2001), p. 38.
[107] “Nuclear Weapons Program – Egypt,” FAS; “Egypt's Budding Nuclear Program,” The Risk Report, vol. 2 no. 5, September-October 1996, http://www.wisconsinproject.org/.
[108] Shawn Twing, “Egypt Opens Nuclear Power Plant,” Washington Report On Middle East Affairs, April 1998, p.38-42, http://www.washington-report.org; “Egypt's Budding Nuclear Program,” The Risk Report,vol. 2 no. 5, September-October 1996; “Weapons of Mass Destruction In The Middle East,” Monterey Institute Center For Nonproliferation Studies.
[109] “Weapons of Mass Destruction In The Middle East,” Monterey Institute Center For Nonproliferation Studies.
[110] “Egypt, South Korea, Sign Nuclear Accord,” MENL, 15 August 2001; Shoham, Ariel Center for Policy Research, 2001, p. 38; “Nuclear Weapons Program – Egypt,” FAS.
[111] For an extensive overview of Syrian WMD, see Anthony H. Cordesman, “Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East, Regional Trends, National Forces, Warfighting Capabilities, Delivery Options, and Weapons Effects,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, revised 31 January, 2002.
[112] “News Chronology,” The CBW Conventions Bulletin, no. 55, March 2002, p. 18; Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, (Washington, DC: January, 2001); CIA “Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of MassDestruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January Through 30 June 2001," January 30, 2002; Shoham, Ariel Center for Policy Research, 2001, p. 36.
[113] David Rudge, “Arrow Radar Tracks Syrian Scud Launch,” Jerusalem Post, 3 July 2001; Ze’ev Schiff, “Syrian Scud Fired With Chemical Warhead,” Ha’aretz, 13 July 2001; Amos Harel and Amnon Barzilai, “Arrow Radar Units Get ‘Real Time’ Practice on Syrian Scud Launch,” Ha’aretz, 3 July 2001.
[114] Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, (Washington, DC: January 2001); CIA “Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January Through 30 June 2001," January 30, 2002; “Syria Developing Long-Range Non-Conventional Missiles,” Jerusalem Post, 26 November 2001.
[115] Shoham, Ariel Center for Policy Research, 2001, p. 32; Shoham, “Guile, Gas, and Germs: Syria’s Ultimate Weapons,” Middle East Quarterly, vol. 9, no. 3, Summer 2002.
[116] Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, January, 2001); Shoham, Ariel Center for Policy Research, 2001, pp 35-6.
[117] “IAEA Annual Report for 1999 (annex), IAEA, 31 October 2000, http://www.iaea.org; Michael Eisenstadt, Jane’s, 1993, p. 169, cited by Lesser and Tellis, p. 70.
[118] “Syria-Special Weapons,” FAS; “Weapons of Mass Destruction In The Middle East,” Monterey Institute Center For Nonproliferation Studies; “IAEA Annual Report for 1999 (annex), IAEA, 31 October 2000, http://www.iaea.org; Michael Eisenstadt, Jane’s, 1993, p. 169, cited by Lesser and Tellis, p. 70.
[119] Michael Eisenstadt, Jane’s, 1993, p. 169, cited by Lesser and Tellis, p. 70; “Russia Interested In Sale Of Nuclear Reactor To Syria,” Israel Line, 31 December 1997; “Syria-Special Weapons,” FAS; "Russia, Syria Sign Nuclear Power Agreement," RFE/RL Newsline, 20 May, 1999.
[120] CIA “Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January Through 30 June 2001," January 30, 2002.
[121] Gerald M. Steinberg, “Re-Examining Israel’s Security Doctrine,” RUSI International Security Review - 1999, London, 2000 pp. 215-224; Yair Evron, Israeli's Nuclear Dilemma, (Routledge, London, 1994); Gerald M. Steinberg, “Parameters of Stable Deterrence in a Proliferated Middle East: Lessons from the 1991 Gulf War”, The NonProliferation Review, 7:3, Fall-Winter 2000
[122] Anthony H. Cordesman, “Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East, Regional Trends, National Forces, Warfighting Capabilities, Delivery Options, and Weapons Effects,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, revised 31 January, 2002; Middle East Strategic Balance -- 2000, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University, Ramat Aviv.
[123] Ze’ev Schiff, “Navy Rethinks Its Strategy,” Ha’aretz, 31 May 2000; Reuven Pedatzur, “Completing the Deterrence Triangle,” Ha’aretz, 27 June 2000
[124] Uzi Mahnaimi and Peter Conradi, “Fears Of New Arms Race As Israel Tests Cruise Missiles,” London Sunday Times, 18 June 2000. The authors claimed that several 200kg nuclear warheads, each containing 6kg of plutonium could be mounted on cruise missiles.
[125] Douglas Davis, “Report: Israel Test Fired, Nuclear Capable, Sub-Launched Cruise Missiles,” Jerusalem Post, 19 June 2000; Dominic Coldwell, “Dressler’s Rehearsal,” Al-Ahram Weekly, no. 497, 31 August-6 September 2000.
[126] “Germany Provides Israeli Nuke Aid For Subs,” MENL, 29 October 2000.
[127] Aluf Benn,“Sharon To Remain Mum On Nukes,” Ha’aretz, 13 March 2001
[128] Aluf Benn,“Analysis: Netanyahu and Sharon Squabble Over What’s Hidden In The Basement of Dimona,” Ha’aretz 9 September 2001.
[129] “Israeli Nuclear Debate Heats Up Knesset,” CNN Interactive, 2 February 2000; “Knesset Debate on Nuclear Weapons,” Disarmament Diplomacy, no. 43, January/February 2000.
[130] Amos Yaron, '”We Could Not Avoid The Arrest Of Brig. Gen. Yitzhak Yaakov,'" Ynet, 30 April 2002; Dorit Gabai, “Brig. General Yaakov: 'Charging Me with espionage is foolishness and malevolence," Ma’ariv, 20 December 2001; “Brig. General Yaakov's Arrest: The Story Becomes More Minor Every Day," Ynet, 23 April 2001; “Former Head of Research And Development In The IDF Arrested –Suspected Espionage," Ha’aretz, 22 April 2002; Julie Stahl, “Israel MovesCloser to Admitting Nuclear Option,” CNSNews.com, 5 November 2001.
[131] Aluf Benn, “Barak Wants Clinton To Renew Nuclear Pledge,” Ha’aretz, 14 March 2000; Janine Zacharia and Danna Harman, “Defense D-G Returning to US for Golan Aid Talks,” Jerusalem Post, 6 January 2000; Akiva Eldar, “Defense Pact Between the United States and Israel is in the Works,” Ha’aretz, 14 February 2000; Ze'ev Schiff, “Israel doubles Tomahawk request,” Ha’aretz, 24 January 2000.
[132] Janine Zacharia, “US, Israel Drafting Strategic Pact,” Jerusalem Post, 28 February 2000; Aluf Benn, “Israel wants advanced U.S. spy technology for Mount Hermon,” Ha’aretz, March 13, 2000; David Zev Harris, “Indyk said to favor US-Israel defense pactas part of Syria deal,” Jerusalem Post, 14 February 2000.
[133] Aluf Benn,“Barak Seeks ‘Upgraded’ U.S. Strategic Ties,” Ha’aretz, 7 April 2000; Bruce Riedel, “Camp David--The US-Israeli bargain”, Bitterlemons, July 15, 2002.
[134] Aluf Benn, “Clinton, PM, Set to Declare Upgrade of Security Ties,” Ha’aretz, 31 August 2000; Aluf Benn, “Washington Demands Say In Israeli Arms Sales,” Ha’aretz, 12 June 2000; Ze’ev Schiff, “U.S. Insists On Say In Israeli Arms Deals,” Ha’aretz, 13 August 2000; Rowan Scarborough, “DIA Excluded On Transfers Of Arms,” Washington Times, 25 July 2000; Steven Mufson, “U.S., Israeli Officials Discuss Strengthening Strategic Relations,” Washington Post, 11 August 2000.
[135] Andrea Koppel, and Elise Labott, “U.S. To Phase Out Economic, Boost Military Aid To Israel,” CNN Interactive, 19 January 2001; Aluf Benn, “PM Hopes For Strategic Upgrade As ‘Parting Gift’, Ha’aretz, 7 November 2000; Aluf Benn, “Americans Delaying Upgrade of Strategic Arms Relations with Israel,” Ha’aretz, 3 September 2000; Janine Zacharia, “Ivry: Talks on US-Israel Strategic Relationship Inconclusive,” Jerusalem Post, 3 September 2000; Aluf Benn, “Israel, U.S. Resume Talks on Strategic Upgrade and IDF aid,” Ha’aretz, 14 September 2000.
[136] “Israel, U.S. Resume Strategic Dialogue,” MENL, 17 October 2001; “Sharon Plans To Make Iran An Issue With Bush,” MENL 15 March 2001.
[137] Arieh O’Sullivan, “Arrow 2 Now Operational,” Jerusalem Post, 14 March 2001; Arieh O’Sullivan, Air Force Welcomes Arrow 2,” Jerusalem Post, 15 March 2000; “Boeing Chosen to Build Arrow Missile With IAI, Ha’aretz, 28 November 2000.
[138] Arieh O’Sullivan,“Arrow is Operational,” Jerusalem Post, 17 October 2000; Arieh O’Sullivan, “Arrow Detects Syrian Scud D Tests,” Jerusalem Post, 26 September 2000; Arieh O’Sullivan, “Arrow Downs Missile,” Jerusalem Post, 15 September 2000; Steve Rodan, “Arrow Missile Intercepts Incoming Target,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 20 September 2000.
**[139] David Rudge, “Arrow Radar Tracks Syrian Scud Launch,” Jerusalem Post, 3 July 2001; Ze’ev Schiff, “Syrian Scud Fired With Chemical Warhead,” Ha’aretz, 13 July 2001; Amos Harel and Amnon Barzilai, “Arrow Radar Units Get ‘Real Time’ Practice on Syrian Scud Launch,” Ha’aretz, 3 July 2001; Arieh O’Sullivan, “Arrow 2 Missile Tested, Said Successful,” 27 August 2001.
[140] Arieh O’Sullivan, “Air Force To Test Arrow Against Scud,” Jerusalem Post, 30 April 2001.
[141] Amnon Barzilai, “Closing the Circle of the Arrow (op-ed),” Ha’aretz, 12 March 2000; Arieh O’Sullivan, “Arrow 2 Now Operational,” Jerusalem Post, 14 March 2000; Amnon Barzilai, “Arrow Anti-Ballistic Missile System No Answer for Iran’s Shehab3,” Ha’aretz, 12 March 2000; Steve Rodan, “Israel plans upgrade for Arrow-2 missile system,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 5 January 2000; Amnon Barzilai, “New Israeli Drones Would Destroy Missile Launch Pads,” Ha’aretz, 17 December 2001.
[142] David Rudge,“Technion: Country Prepared For Non-Conventional War,” Jerusalem Post, 11 October 2001.
[143]See the Terrorism section of this report.
[144] HaimShadmi and Gideon Alon, “Dahan Wants More Cash To Fight Bioterrorism,” Ha’aretz, 16 October 2001.
[145] Abraham Rabinovich, “Israeli Military Plans for Iraq’s Wrath,” Washington Times, 28 November 2001; Judy Siegel, “Hepatitis In Suicide Bomber ‘No Threat’ – Doctor,” Jerusalem Post, 8 June 2001.
[146] Ellis Shuman, “Israel Develops Anthrax Vaccine,” IsraelInsider.com, 20 December 2001, citing Yediot Aharonot.
[147] Office of the Central Intelligence Agency, Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January Through 30 June 2001," (Washington, DC: January 30, 2002).
[148] Anthony Loyd, “Bin Laden’s Nuclear Secrets Found,” 15 November 2001; “Bush: Terrorists Seeking Weapons Of Mass Destruction,” CNN Interactive, 6 November 2001.
[149] For additional information on anthrax, see Eric Croddy, “Anthrax: Background Report,” Monterey Institute Of International Studies, 9 October 2001.
[150] Eki Karmon “The Anthrax Campaign - An Interim Analysis,” The Institute of Counter-Terrorism, Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya, 30 October 2001; David Rose and Ed Vulliamy, “Iraq ‘Behind US Anthrax Outbreaks,” The Observer, 14 October 2001; Alexander G. Higgins, “U.S. Sees Saddam As A Priority, Cites Biological Weapons, ”Associated Press, 20 November 2001, “News Chronology” The CBW Conventions Bulletin, 55, March 2002, p. 18.
[151] “News Chronology” The CBW Conventions Bulletin, 55, March 2002, pp. 14,18, 21, 25, 26; Chris Griffith, “Unholy Trinity In Chemical Weapons Pact,” The Courier Mail, 24 September 2001.
[152] Anthony Loyd, “Bin Laden’s Nuclear Secrets Found,” 15 November 2001; Bob Woodward, Robert G. Kaiser and David B. Ottaway, “U.S. Fears Bin Laden Made Nuclear Strides,” Washington Post, 4 December 2001; CIA “Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January Through 30 June 2001," January 30, 2002.
[153] Barbie Dutter and Ben Fenton, “Uranium And Cyanide Found In Drums At Bin Laden Base,” The Telegraph, 24 December 2001. Bob Woodward, Robert G. Kaiser and David B. Ottaway, “U.S. Fears Bin Laden Made Nuclear Strides,” Washington Post, 4 December 2001; Bill Gertz, “Taliban Arms Sites Searched,” Washington Times, 28 November 2001.
[154] “Pakistan: Scientists Had Contact With Bin Laden,” Global Security Newswire, 12 November 2001
**[155] Daniel Mcgryory, “Israel Fears Chemical Attack By Hamas Suicide Bombers,” London Times, 2 January 2002; “News Chronology,” The CBW Conventions Bulletin, 55, March 2002, pg. 21.
[156] “IDF Finds 12 Liters Of Poisonous Bromine Hidden In Arafat's Ramallah Compound,” IMRA, 19 April 2002, (English translation of Yoav Yitzchak, ““IDF Finds 12 Liters Of Poisonous Bromine Hidden In Arafat's Ramallah Compound,” Ma’ariv, 19 April 2002; Ehud Yaari, “Dispatch From Israel: Cyanide Bombs,” Simon Wisenthal Center Press Information, 21 May 2002.
[157] Karmon, E,“Are The Palestinians Considering Biological Weapons,” ICT, 14 August 2001. Note: The Al-Manar article entitled “Will We Reach the Option of Biological Deterrence?” was translated by MEMRI (The Middle East Media Research Institute); Daniel Mcgryory, “Israel Fears Chemical Attack By Hamas Suicide Bombers,” London Times, 2 January 2002.
[158] Steinberg, 2000, p. 42.
[159] For an overview of Egyptian policy, see Gerald M. Steinberg, “The 1995 NPT Extension and Review Conference and the Arab-Israeli Peace Process”, NonProliferation Review, 4:1, Fall 1996; and Rebecca Stevens and Amin Tarzi, “Egypt and the Middle East Resolution at the NPT 2000 Review Conference,” Monterey Institute Center For Nonproliferation Studies.
[160] Steinberg, 2000, pp. 42-46
[161] Shlomo Shamir, “Egypt Wants Israel Condemned at UN Nuclear Meeting,” Ha’aretz Daily, 25 April 2000; Marilyn Henry, “Israel May Be Urged To Abide by the NPT,” Jerusalem Post, 25 April 2000.
[162] Ambassador Norman A. Wulf, “Observations from the 2000 NPT Review Conference,” Arms Control Today, November 2000.
[163] Marilyn Henry, “Israel likely target of UN nuclear treaty review,” Jerusalem Post, 23 April 2000. For more information and analysis, see Rebecca Johnson, “Disaster Averted,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 56, no. 4, July/August2000, pp. 52-57; see also, Jayantha Dhanapala, “The NPT at a Crossroads,” The Nonproliferation Review, vol. 7, no. 1, Spring 2000; Ambassador Norman A. Wulf, “Observations from the 2000 NPT Review Conference,” Arms Control Today, vol. 30, no. 9, November 2000.
[164] Marilyn Henry and News Agencies, “Arab States Demand Nuclear Transparency for Israel,” Jerusalem Post, 27 April 2000.
[165] Rebecca Johnson and Jenni Rissanen, “The Review Conference Opens: Dominant Issues & Contested Claims,” Disarmament Diplomacy, no. 45, April 2000; Marilyn Henry and News Agencies, “Arab States Demand Nuclear Transparency for Israel,” 27 April 2000.
[166] “Neighbors Blast Israel’s Nuclear Weapons Policy,” Reuters, 26 April 2000; Rebecca Johnson and Jenni Rissanen, “The Review Conference Opens: Dominant Issues & Contested Claims,” Disarmament Diplomacy, no. 45, April 2000.
[167] Rebecca Johnson, “The 2000 NPT Review Conference: A Delicate, Hard-Won Compromise,” Disarmament Diplomacy, no. 46, May 2000; Colum Lynch, “Israel Pressed on Nuclear Status,” Washington Post, 30 April 2000.
[168] Ibid.
[169] Nitzan Horowitz and Shlomo Shamir, “Israeli Nukes Ignored in NPT Talks,” Ha’aretz, 3 May 2000.
[170] Marilyn Henry, “UN draft statement on nuclear non-proliferation singles out Israel,” Jerusalem Post, 11 May 2000.
[171] For more information on UNSCR 1284, see Steinberg, 2000, pp. 4-15
[172] Colum Lynch, “U.N. Asks Israel to Sign Nuclear Pact,” Washington Post, 21 May 2000; Aluf Benn,“Israel Can Live With the Conclusions of the NPT Conference, Ha’aretz, 22 May 2000; Rebecca Johnson,“The 2000 NPT Review Conference: A Delicate, Hard-Won Compromise,” Disarmament Diplomacy, no. 46, May 2000.
[173] The text of the 2000 Conference is located at http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org.
[174] Shlomo Shamir, “Egypt Wants Israel Condemned at UN Nuclear Meeting,” Ha’aretz, 25 April 2000.
[175] Marilyn Henry, “Israel May Be Urged To Abide by the NPT,” Jerusalem Post, 25 April 2000.
[176] “Israel Justifies Nuclear Decision,” Associated Press, 12 May 2000.
[177] Gerald M. Steinberg, “Israeli Perspectives on the Outcome of the NPT Review Conference,” Jerusalem Post, 24 May 2000.
[178] “UNGA General Debate 2000: Statements on Arms Control & Disarmament,” Acronym Institute.
[179] Statement by Jeremy Issacharoff, Representative of Israel to the 55th Session of the UN GA First Committee, “The Challenge of Peace, and the Threat of War,” 13 October 2000, Reaching Critical Will.
[180] Ibid.
[181] Fifty-Fifth Session, First Committee, Agenda Item 70, Egypt, Draft Resolution, “Establishment of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Region of the Middle East,” A/C.1/55/L.16, 13 October 2000; Resolutions Adopted by The General Assembly [on the report of the First Committee (A/55/556)] General and Complete Disarmament, http://www.un.org; “Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East,” 20 November 2000.
[182] Fifty-Fifth Session, First Committee, Agenda Item 76, Egypt, Draft Resolution, “The Risk of Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East,” A/C/.1/55/L.29, 13 October 2000.
[183] Ibid; Fifty-Fifth Session, First Committee, “The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East,” A/55/PV.69, 20 November 2000.
[184] Jenni Rissanen, “Low-Key Discussions as Drafts Introduced,” Disarmament Diplomacy, No. 51, October 2000, citing Meir Itzchaki, First Committee, October 23, 2000.
[185] Ambassador Robert Grey,EOV on L.29/REV.I Before the Vote, Risk of Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East (UN First Committee, U.S. Delegation).
[186] Resolutions Adopted by The General Assembly [on the report of the First Committee (A/55/559)] 55/33, General and Complete Disarmament, 20 November 2000.
[187] Fifty-Fourth Session, First Committee, A/RES/54/11, Resolutions: General Assembly, 54th Session; UN Press Release, GA/DIS/3168, 29 September 2000; Fifty-Fifth Session, First Committee, Agenda Item 73 (h) Islamic Republic of Iran, Draft Resolution “Missiles,” A/C.1/55/L.1, 4 October 2000.
[188] Appendix: Summary of Resolutions,” Disarmament Diplomacy, no. 52, November 2000.
[189] Fifty-Fifth Session, First Committee, Agenda Item 73, New Agenda Coalition, Revised Draft Resolution, “Towards a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World: The Need for a New Agenda,” A/RES/55/33C, 20 November 2000; “The UN First Committee: New Agenda Draft UNGA Resolution,” Acronym Institute.
[190] Jenni Rissanen, “General Debate Of The UN First Committee: Nuclear Weapons, Missile Defense, And Outer Space,” Acronym Institute, 8-17 October, 2001; “Responsible Governments Cannot Stand Aside When Citizens Slaughtered Says United States, As First Committee Continues General Debate,” Fifty-Sixth General Assembly First Committee, 5th Meeting, UN Press Release, 10 October 2001, GA/DIS/3200.
[191] “Global Economic Disparity Incompatible With Global Security First Committee Told, As General Debate Continues,” Fifty-Sixth General Assembly First Committee, 9th Meeting, UN Press Release, 15 October 2001, GA/DIS/3204
[192] “Risk Of Unauthorized Nuclear-Weapon Use, Middle East Security Among Issues Addressed In First Committee’s General Debate,” Fifty-Sixth General Assembly First Committee, 10th Meeting, UN Press Release, 16 October 2001, GA/DIS/3205.
[193] Ibid.
[194] “Establishment Of A Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone In The Region Of the Middle East,” 17 October, A/C.1/56/L.5 as found on “Draft Resolutions Of The 2001 UNGA 1st Committee; “UN First Committee Report: Summary Of Resolutions,” Disarmament Diplomacy, no. 61, October-November 2001.
[195] Jenni Rissanen, “UN First Committee Report: Summary Of Resolutions,” Disarmament Diplomacy, 61, October-November 2001;“The Risk Of Nuclear Proliferation In The Middle East,” 18 October, 2001, A/C.1/56/L.25 as found on “Draft Resolutions Of The 2001 UNGA 1st Committee” .
[196] Jenni Rissanen, “UN First Committee Report: Summary Of Resolutions,” Disarmament Diplomacy, no. 61, October-November 2001;“Transparency In Armaments,” 18 October 2001, A/C.1/56/L.40 as found on “Draft Resolutions of the 2001 UNGA 1st Committee”
[197] Ibid.
[198] For additional information on the 2000 UN Conference on Disarmament, see Jozef Goldblat, “The Conference on Disarmament at the Crossroads: To Revitalize or Dissolve?” The Nonproliferation Review, 7:2, Summer 2000; Wade Boese,“2000 CD Session Begins Without Beginning Talks,” Arms Control Today, vol. 30, no. 8, October 2000; “Deadlocked and Waiting at the UN Conference on Disarmament, An Interview With Ambassador Robert T. Grey, Jr.,” Arms Control Today, vol. 30., no. 10, December 2000.
[199] Jenni Rissanen, “CD Split Over Priorities,” Disarmament Diplomacy, no. 43, January-February, 2000.
[200] Steinberg, 2000 pp. 49-50
[201] Ibid; see also Gerald M. Steinberg, "Israel and the Changing Global Non-Proliferation Regime: “The NPT Extension, CTBT, and Fissile Cut-Off", Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 16, No. 1, Spring 1995.
[202] John Bolton, US Statement & Press Conference at CD, January 24th, 2001, as found on Acronym Institute website.
[203] Jenni Rissanen, “CD Begins New Year at High Level, but with Low Expectations,” Disarmament Diplomacy, no. 53, December 2000-January 2001; Jenni Rissanen, “CD Inches Forward: Reform Coordinators But No Negotiations,” Disarmament Diplomacy, no. 57, May 2001; Jenni Rissanen, “Modest Appointments,” Disarmament Diplomacy, no. 58, June 2001; Jenni Rissanen, “Special Coordinators Report No Agreement as Session Nears End,” Disarmament Diplomacy, no. 59, July-August, 2001
[204] Steinberg, 2000 pp. 46-48
[205] Ibid.
[206] Trevor Findlay, “Verifiability of the CTBT: The Report of the Independent Commission,” Disarmament Diplomacy, no. 51, October 2000.
[207] Rebecca Johnson, “Boycotts And Blandishments: Making The CTBT Visible,” Disarmament Diplomacy, no. 61, October-November 2001.
[208] Aaron Karp, “The Spread of Ballistic Missiles and the Transformation of Global Security’, in Nonproliferation Review, Fall/Winter 2000
[209] “Secretary-General stresses need for multilaterally negotiated norms against development of missiles”, United Nations, Press Release SG/SM/6960, 15 April 1999; Gerald Steinberg, “The Failure of the MTCR in the Middle East”, in Ballistic Missiles: The Threat and the Response, Arieh Stav ed., Brassey’s, London, 1999, pp. 149-170; Yuri Nazarkin, “Implementation of Multilateral Arms Control Agreements: Questions of Compliance - The Case of the Missile Technology Control Regime”, Geneva Centre for Security Policy Paper 1999-2000, p. 6; Mark Smith, “The MTCR and the Future of Ballistic Missile Non-Proliferation” Disarmament Diplomacy, No. 54, February 2001.
[210] Matthew Rice, “Russia Proposes Global Regime on Missile Proliferation,” Arms Control Today, May 2000; “Press Release,” Plenary Meeting of the Missile Technology Control Regime, Nordwijk, October 11-15, 1999; Aaron Karp, “You Can’t Go Back Again: Missile Defense and the MTCR,” presented at the Geneva Forum on “Missiles: An Unanswered Challenge to Multilateral Arms Control and Disarmament,” 8 June 2001; Mark Smith, “The MTCR and the Future of Ballistic Missile Non-Proliferation” Disarmament Diplomacy, No. 54, February 2001.
[211] “Plenary Meeting of the Missile Technology Control Regime,” MTCR Press Release, October 10-13; Mark Smith, “Verifiable Control of Ballistic Missile Production,” Trust and Verify, 19 February 2001.
[212] Karp, “You Can’t Go Back Again: Missile Defense and the MTCR,” 2001; Mark Smith, “Verifiable Control of Ballistic Missile Production,” Trust and Verify, “Plenary Meeting of the Missile Technology Control Regime,” MTCR Press Release.
[213] Representatives from 46 countries, (and the United Nations), attended, including Iran, China, India, and Egypt. The US sent an observer but did not participate, Matthew Rice, “Russia Proposes Global Regime on Missile Proliferation,” Arms Control Today, May 2000; Mark Smith, “Verifiable Control of Ballistic Missile Production,” Trust and Verify, 19 February 2001; Karp, “You Can’t Go Back Again: Missile Defense and the MTCR,” 2001
[214] David Grahame, “A Multilateral Approach to Ballistic Missiles?” BASIC (Note), 2 April 2002; “Press Release,” Plenary Meeting of the Missile Technology Control Regime, 28 September 2001.
[215] Richard Speier, “How Effective is the MTCR?” Carnegie Proliferation Brief, 4:7, 12 April 2001.
[216] Mark Smith, “The MTCR and the Future of Ballistic Missile Non-Proliferation” Disarmament Diplomacy, No. 54, February 2001.
[217] Steinberg, 2000, p. 36.
[218] Jean Pascal Zanders, Melissa Hersh, Jacqueline Simon and Maria Wahlberg, “Chapter 7: Chemical and biological weapon developments and arms control”, SIPRI Yearbook 2001: Armaments, Disarmament, and International Security, (New York: Oxford University Press), p. 2; Alexander Kelle, “The CWC at Three: On the Way Towards a Level Playing Field,” Disarmament Diplomacy, no. 46, May 2000.
[219] Dany Shoham,“Chemical And Biological Weapons In Egypt,” The Non-Proliferation Review, vol. 5, no. 3, Spring-Summer 1998; Dany Shoham, Chemical Weapons In Egypt And Syria (Hebrew), Mideast Security And Policy Studies, no. 21 (Ramat Gan: BESA Center For Strategic Studies, Bar Ilan University, 1995); Anthony H. Cordesman, “The Military Balance In The Middle East: An Executive Summary,” Policy Paper no. 49, (University of California: Institute On Global Conflict And Cooperation, 1999).
[220] Mills, Pamela G, in (July/August) of "Disarmament Diplomacy,” (forthcoming) citing UN document, A/56/PV.49; “News Chronology,” The CBW Conventions Bulletin, 55, March 2002, pp. 17, 25.
[221] Steinberg, G. M., ‘Israeli policy on the CWC’, OPCW Synthesis, Nov. 2000, pp. 29–31.
[222] “Developments in the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons,” The CBW Convention Bulletin, no. 47, March 2000, pg. 6.
[223] Jean Pascal Zanders, Melissa Hersh, Jacqueline Simon and Maria Wahlberg, “Chapter 7: Chemical and biological weapon developments and arms control”, SIPRI Yearbook 2001: Armaments, Disarmament, and International Security, (New York: Oxford University Press), http://projects.sipri.se, pp. 2-3, 515; and The CBW Convention Bulletin, 48, June 2000, pg. 26; OPCW Secretariat Brief, no. 23 (16 Oct. 2000); and OPCW Secretariat Brief, no. 24 (21 Dec. 2000).
[224] Mills, P.,“Developments in the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons,” The CBW Convention Bulletin, no. 51, March 2001, p. 16.
[225] Ibid, pg. 8.
[226] Mills, P., “Developments in the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons,” The CBW Conventions Bulletin, no. 54, December 2001, pg. 8; Mills, P., “Development in the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons,” The CBW Conventions Bulletin, no. 52, June 2001, pg. 5.
[227] Ibid, pg. 9.
[228] For additional information on the BWC and related subjects, see “Disease By Design: De-Mystifying The Biological Weapons Debate,” BASIC Publications, November 2001.
[229] Summary of statement by John Bolton, U.S. Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, at the Fifth Review Conference of the BTWC, November 2001; Jenni Rissanen, “Acrimonious Opening for BWC Review Conference,” Acronym Institute BWC Review Conference Bulletin, 19 November 2001; Avner Cohen, “Israel and Chemical/Biological Weapons: History, Deterrence, and Arms Control,” The Non-Proliferation Review, Fall-Winter 2001; Milton Leitenberg, “Biological Weapons, International Sanctions and Proliferation,” Asian Perspective (Winter 1997), p.11.
[230] “The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Website- States Parties and Signatories to the BTWC,” http://www.bradford.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc/btwc/convention/btwcsps.html.
[231] Text for the cited working papers can be found at The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Website. See also Dany Shoham, “Chemical and Biological Weapons in the Arab Countries and Iran - An Existential Threat to Israel?” Ariel Center for Policy Research, July 2001; Avner Cohen, “Israel and Chemical/Biological Weapons: History, Deterrence, and Arms Control,” The Non-Proliferation Review, Fall-Winter 2001.
[232] Seth Brugger, “BWC Ad Hoc Group Meets; Chairman's Talks Continue,” Arms Control Today, vol. 31, no. 1, January/February 2001.
[233] Jenni Rissanen, “Middle-Mass” Grows as AHG Continues to Examine the Text,” Acronym Institute BWC Protocol Bulletin,” 7 May 2001; Jenni Rissanen, “BWC AHG Faced With a Major Challenge,” Acronym Institute BWC Protocol Bulletin, 12 February 2001; Seth Brugger, “BWC Ad-Hoc Group Meets With ‘Mixed’ Results,” Arms Control Today, vol. 31, no. 3, April 2001; Jenni Rissanen, “Chair’s ‘Composite Text’ for BWC Protocol Out,” Acronym Institute BWC Protocol Bulletin, 2 April 2001
[234] Jenni Rissanen, “United States Rejects Protocol,” Acronym Institute BWC Protocol Bulletin, 25 July 2001; Rebecca Whitehair and Seth Brugger, “BWC Talks In Geneva Collapse Following U.S. Rejection,” Acronym Institute, vol. 31, no. 7, September 2001.
[235] Jenni Rissanen, “AHG Stumbles On Its Report – More Struggles Predicted,” Acronym Institute BWC Protocol Bulletin, 20 August 2001; Jenni Rissanen, “Deep Disappointment But Restrained Reactions To US Decision,” Acronym Institute BWC Protocol Bulletin, 3 August 2001; Jenni Rissanen, “Uncertain Future as AHG Drafts Report,” Acronym Institute BWC Protocol Bulletin, 10 August 2001.
[236] Judith Miller, “A Nation Challenged: BioTerror Treaty; U.S. Seeks Changes In Germ War Pact,” New York Times, 1 November 2001.
[237] For information on NGO proposals at the BWC, see Jenni Rissanen, “NGO’s Share Their Hopes, Fears, And Proposals With Conference,” Acronym Institute BWC Review Conference Bulletin, 23November 2001.
[238] Jenni Rissanen, “Acrimonious Opening for BWC Review Conference,” Acronym Institute BWC Review Conference Bulletin, 19 November 2001; Jenni Rissanen, “Calm After The Storm: General Debate Concludes As The Hard Work Begins,” Acronym Institute BWC Review Conference Bulletin, 26 November 2001.
[239] Ibid.
[240] Jenni Rissanen, “Anger After The Ambush: Review Conference Suspended After US Asks For AHG's Termination,” Acronym Institute BWC Review Conference Bulletin, 9 December 2001; Jenni Rissanen, “Differences And Difficulties As Delegates Consider Wide Range Of Proposals,” BWC Review Conference Bulletin, 30 November 2001.